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Notes from the Editor 
 
The articles in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs explore a wide range of 
homeland security and defense strategic policies, including the detention of possible 
terrorists, our level of national preparedness, the use of the military in guarding our 
borders, and how we might better implement and measure homeland security 
strategies. 
 
Stephanie Blum looks at U.S. treatment of enemy combatants in the war on terror, 
questioning policies that allow for indefinite detention. In “Preventive Detention in the 
War on Terror: A Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and 
Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects,” Ms. Blum shows that other democracies have found 
ways to implement preventive detention policies that are not based on unilateral 
executive usurpation of power and makes recommendations for the next presidential 
administration. 
 
Recommendations are also offered by Samuel H. Clovis, Jr., in “Promises Unfulfilled: 
The Sub-obtimization of Homeland Security National Preparedness.” Homeland 
security preparedness, he argues, is sub-optimized because of flawed assumptions and 
perceptions within the federal government’s policy environment, and specific policy-
distorting institutional pathologies. Officials at the national level have lost track of the 
original goals established after 9/11; the resulting policy failures have led to missed 
opportunities, intergovernmental tensions, and disincentives for state and local 
governments to pursue enhancements to homeland security national preparedness. The 
federal government, Clovis argues, must revise the flawed operating assumptions 
driving current policies and work with state and local jurisdictions to put in place 
preparedness programs that are attainable given the level of local resources available. 
These state and local governments, in turn, need to adopt contemporary public 
management models for planning and augmenting preparedness from the bottom up. 
 
Applying planning models at the national level is the focus of Sharon Caudle’s article 
“The Balanced Scorecard: A Strategic Tool in Implementing Homeland Security 
Strategies.” Using the “balanced scorecard” advocated by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. 
Norton in the early 1990s, Caudle shows how existing strategies can be translated into 
specific and measurable strategic objectives.  The balanced scorecard, she argues, 
stresses the drivers of future organizational performance (capabilities, resources, and 
processes) and the outcome results of those drivers, providing a tool to better 
implement homeland security strategies. 
 
Bert Tussing addresses one particular strategy: utilizing the military to protect U.S. 
borders.  “New Requirements for a New Challenge: The Military’s Role in Border 
Security” looks at how the concerns and assumptions relating to border security have 
changed in the past three decades.  Securing the nation’s borders was once viewed as 
both a humanitarian and a security issue, best handled through law enforcement. But 
border security now faces the challenges of paramilitary violence, organized crime, and 
international terrorism. These new security challenges require the federal government 
to re-think how to best use the depth and breadth of its capabilities – up to and 
including the active and reserve components of the military – to meet the trials that lay 
ahead. 
 
The challenges of border security are also addressed in a new book by Edward Alden, 
The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11, 
reviewed in this issue by Randy Beardsworth and Theophilos Gemelas. Alden attempts 
to “examine comprehensively the set of issues and problems confronting border 
security” and “brilliantly frames for the reader the struggles” between advocates of 
opposing strategic approaches to border security.   
 
Also in this issue, Philip J. Palin reviews Terror and Consent: The Wars for the 21st 
Century” by Philip Bobbitt.  According to Palin, the central premise of this “big book full 
of big ideas” is that those in power have developed a tendency to patronize those they 
protect: the citizens of the U.S. “Rather than citizens to be engaged, the American 
People have been treated as consumers to be assuaged. This approach [Bobbitt argues] 
only increases our vulnerability to terrorism.” 
 
Yet our attitudes toward terrorism – and the measures the government is taking to fight 
terrorism – may be changing, as Judy Boyd argues in her review of the 2008 comedy 
film Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay. “If popular culture serves as a 
reflection of public concerns on a continuing basis,” Boyd posits, “then this film 
demonstrates that terrorism may no longer hold the tight grip it once did on American 
society.” 
 
Finally, we are pleased to publish two letters from our readers.  Based on insight gained 
from his years with DHS, Derek Rieksts offers one answer to Christopher Bellavita’s 
question “what is homeland security?”  In response to Adam Crowe’s recent essay on 
national strike teams, CWO Zacharias Fuentes suggests the strike team concept should 
be expanded to include intelligence strike teams working in tandem with local law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
As always, we welcome the comments, suggestions, and reflections of our readers. 
 
-The Editor 
Preventive Detention in the War on Terror:  
A Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel 
Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects 
 
Stephanie Cooper Blum1 
 
 
No civilized nation confronting serious danger has ever relied exclusively on 
criminal convictions for past offenses. Every country has introduced, by one means or 
another, a system of preventive or administrative detention for persons who are 
thought to be dangerous but who might not be convictable under the conventional 
criminal law. 
                     – Alan Dershowitz2 
INTRODUCTION 
One tool in the current war on terror involves the Bush Administration’s labeling of 
alleged terrorists as “enemy combatants” and detaining them indefinitely, without 
access to counsel, and without having to file any criminal charges. This enemy 
combatant policy is really an ad hoc system of preventive detention whereby U.S. 
citizens or foreign nationals are detained against their will without the filing of criminal 
charges for the purposes of incapacitation and interrogation. President Bush has 
justified his unilateral decisions to label individuals as enemy combatants on the 
exercise of his war power as Commander in Chief under Article II of the Constitution 
and the Joint Resolution passed by Congress after 9/11 to use all “necessary and 
appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”3 As law professors Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes describe: “The most controversial legal power that the 
U.S. government has not just asserted but actually deployed at this point in the war on 
terrorism is probably the power to detain preventatively both citizens and noncitizens 
who the executive considers are ‘enemy combatants.’”4  
On July 21, 2008 – almost seven years after 9/11 – Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey argued in a speech before the American Enterprise Institute that preventive 
detention of terrorist suspects is an essential component of prosecuting this war on 
terror: 
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy combatants in this 
conflict, and need not simply release them to the battlefield….We have every right 
to prevent them from returning to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to 
target innocent civilians. And this detention often yields valuable intelligence 
about the intentions, organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.  In 
short, detaining dangerous enemy combatants is lawful, and makes our Nation 
safer. … 
[T]o suggest that the government must charge detainees with crimes or release 
them is to seriously misunderstand the principal reasons why we detain enemy 
combatants in the first place: it has to do with self-protection, because these are 
dangerous people who pose threats to our citizens and to our soldiers.5 
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As America approaches a new presidential election and new Administration, one has to 
wonder whether President Bush’s version of preventive detention, e.g. the enemy 
combatant policy, will ultimately be repudiated as a mistaken experiment that 
needlessly sacrificed liberty and America’s reputation for questionable security gains or 
whether it or some alternative method of preventive detention will become part of 
America’s legal landscape for the indefinite future.  
 Israel and Britain, by comparison, have been dealing with terrorist threats for 
decades, and both countries have created various regimes of preventive detention of 
terrorist suspects to deal with the recurring reality of terrorism. While no one terrorist 
attack in either country resulted in 3,000 deaths, as did the 9/11 attack, both countries 
view terrorism as threats to national security and both countries grapple with the 
balance between security and liberty in their counterterrorism policies. Hence, in 
understanding the broader context of America’s enemy combatant policy, and analyzing 
whether preventive detention is needed in the war against terror, it is useful to look at 
other democracies that have dealt with asymmetric terrorist threats and observe how 
they have handled incapacitation and interrogation of terrorist suspects. As New York 
University law professor Stephen Schulhofer notes: “Fighting terrorism poses challenges 
that are essentially new (or newly recognized) for America. For that reason, it is worth 
considering the experience of Western democracies that confronted grave terrorist 
threats over extended periods before September 11, 2001.”6 To this end, he posits that 
Britain and Israel “offer two of the few available sources of recent experience in 
attempting to reconcile the demands of national survival and the rule of law in the 
context of an unremitting terrorist threat.”7 
As this article will illustrate, there are significant differences between the preventive 
detention regimes of Israel and Britain and America’s enemy combatant policy, namely: 
(1) the manner in which the preventive detention policies were created in the first place 
and (2) the ensuing substantive rights of the detainees. While America’s enemy 
combatant policy was created unilaterally by executive fiat based on claimed inherent 
constitutional authority, Israel’s and Britain’s preventive detention policies – which 
have changed throughout the decades – have virtually always been enacted by a 
legislative body and were not just executive usurpations of power. Moreover, both Israel 
and Britain have almost always had an explicit role for judicial review before subjecting 
the suspect to prolonged preventive incapacitation whereas President Bush has asserted 
that the executive branch can alone resolve factual disputes and determine whether an 
individual is an enemy combatant based on intelligence reports without any opportunity 
for the detainee to respond. Finally, and most significantly, the breadth and scope of 
Israel’s and the Britain’s current preventive detention policies are strikingly more 
modest than America’s. Although Britain is currently trying to increase pre-charge 
detention to forty-two days (and in July 2005 tried to increase pre-charge detention to 
ninety days), its current limit is twenty-eight days of preventive detention. While Israel 
has administratively detained some Palestinians for years, the detainees were allowed 
judicial review, generally within eight days, and are subject to renewals every six 
months. Conversely, President Bush has asserted his right to unilaterally label 
individuals as enemy combatants and detain them indefinitely and incommunicado for 
a war that may never end.  
Although all three countries are democracies dealing with terrorism and all struggle 
with balancing civil liberties with national security, America’s policy of preventive 
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detention is not just different as a matter of degree – it is grossly different as a matter of 
kind. An important question that needs to be addressed is to what extent, if any, is the 
threat America faces from terrorism graver than the threat faced by Israel, which is 
surrounded by hostile nations and has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 
1948, or the threat faced by Britain, which has a larger home-grown Islamic terrorism 
threat than America. If the threat that America faces is similar or not as severe, then the 
rationale for its more draconian preventive detention policies loses even more of its 
persuasiveness.  
As this article will demonstrate, historically both Britain’s and Israel’s preventive 
detention policies started with less judicial review and more executive discretion. Over 
the years as each country became more accustomed to its “emergency” situation, it 
provided more due process rights and judicial review to detainees even though the 
threat posed by terrorism did not diminish. Perhaps this is the United States’ fate, and it 
too will eventually provide more due process rights to its enemy combatants by 
involving Congress and the judiciary in creating and monitoring a preventive detention 
regime. The purpose of this article is to persuade the reader the United States needs to 
move in that direction.  
AMERICA’S ENEMY COMBATANT POLICY 
After September 11, 2001, the Administration decided to detain certain individuals 
suspected of being members or agents of al Qaeda or the Taliban as enemy combatants 
and hold them indefinitely and incommunicado for the duration of the war on terror. 
The rationale behind this system of preventive detention is to incapacitate suspected 
terrorists, facilitate interrogation, and hold them when traditional criminal charges are 
not feasible for a variety of reasons. By employing an armed-conflict model that treats 
terrorists as “combatants,” the Bush Administration argues it can preventively detain 
terrorists until the end of hostilities, despite there being no foreseeable ending scenario 
to an amorphous war on terror. Furthermore, terrorists are automatically “unlawful” or 
“enemy” combatants and hence not entitled to protections as true prisoners of war; yet, 
under the Bush Administration’s approach, they also are not entitled to the legal 
protections afforded criminals. As law professor David Luban notes: “By selectively 
combining elements of the war model and elements of the law model, Washington is 
able to maximize its own ability to mobilize lethal force against terrorists while 
eliminating most traditional rights of a military adversary, as well as the rights of 
innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire.”  
Designating individuals as enemy combatants and holding them indefinitely for a war 
on terror that may never end raises serious legal and policy concerns. After 9/11, the 
Administration determined that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict 
with the Taliban and al Qaeda.8 Hence, all Taliban and al Qaeda operatives were 
automatically unlawful “prisoners of war” and could be subjected to interrogation.9 In 
August 2002, Jay Bybee, then-assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
sent President Bush a memorandum stating: “As commander-in-chief, the President has 
constitutional authority to order interrogations of enemy combatants to gain 
intelligence information concerning the military plans of the enemy.”10 According to 
John Yoo, former deputy assistant attorney general under the Bush Administration, 
“Information is the primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind of enemy, and 
intelligence gathered from captured operatives is perhaps the most effective means of 
BLUM, PREVENTION DETENTION  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
4 
preventing future terrorist attacks upon U.S. territory.”11 As law professor Howard Ball 
observes, “the Administration has offered one fundamental rationale for such treatment 
[designations of enemy combatants]: the acquisition of actionable intelligence.”12    
In addition to the need for information, the Administration argues that its enemy 
combatant policy is necessary to incapacitate terrorists so they do not return to the 
battlefield. During the oral argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, then-Deputy Solicitor 
General Clement argued that incapacitation of Hamdi – a U.S. citizen turned over to 
U.S. forces by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan – was a legitimate rationale for 
designating him an enemy combatant. Clement posited that the Administration needed 
to detain Hamdi so he would not rejoin the battlefield while the United States had 
10,000 American troops in Afghanistan.13 Yet, if the battlefield includes the whole world 
and the war is indefinite, the implication of incapacitation as a rationale for prevention 
detention is staggering. Essentially, under the enemy combatant policy, the executive 
branch can unilaterally designate any person in the world as an enemy combatant and 
hold that individual incommunicado, indefinitely, and with no criminal charges for the 
purposes of coercive interrogation and incapacitation.   
The Administration has applied its enemy combatant policy to U.S. citizens and legal 
residents (hereafter called U.S. persons) as well as foreign nationals captured overseas. 
With respect to U.S. persons, Jose Padilla (U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago), Yaser 
Hamdi (U.S. citizen arrested in Afghanistan), and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (legal 
resident arrested in Peoria, Illinois) have all been designated at one point as enemy 
combatants and subjected to this Administration’s preventive detention regime.14 The 
cases of Hamdi and Padilla have been resolved. After a plurality of the Supreme Court 
ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that Hamdi must be allowed to challenge his designation as 
an enemy combatant in a neutral forum,15 the Administration released him to Saudi 
Arabia in 2004 without any kind of adversarial hearing, thereby undermining – to some 
extent – its rationale of needing to detain this dangerous individual so he did not return 
to the battlefield.16 The Administration transferred Padilla to the criminal justice system 
in 2005, presumably to avoid a show-down at the Supreme Court over its enemy 
combatant policy.17 Padilla was subsequently convicted of terrorism-related charges and 
sentenced to seventeen years in prison in 2007. 
As of this writing, it appears that al-Marri is the only U.S. person currently being 
detained as an enemy combatant. On July 15, 2008, in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, the full 
Fourth Circuit ruled in a split decision 5-4 that the Administration does have the 
authority to designate U.S. persons captured in peaceful civilian areas as enemy 
combatants but that the government needs to submit more than a declaration based on 
hearsay to support such a designation, or explain why a declaration is the “most reliable 
available evidence” to support indefinite detention of al-Marri as an enemy combatant.18 
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further evidentiary proceedings 
to allow al-Marri to better challenge the underlying evidence. On September 19, 2008, 
al-Marri requested an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court arguing that the Joint 
Resolution did not authorize his indefinite military detention without criminal charge or 
trial based on the government’s assertions that he conspired with al Qaeda. It is 
presently unclear whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in the matter or allow 
the evidentiary hearing to proceed.  In sum, as of this writing, the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on the pivotal constitutional question of whether U.S. citizens, such as Padilla, 
or legal residents, such as al-Marri – who are captured in peaceful civilian areas away 
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from a battlefield – can be detained indefinitely as enemy combatants with no criminal 
charges.  
 As of June 2008, there are approximately 270 foreign nationals being detained at 
Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatants.19 On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in 
Boumediene v. Bush that the detainees must be allowed to challenge their detention in 
federal court through the writ of habeas corpus.20 The Supreme Court explicitly stated, 
however: “We do not address whether the President has authority to detain these 
petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and other questions regarding 
the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District 
Court.”21 In other words, even after seven years of the enemy combatant policy, the 
standard of review and substantive standards justifying detention as an enemy 
combatant remain unclear. Significantly, the legality of the Bush Administration’s 
enemy combatant policy as applied to both U.S. persons and foreign nationals remains 
unsettled as of this writing. 
Assuming there is a genuine need for preventive detention as a tool in the war on 
terror, and assuming a regime can be created that is lawful, there remains the 
underlying question of sound policy: to what extent can the United States create a 
system of preventive detention that is perceived as fair, applied consistently, and 
narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives. A significant negative repercussion to the 
enemy combatant policy is that other democratic countries may be hesitant to cooperate 
with the United States in pursuing terrorist suspects due to displeasure at the United 
States’ preventive detention policies. Not surprisingly, the enemy combatant policy has 
sparked criticism from individuals across the political spectrum.22 
Given that the war on terror is unlikely to end soon and given the inevitable change in 
administration that will occur in 2008, it is an opportune time to think through the 
complex legal and policy issues now and be ready to propose a better solution to the new 
Administration. Analyzing how Israel and Britain have dealt with incapacitation and 
interrogation of terrorist suspects can help with this endeavor. Professor Thomas 
Powers notes: “The policies of Britain and Israel each moved in the same direction: 
toward greater legal clarity and toward more extensive due process protections. The 
United States should take advantage of those countries’ experiences to find ways to 
build due process into preventive detention.”23 
ISRAEL’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Israel, preventive detention is called “administrative detention” and is distinct from 
criminal detention. Administrative detention is defined as detention without charges or 
trial and is authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.24 It can be 
used solely for prevention.25 According to Haifa University law professor Emanual 
Gross, administrative detention is based on the danger to state or public security posed 
by a particular person whose release would likely threaten the security of the state and 
the ordinary course of life.26 The goals of administrative detention are not arrest, trial, 
conviction, and punishment but rather prevention. Although difficulty in convicting a 
person in ordinary criminal proceedings is not a reason for employing administrative 
detention, if evidence is classified and cannot be disclosed, administrative detention 
becomes an option.27  
Significantly, Israel has separate administrative detention policies for Israel proper 
versus the Palestinian Territories, much like America’s enemy combatant policy as 
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applied to U.S. persons, Hamdi, al-Marri, and Padilla, who were/are detained in 
America versus aliens captured overseas and held at Guantanamo Bay or Bagram 
airbase in Afghanistan. While Israel’s detention laws provide for judicial review and 
considerably more due process for its detainees than America’s enemy combatant 
policy, Israel’s administrative detention policies nonetheless invoke criticism from civil 
rights groups within Israel. 
I.  Israel Proper 
In 1948, when Israel achieved its independence, Israel adopted the British Mandate’s 
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which empowered the High Commissioner 
and Military Commander to detain any person it deemed necessary for maintaining 
public order or securing public safety or state security. In 1979, Israel reformed its 
detention laws and enacted a new statute: the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 
1979 (EPDL of 1979), which provided more rights to detainees than the prior 
regulations, such as requiring that a detainee be brought before the president of the 
district court within forty-eight hours after arrest for judicial review of the detention, 
allowing appeals to the Supreme Court, and mandating periodic reviews by the 
president of the district court every three months.28 While the EPDL of 1979 only 
applies once a state of emergency has been proclaimed by the Israeli Knesset (Israel’s 
legislature), Israel has been in such a state of emergency since its inception in 1948.  
Under the EPDL of 1979, Israeli citizens and non-citizens within Israel can be 
detained if the defense minister has “reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state 
security or public security” requires it, although “state security” and “public security” 
have never been expressly defined.29 The district court in reviewing the detention order 
must vacate the order if it does not find “objective reasons of state security or public 
security” that require the detention or if the detention “was made in bad faith or from 
irrelevant considerations.”30 A detainee may appeal the district court’s decision directly 
to the Israeli Supreme Court, which requires that the danger to the State must be “so 
grave as to leave no choice but to hold the suspect in administrative detention” or that 
the detainee “would almost certainly pose a danger to public or State security.”31 Unlike 
America where an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely, the detention order in 
Israel is limited to six months, although it can be indefinitely renewed.32 Hence, this six-
month distinction may be more form than substance. Matti Friedman of the Jerusalem 
Post notes that “in theory, someone could be held ad infinitum” under Israel’s 
administrative detention policies and in practice some Palestinians have been held for 
years in administrative detention.33  
During the detention proceedings, the judge sees all the evidence, even if it is 
classified, and the judge decides what evidence may be disclosed to the detainee and 
his/her counsel.34  Therefore, some detainees are held without knowledge of the specific 
allegations against them and without a meaningful opportunity to rebut the charges.35 
Such a practice has caused B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, to decry that “Israel 
has therefore made a charade out of the entire system of procedural safeguards in both 
domestic and international law regarding the right to liberty and due process.”36 It 
further argues that Israel has used administrative detention to detain Palestinians for 
their political opinions and non-violent political activity.37 
Similar to some of the rationales for America’s enemy combatant policy,38 one 
rationale for Israel’s administrative detention is to protect sources and methods and 
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allow otherwise inadmissible evidence such as hearsay into evidence.39 Prolonged 
incapacitation for purposes of interrogation, however, does not seem to be a primary 
rationale in Israel, which stands in stark contrast to America’s principal rationale for its 
enemy combatant policy.40 Unlike America (at least so far), Israel has also detained 
terrorists under administrative detention who have completed their criminal sentences 
if there is a fear they might engage in subsequent terrorist activities against Israel.41 
Such a rationale B’Tselem argues means that Israel has totally blurred the “distinction 
between preventive and punitive detention.”42  
II. Palestinian Territories 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, administrative detentions are generally enforced 
pursuant to various military orders. The military orders allow a senior military 
commander to detain an individual for up to six months, although it can be indefinitely 
renewed as in Israel proper, if the commander has “reasonable grounds to presume that 
the security of the area or public security require the detention.”43 As in Israel proper, 
the terms “security of the area” and “public security” are not defined and their respective 
interpretations have been left to the military commanders.44 The detainees are allowed 
to appeal the military orders to the Israeli Supreme Court, which sits in these cases as a 
High Court of Justice. As the High Court of Justice, the Court may hear “matters in 
which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice.”45  
Unlike America’s detainees at Guantanamo Bay who receive no access to a lawyer for 
their initial status determination or review hearings46 (although this may change based 
on the Supreme Court’s recent June 2008 decision in Boumediene), a detainee in the 
Palestinian Territories is entitled to a lawyer, and an appearance before a judge is 
generally required within eight days of arrest (by comparison to forty-eight hours in 
Israel proper).47 Throughout the decades, however, different military orders have 
changed the number of days a detainee can be held without seeing an attorney and the 
number of days before judicial review. For instance, in 1970, Military Order 378 allowed 
military authorities to impede access to counsel for thirty days for individuals suspected 
of violating security laws.48 Specifically, Order 378 allowed the head of the investigation 
to bar access to a lawyer for fifteen days, and a reviewing administrator could extend the 
bar for an additional fifteen days if convinced that the measure was “necessary for the 
security of the area or for the benefit of the investigation.”49 In 2002, a military order 
gave the commanding officer the authority to prevent a detainee from meeting with a 
lawyer for up to thirty-four days if the officer believed that such a meeting with the 
lawyer would impede the effectiveness of the interrogation.50 The Israeli Supreme Court 
upheld this provision finding that, on balance, the risk of damage to the investigation or 
national security outweighed the immediate right to an attorney.51 The detention, 
however, was not incommunicado; after forty-eight hours, the detainees had the right to 
be visited by the International Red Cross (IRC) and their families were informed of their 
whereabouts.52  By contrast, in America, the Bush Administration barred al-Marri from 
seeing his attorneys or the IRC until after he had been in incommunicado detention for 
sixteen months.53 
Israel uses administrative detention more aggressively against Palestinians than 
against Israeli citizens. According to Amnesty International, between 2000 and 2005, 
thousands of Palestinians were held in administrative detention, some of them for more 
than three years, while during that same time period only four Israelis were placed in 
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administrative detention for periods ranging from six weeks to six months.54 Israel’s use 
of administrative detention has also increased since the second intifada. Before the start 
of the first intifada in 1987, Israel had about 200 administrative detainees.55 According 
to B’Tselem, by 2007, Israel held a monthly average of 830 Palestinians in 
administration detention, which was one hundred higher than in 2006.56 As of February 
2008, Israel is holding 780 Palestinians in administration detention57 (at its height, 
Guantanamo Bay held about 750 prisoners).58 By comparison, over the years, only nine 
Israeli citizens residing in settlements in the West Bank have been administratively 
detained for periods up to six months.59 Similarly, in America, most of its enemy 
combatants are held overseas and there appear to have been only three enemy 
combatants who were U.S. persons. 
Although Israel’s administrative detention regimes in both the territories and Israel 
proper provide more due process and substantive rights to its detainees than America’s 
enemy combatant policy, many civil libertarians in Israel deride administrative 
detention as inhumane and undemocratic. Hebrew University law professor David 
Kretzmer argues that the main problem with administrative detention is the “temptation 
to use it even when it’s not necessary.”60 He argues that it is overused in the territories 
instead of employing the criminal justice system and that Israel fails to recognize the 
“distinction between legitimate political activity and unlawful conduct that endangers 
security.”61 
III. Role of Israel’s Judiciary  
Unlike America where the Supreme Court has been largely (but not entirely) deferential 
to the executive branch on matters of preventive detention, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has been extremely activist and attentive to due process and human rights issues raised 
by administrative detention. In fact, the Knesset has often criticized the activist nature 
of the Israeli Supreme Court, arguing that it oversteps its bounds and second guesses 
the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives.  
Israel has been in a state of war since its founding in 1948 – with frequent uprisings 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have 
directly targeted Israeli civilians, largely with suicidal attacks in Israeli cities. Terrorism 
against Israel increased dramatically after the second intifida, beginning in September 
2000 and continuing to this day. According to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 960 
Israeli citizens have been killed by terrorists between 2000 and 2006 and 6,596 have 
been wounded. 62 In 2002 alone, there were 60 separate suicide attacks against Israeli 
targets63 – more than during the previous eight years combined.64 Yet, as Professor 
Schulhofer notes, although the Palestinian intifada has grown in intensity since 1999, 
“Israeli courts have become increasingly interventionist” and not increasingly 
deferential to military authorities.65  Harvard Professor Philip Heymann expresses a 
similar sentiment: “The contrast with Israel is revealing. Even in the midst of the 
intifada, the Israeli Supreme Court has asserted some level of judicial review over 
government actions that affect Palestinians, both within Israel and also within the West 
Bank and Gaza.”66 
For instance, in 2002, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) undertook a military 
operation known as Defensive Shield (or Defensive Wall) in response to an extremely 
bloody month of terrorist attacks in Israel which culminated in a suicide bomber killing 
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dozens of Israelis during a Passover dinner at a hotel. As a result, IDF arrested 
thousands of Palestinians and, pursuant to a new military order,67 detained them for 
eighteen days (and then twelve days) without judicial review based on an IDF officer’s 
determination that the “circumstances of [the person’s] detention raise the suspicion 
that he endangers or may be a danger to the security of the area, the IDF, or the 
public.”68  In Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, the Israeli Supreme Court 
invalidated the military order that allowed investigative detention of Palestinians in the 
West Bank for twelve days without a judicial hearing for purposes of interrogation.69 
Rejecting the government’s claim that effective interrogation and security merited the 
delay, the Court held that prompt judicial review of detention is an inherent part of the 
legality of the detention measure because the detainee is still presumed innocent.70 The 
Court found that detaining Palestinians twelve days without judicial review was “in 
conflict with the fundamentals of both international and Israeli law,” which view 
“judicial review of detention proceedings essential for the protection of individual 
liberty.”71  Significantly – and in stark contrast to America – the Israeli Supreme Court 
ruled that even “an ‘unlawful combatant’ . . . is to be brought promptly before a judge.”72  
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, deferred its ruling for six months to allow the IDF 
to create a new regime of detention and arrest.73 Israel went back to allowing eight days 
before judicial review. 
Interestingly, while the Israeli Supreme Court in Marab did not allow twelve days 
before judicial review, it did allow the IDF to postpone access to counsel for up to thirty-
four days, meaning that some detainees would attend their judicial review hearing 
without the benefit of counsel. The Court based this determination on “significant 
security considerations.”74  Importantly, the Court explicitly noted that “advancing the 
investigation [e.g., facilitating interrogation] is not a sufficient reason to prevent the 
meeting . . . . there must be an element of necessity.”75 This, of course, stands in stark 
contrast to America where the main rationale for years of incommunicado detention is 
to facilitate interrogation without interference posed by attorneys. 
While the Israeli Supreme Court does not hesitate to involve itself in the minutia of 
administrative detention (e.g., discussing the exact number of days before judicial 
review and access to counsel), the U.S. Supreme Court by contrast has largely avoided 
the substantive details concerning preventive detention and focused more on narrow 
jurisdictional issues. For instance, in Rasul v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the foreign nationals (similar to Israel’s detainees in the Palestinian Territories) held at 
Guantanamo Bay had a right to challenge their detentions in federal court with a writ of 
habeas corpus.76  Yet the Court failed to provide any details on what proceedings, if any, 
would be appropriate. Therefore, there was no discussion of the time limits for 
incommunicado detention or judicial review and no discussion of what standards 
merited preventive detention in the first place. After Rasul, at the Bush Administration’s 
urging, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005,77 which stripped 
the foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay of their limited victory in Rasul and held that 
the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals challenging their 
detention.  
In June 2006, however, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
DTA restrictively, holding that it only applied prospectively from the date of enactment 
and did not remove jurisdiction from the federal courts in habeas proceedings pending 
on that date.78 Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 
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2006 which stated that the DTA applied to all pending cases – not just those that 
occurred prospectively.79 On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held 5-4 in Boumediene 
v. Bush that the foreign nationals at Guantanamo have a right to challenge their 
detentions in U.S. civilian courts and that the MCA is unconstitutional to the extent that 
it precludes the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by 
them.80 Yet, Boumediene does not concern the substantive rights detainees have on the 
merits and what claims will be cognizable before federal courts. In fact, ironically, after 
six years of litigation, the aliens at Guantanamo have the same rights – or lack thereof – 
that Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri have: they all can bring habeas petitions before 
federal courts. As commentator George Will notes of Boumediene, “None [of the 
detainees] will be released by the court’s decision, which does not even guarantee a right 
to a hearing. Rather, it guarantees only a right to request a hearing.”81 In other words, 
while the Israeli Supreme Court has intervened and addressed substantive details of 
preventive detention (e.g., arguing that twelve days is too long before judicial review), 
the U.S. Supreme Court – six years later – is still standing on the sidelines.  
The same pattern has occurred with the enemy combatant cases involving U.S. 
persons detained in America. In Hamdi, the plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court merely 
held that after two years of incommunicado detention as an enemy combatant, Hamdi 
must be allowed a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation of an enemy 
combatant in a neutral forum – something Israel’s 1979 law had already provided after a 
mere forty-eight hours for detainees arrested within Israel. Disappointingly, as in 
Rasul, Hamdi did not specify how long an enemy combatant could be held 
incommunicado or how long he could be held before being brought for judicial review. 
As Professor Schulhofer laments, the Supreme Court “expressed no impatience and 
showed no evident discomfort with the two-year-plus periods that detentions had been 
allowed to remain unreviewed.”82    
Similarly, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s appeal on 
jurisdictional grounds – finding 5-4 that Padilla filed his habeas petition in the wrong 
jurisdiction – and did not reach any of the substantive issues concerning his indefinite 
and incommunicado detention. As Professor Schulhofer observes: “After more than two 
years of detention, virtually all of it incommunicado, and after persistent, unsuccessful 
efforts to secure the rights to counsel and to a hearing on the allegations against him, 
Padilla obtained no relief whatsoever. He was told to start again in another court.”83 
When Padilla’s case was about to reach the Supreme Court for a second time, the 
Administration switched course and transferred him to the criminal justice system 
where he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to seventeen years for terrorism-
related charges. In sum, the Supreme Court in Israel is exceedingly more proactive in 
scrutinizing the details of administrative detention to guarantee basic human rights 
while the U.S. Supreme Court is much more reticent and deferential to the executive 
branch. 
Some of these differences between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts can be 
attributed to their divergent views on standing and justiciability. While in America the 
Supreme Court tends to be deferential to the executive branch during times of war, in 
Israel, which has been in a perpetual state of war, the Israeli Supreme Court believes 
that it can review virtually all activities conducted by the executive branch whether in 
Israel proper or the Palestinian Territories. In fact, there is almost no standing 
requirement for the Israeli Supreme Court – almost any person directly affected by state 
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action can petition the Court that the action was unlawful, although the Court will not 
substitute its own discretion for the executive’s decisions on operational issues or 
counter-terrorism measures.84 In fact, even organizations interested in the fate of a 
detainee can appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court.85 As Israeli Supreme Court Registrar 
Yigal Mersel notes: “The approach of the [Israeli] Court is to balance human rights and 
national security on a case-by-case basis; this approach manifests itself in an almost 
total willingness to hear any case challenging any counter-terrorism activity, without 
reservations of standing or justiciability.”86 According to Chief Justice Barak, 
“everything is justiciable.”87 In other words, if a petitioner argues that the military is 
acting unlawfully, the petition will not normally be rejected on the grounds that the 
petitioner is not an Israeli citizen or inhabitant.88  
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has strict standing and jurisdictional 
requirements as demonstrated by the years of litigation just concerning whether the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay could bring habeas petitions challenging their detentions 
in federal court. A fundamental difference between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts 
is that the U.S. Supreme Court is restricted to ruling on specific cases that have been 
previously adjudicated and hence cannot opine on broader policy issues as can the 
Israeli Supreme Court. Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s greater standing and 
jurisdictional restrictions, it could be argued that Congress needs to take the initiative to 
protect the procedural and substantive rights of detainees more than does the Supreme 
Court. Stated differently, while the Israeli Supreme Court is activist (much to the 
chagrin of the Knesset) and often protects substantive human rights, the U.S.’s differing 
system of government leads to the conclusion that Congress needs to play this role.  
IV. Israel’s 2002 Unlawful Combatants Act 
In 2000, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the EPDL of 1979 did not allow Israel to 
detain individuals who are not themselves terrorist threats for “bargaining chips.”89 The 
Court held that the particular terrorist had to pose a risk and could not be held simply as 
a negotiating tool despite the fact that his detention might be crucial to state security 
and the release of Israeli soldiers. Rather, the Court found that an individual’s detention 
had to ensue from the dangers posed by his release.90  
As a result of this decision, the Knesset enacted the 2002 Incarceration of Unlawful 
Combatants Law, which allows Israel to detain “members of a force perpetrating hostile 
acts against Israel” even without a showing of immediate threat or individual 
involvement in terrorist acts.91  Although this law provides for access of counsel within 
seven days of detention, judicial review within fourteen days of detention, and a right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days,92 this law would theoretically allow 
Israel to detain terrorist members based on mere association. The detainee can be held 
until the Minister of Defense determines that the group with which the detainee is 
associated has ceased hostilities against Israel or until a court determines that the 
detainee’s release would not threaten state security.93 Significantly, if the Minister of 
Defense determines in writing that a force engages in hostile acts, this finding is 
presumed correct unless the detainee can prove otherwise.94 After the initial detention 
hearing, the detention must be reviewed by the district court every six months (in 
contrast to every three months under the 1979 law).95 It appears that Israel has used this 
law only a few times, against high-profile terrorists from abroad. Most recently, Israel 
used it to detain Hezbollah fighters during the summer of 2006.96 
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By comparison, in 2005, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the Detention of 
Enemy Combatants Act (DECA) (HR 1076) to the House of Representatives but it never 
became law.97  The purpose of DECA was to “authorize the President to detain an enemy 
combatant who is a United States person or resident who is a member of al Qaeda or 
knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda, to guarantee timely access to judicial 
review to challenge the basis for a detention, to permit the detainee access to counsel, 
and for other purposes.”98  Significantly, DECA explicitly stated that “Congress has a 
responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention of United States citizens 
and lawful residents to assure that such detentions are consistent with due process.”99 
Furthermore, in order to detain an “enemy combatant” under DECA, the President 
would need to certify that (A) “the United States Armed Forces are engaged in a state of 
armed conflict with al Qaeda and an investigation with a view toward prosecution, a 
prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding in the case of such person or resident is ongoing; 
or (B) detention is warranted in order to prevent such person or resident from aiding 
persons attempting to commit terrorist acts against the United States.”100 Importantly, 
like Israel, the certifications would be effective for 180 days but able to be renewed with 
successive certifications.101 Judicial review would occur at the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia where detainees could challenge – with the assistance 
of counsel – the basis of the detention.102 Yet, DECA did not proscribe any particular 
time frame that a detainee could be held incommunicado or otherwise brought for 
judicial review, instead relying on vague generalities about future rules that shall 
“guarantee timely access to judicial review to challenge the basis for a detention, and 
permit the detainee access to counsel.”103 Significantly, had DECA been enacted, it 
would have been similar to Israel’s law that passed in 2002, although Israel’s Act did 
specifically provide strict time frames for judicial review and access to counsel.  
Yet, because DECA was not passed into law – and no alternative legislation has been 
enacted – the executive branch still argues it retains the right to unilaterally label a U.S. 
person caught in a civilian area as an enemy combatant and hold that person 
indefinitely, although pursuant to Hamdi that individual must be allowed to challenge 
that designation in a neutral forum. On the other hand, Israel’s 2002 Incarceration of 
Unlawful Combatants Law effectively allows Israel to “take hostages” to secure the 
release of Israeli prisoners. Thus, an argument could be made that such a rationale is 
more draconian than the U.S. enemy combatant policy where at least the enemy 
combatants are themselves (alleged) unsavory characters. Neither policy is refreshing. 
V.  Summary of Analysis: Israel versus United States 
While Israel’s administrative detention used primarily against Palestinians has several 
problems (namely, that secret evidence can be used to detain individuals for indefinite 
renewals of six months), it nonetheless provides more transparency and due process 
than America’s form of preventive detention employed in its enemy combatant policy. 
Although Israel has not suffered a catastrophic terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11, 
between 2000 and 2006 Israel suffered 152 attacks in a country with a population of 
close to seven million.104 Unlike America, however, it has always allowed judicial review 
of its administrative detention of individuals and allowed access to counsel. Although 
the number of days has changed throughout the decades, the maximum number of days 
a detainee can be held without access to counsel in Israel is thirty-four days and the 
maximum number of days before judicial review is eight days compared to America’s 
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indefinite and largely incommunicado detention. While pursuant to Hamdi, America’s 
enemy combatants must now be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
designation presumably with counsel, the details of that review and how long the person 
initially can be held without judicial review and access to counsel are still unresolved. As 
Heymann observes, “though our danger is far less than the danger that Israel faces, our 
willingness to abandon the most fundamental judicial protections of personal security 
has been far greater.”105 
Significantly, the rationales for preventive detention are also different between the 
two countries. While both countries attest they need preventive detention when 
evidence is classified or inadmissible – or when they do not want to compromise 
methods and sources – America further asserts that it needs preventive detention to 
gain actionable intelligence from the detainees, and that access to counsel will thwart 
that purpose. By contrast, Israel’s Supreme Court refused to allow incommunicado 
detention for a mere thirty-four days based on such a rationale. Israel, however, uses 
administrative detention to continue to detain individuals that are dangerous to Israel’s 
security after the completion of their criminal sentences. America has not yet articulated 
this rationale but it may be too soon to tell since all of America’s convicted terrorists are 
still serving their sentences such as Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, and John Walker Lindh. 
Finally, Israel has never claimed that its executive branch or military could 
unilaterally create a system of administrative detention without input from the 
legislative or judicial branches. In fact, even at the height of suicidal terrorist attacks in 
2002, the IDF only authorized detention of eighteen days (then dropped it to twelve 
days) without judicial review (which was struck down by the Israeli Supreme Court). It 
is telling that Israel’s military only tried to obtain preventive detention for weeks 
compared to President Bush’s claim of indefinite detention without judicial review.  
Although Israel’s administrative detention policies highlight some substantial flaws 
in America’s system of preventive detention, it is also useful to look at how Britain has 
dealt with its various terrorism threats throughout the decades. As will be shown, while 
Israel and America view the conflict with terrorism more as a “war” using terms such as 
“unlawful” or “enemy” combatants, Britain treats terrorists more as criminals, and its 
preventive detention regime reflects a need for additional time to investigate potential 
terrorist acts as crimes. 
BRITAIN’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Britain, preventive detention is presently called “pre-charge detention” and is used to 
increase the time for investigation of a potential crime before charging the suspect. 
Unlike the Israeli model, pre-charge detention in Britain cannot be used to detain an 
individual after completion of a criminal sentence because he/she is a threat to security, 
and unlike the practice in the United States, pre-charge detention does not appear to be 
used solely for interrogation to gain useful intelligence, although this can be part of the 
rationale. Britain’s form of preventive detention is really in support of its criminal 
justice system. There is no argument that terrorists are unlawful or enemy combatants 
and no discussion of how to create a regime outside of criminal law. As a British 
government committee noted in April 2002: “Terrorists are criminals, and therefore 
ordinary criminal justice and security provisions should, so far as possible, continue to 
be the preferred way of countering terrorism.”106  
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I.  Britain’s Emergency Executive Powers 
While Britain’s current preventive detention regime is framed as pre-charge detention 
under its criminal justice system, this was not always the case. During both World Wars, 
Britain used virtually unchecked executive power to detain individuals suspected of 
being spies or otherwise hostile to the nation. Regulation 14B, enacted in 1915, allowed 
the home secretary (responsible for internal affairs in Britain and Wales) to order the 
internment of any person “for securing the public safety or the defense of the realm.”107 
Detainees could not use habeas corpus to challenge the detentions in court; rather, a 
government committee could recommend, but not order, release. The House of Lords 
ruled that it was “necessary in a time of great public danger to entrust great powers to 
[the executive]” and assumed that “such powers will be reasonably exercised.”108 Similar 
powers were enacted during World War II with Regulation 18B, under which 2,000 
individuals were detained without trial.109 Many were British citizens, including leaders 
of right-wing fascist originations. Although Winston Churchill initially supported 
Regulation 18B during World War II, he ultimately condemned it, and it was abolished 
after the war. He stated: “The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without 
formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgment of 
his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the foundation of all totalitarian 
government whether Nazi or Communist.”110  
Emergency executive power to detain generally ended after World War II. Britain 
then promulgated a series of emergency regulations that were constantly renewed to 
deal with the threat posed by Irish Republicans and later al Qaeda.111 Instead of 
unfettered executive detention, the focus changed to pre-charge detention periods (the 
current maximum is twenty-eight days) with judicial review at varying intervals. While 
America also detained individuals during World War II (e.g., Japanese internment 
camps), Britain’s Regulations 14B and 18B during the World Wars seem similar to 
President’s Bush current claim of executive war powers to unilaterally detain terrorist 
suspects as enemy combatants. In other words, although Britain faced a serious terrorist 
threat with its conflict in Northern Ireland (between 1966 and 1999 a total of 3,636 
individuals lost their lives in violence related to the Northern Ireland conflict),112 it did 
not resort to executive detentions as it had during the World Wars but instead issued a 
series of regulations that, while controversial, at least allowed for judicial review of pre-
charge detention. Similar to Israel, as the terrorist threat increased, it could be argued 
that the Britain responded overall with more due process for terrorist suspects.  
II. Britain’s Emergency Regulations Pre 9/11 
While a detailed recounting of Britain’s conflict with Northern Ireland and its ensuing 
legal instruments to fight terrorism before 9/11 is beyond the scope of this article, with 
respect to pre-charge detention, there are some useful regulations to discuss. The 1939 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act (PVA) empowered the home 
secretary to arrest and detain individuals without warrant for an initial period of forty-
eight hours and, with the authorization from the secretary of state, for an additional 
period of five days, making the total number seven days for pre-charge detention.113 The 
PVA was supposed to be temporary and only last two years; however, it was not until 
1952 that it was allowed to expire and not until 1973 that it was formally repealed.114 Yet, 
in 1974, after IRA bombings of two pubs in Birmingham left twenty-one people dead 
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and 160 injured, the PVA was reintroduced again in 1974 as the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA).115 Section 12 (1b) of the PTA allowed the 
British police to arrest and detain anyone they reasonably suspected “to be or have been 
involved in acts of terrorism” for seven days without charge with the approval of the 
secretary of state. For the first forty-eight hours, the suspects could be held without 
access to attorneys.116  Under general criminal law, by comparison, pre-charge detention 
could not and presently cannot exceed ninety-six hours (four days) and the suspect is 
entitled to see an attorney within the first thirty-six hours.117 It is interesting to note 
that, when faced with a serious terrorist threat, Britain increased incommunicado 
detention a mere twelve hours (from thirty-six hours to forty-eight hours) while 
incommunicado detention has been more than two years for America’s enemy 
combatants with no prescribed statutory limit at all. 
The PTA was rewritten in 1976, 1984, and again in 1989, but continued to stay as 
emergency “temporary” powers that had to be renewed each year until the 2000 
Terrorism Act, discussed below. The seven days of pre-change detention stayed the 
same throughout the PTA’s existence. From 1974 until 1996, 27,000 people were 
arrested under the PTA alone. Although fewer than 15 percent were subsequently 
charged with a crime, according to terrorism expert and Professor Linda Donahue, the 
information gained during questioning most likely decreased the level of violence.118  
In 1972, as the conflict and violence in Northern Ireland escalated, the British 
government appointed Lord Diplock to head an inquiry into needed emergency powers 
to deal with the growing terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. The resulting 1973 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) empowered the government to 
intern terrorist suspects for seventy-two hours without charges based on mere 
subjective suspicion (reasonableness was not even required). In 1987, these special 
arrest powers for Northern Ireland were suspended and instead the PTA provision 
requiring “reasonable grounds” before detainment was employed.119 While the EPA (like 
the PTA) was supposed to be temporary, it lasted twenty-six years until the 2000 
Terrorism Act (discussed below).120 Although Britain had a tendency to enact restrictive 
legislation under the guise of being “emergency” legislation, the laws were continued 
because they proved effective.121 Donahue points out, however, that the effectiveness of 
security had a corresponding negative effect on civil liberties, including increased 
friction within Northern Ireland and unwelcome international attention on British 
domestic affairs.122  
After the peace process with Northern Ireland in 1999, Britain began to focus more 
on international terrorism, including al Qaeda.123 In 2000, Britain passed permanent 
counterterrorism legislation (no more discussions of “temporary” measures) with the 
2000 Terrorism Act (TA). While originally the TA only allowed seven days for pre-
charge detention, it was amended in 2003 to increase the total possible period of 
detention without charge to fourteen days for any individual reasonably suspected of 
being a terrorist.124  Between the date of the amendment and September 4, 2005, 357 
people were arrested of whom thirty-six were held in excess of seven days. 125  In other 
words, although the police had the ability to hold suspects for fourteen days in pre-
charge detention, they exercised that power infrequently.  
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III. Britain’s Regulations Post 9/11 
Like Israel and America, Britain proposed different preventive detention or pre-charge 
detention policies for its citizens compared to aliens residing within its borders. While 
Britain has never held an individual outside its borders as the United States has at 
Guantanamo Bay or Israel has in the Palestinian Territories, Britain’s preventive 
detention policy towards its foreign nationals after 9/11 was more draconian than the 
procedures applied to its own citizens, causing much uproar and the policy’s eventual 
demise. 
A. Foreign Nationals in Britain 
After 9/11, Britain adopted additional legal measures with the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime, and Security Act (ATCSA) which provided stronger powers to allow the police to 
investigate and prevent terrorist activity and other serious crime. Sixty-seven British 
citizens died in the 9/11 attacks, and eleven of the nineteen suspected 9/11 hijackers had 
British links.126  The attack highlighted that terrorist organizations were using Britain to 
plan attacks.127  
While the ATCSA did not increase pre-charge detention for British citizens from the 
2000 TA’s seven days – that happened later in 2003 and again after the July 2005 
bombings – it did allow for the removal or indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorist activity (albeit this part of ATCSA was limited to fifteen months, 
unless renewed by Parliament).128 Upon certification by the home secretary that the 
individual was an international terrorist whose presence in Britain created a risk to 
national security, that individual could be deported. If deportation could not occur 
because of Britain’s international obligation to prevent torture or other inhumane 
treatment, or because of national security concerns, then ATCSA provided the individual 
could be indefinitely detained – without trial – in Britain, unless the suspect agreed to 
go to another country and that country agreed to accept him.129  
Yet, ATCSA did provide some measure of review: a person detained or deported could 
appeal – with the assistance of counsel – the certification to the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC), which had the power to cancel the certification if it 
concluded there were not grounds for the home secretary’s certification.130  
Significantly, the appeal included two stages: an “open” one where the home secretary 
disclosed information and a “closed” one where classified information was made 
available to a security-cleared special advocate.131 Once receiving classified information, 
the special advocate was precluded from further communication with the suspect or his 
attorney. Unlike in Israel where a judge could prohibit both the suspect and his attorney 
from seeing classified information during the judicial proceeding for administrative 
detention, British law allows for a special advocate to access the information against the 
suspect and provide some measure of review. 
Nonetheless, ATCSA’s provisions regarding indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
did not survive scrutiny. The government ultimately repealed the provisions of ATCSA 
dealing with indefinite detention based on a House of Lords Judicial Committee 
December 2004 ruling that such powers were incompatible with articles of 
the European Commission on Human Rights relating to the right to liberty and the right 
to freedom from discrimination. The Committee found the indefinite detention powers 
to be discriminatory as they only applied to foreign nationals, not to British citizens, and 
that they were not proportionate to the threat Britain faced from terrorism.132  
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During the relatively short-life of ATCSA, Britain held seventeen foreign nationals, 
some more than two years.133 Of the seventeen, two men voluntarily left Britain and one 
individual was released under ATCSA and detained on other grounds.134 In October 
2003, the SIAC rejected appeals of ten of the remaining fourteen detainees.135 In other 
words, while the indefinite detention of foreign nationals under ATCSA was short-lived, 
it does not appear that the SIAC rejected many of the detentions on substantive 
grounds. Yet, even the indefinite detention provision of ATCSA – which was 
controversial and only lasted approximately three years – provided at the outset for 
some level of judicial review of the indefinite detention of foreign nationals.  
By contrast, the United States did not provide any review of the foreign nationals held 
at Guantanamo Bay until after the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi and Rasul that enemy 
combatants must be allowed to challenge the designation in a neutral forum. As a result, 
the Bush Administration created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) where a 
three-panel board of military officers from the Department of Defense (not the 
judiciary) decides the detainees’ status based on the current threat assessment and 
intelligence value of each detainee. The detainees are not allowed attorneys; they cannot 
see evidence used that is considered classified; and there is a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of the government.136  
For aliens detained within the United States, the USA Patriot Act allowed detention 
by the attorney general without charge for seven days, after which the person needed to 
either be charged or removal proceedings commenced.137 If a detainee could not be 
otherwise deported and the “release of the alien was found to threaten the national 
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person” the attorney 
general could hold the individual for renewable periods of six months.138 According to 
the inspector general of the Department of Justice, 762 aliens were arrested in 
connection with investigating 9/11 and the majority of these individuals were charged 
with immigration violations (such as overstaying visas).139 Ironically, foreign nationals 
under the USA Patriot Act have more due process rights than U.S. persons detained as 
enemy combatants. After all, the Administration detained Padilla as an enemy 
combatant for three and one-half years before bringing criminal charges, which seems 
to be in contrast to Britain and Israel where non-citizens are (or were in the case of 
Britain) treated in a harsher manner. 
B. British Citizens 
After terrorist bombs murdered fifty-two people in London on July 7, 2005, the Home 
Office (similar in some respects to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) tried to 
increase pre-charge detention for British citizens from the fourteen days provided in the 
TA of 2000, as amended in 2003, to ninety days. Then-Prime Minister Tony Blair 
addressed Parliament by stating: “I have to try to do my best to protect people in this 
country and to make sure their safety and their civil liberty to life come first. Let us have 
a debate about the strength or otherwise of those proposals but for myself I find it a 
convincing case.”140 Although Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention to 
ninety days in what was Mr. Blair’s first parliamentary defeat, it is significant to note 
that Mr. Blair presented his recommendation to Parliament and encouraged debate 
about the issue. This, of course, contrasts to President Bush’s unilateral decisions – 
without any debate or input from Congress – on the identity of enemy combatants and 
how long they can be held without access to counsel. 
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On July 3, 2006, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee141 published a 
report entitled Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, which 
evaluated whether there was a legitimate justification to extend pre-charge detention to 
ninety days. The report articulated reasons to extend pre-charge detention beyond 
fourteen days: the international nature of terrorism; difficulties in establishing the 
identity of terrorist suspects; the need to find interpreters; the need to decrypt computer 
files; the length of time needed for scene examination and analysis; the length of time 
needed to obtain and analyze data from mobile phones; the need to allow for religious 
observance by detainees; and delays arising from solicitors’ consultations with multiple 
clients.142  Significantly, unlike in America, interrogation to gain intelligence was not one 
of the rationales listed as a justification for extending preventive detention, although 
certainly the detainees are allowed to be questioned during the pre-charge detention 
period. Yet, the report notes that “In general it cannot be expected that interviews of 
suspects during extended detention will lead to significant additional information that 
can be used in court.”143 According to the police, “the detention process is not about 
interviewing alone as many people do not answer questions in any event” and that “in 
the majority of suspect interviews, terrorist suspects are advised, and exercise, their 
right to remain silent.”144 By comparison, in America, enemy combatants are not 
allowed to meet with attorneys expressly because it would interfere with interrogation 
and questioning of terrorist suspects.145 The report concluded that ninety days of pre-
charge detention may be useful in some cases but that it was not essential.146 
While ninety days of pre-charge detention did not pass, as a compromise, in the 
Terrorism Act of 2006, twenty-eight days for pre-charge detention became the new 
limit.147 According to the TA of 2006, those arrested can be detained for forty-eight 
hours, after which the police or Crown Prosecution Service may apply to a judicial 
authority for an extension of the detention warrant.148 In other words, judicial review 
begins after forty-eight hours. Detention can only be authorized if it is necessary to (1) 
obtain relevant evidence by questioning the suspect; (2) preserve evidence or (3) to 
make a decision about the deportation or charging of the suspect.149 Applications to 
extend the detention period may be made for seven days at successive intervals up to a 
maximum of twenty-eight days.150 For the first fourteen days, the application for 
detention is made to a designated magistrate judge. Between days fourteen and twenty-
eight, the application must be made to a High Court judge.151 At each proceeding, the 
detainee can be represented by special counsel who has been cleared to handle classified 
information.152 This judicial review at week-long intervals stands in stark contrast to the 
Bush Administration’s claim of inherent constitutional authority to detain enemy 
combatants indefinitely and without access to counsel. Finally, in Britain, the home 
secretary appoints an independent reviewer to examine the operation of the detention 
laws and to review each individual case of detention.153 Significantly, there is no such 
equivalent review function in the United States for its enemy combatants. 
According to the Home Office, the judicial review proceedings have been rigorous, 
with applications for detentions being strenuously contested by the defense attorneys 
and lasting several hours. Not all detention orders have been granted and some have 
been granted for less time than requested.154 Between July 26, 2006, when pre-charge 
detention was increased to twenty-eight days, and October 2007, there were 204 arrests 
under the TA. Only eleven suspects were detained for more than fourteen days (eight of 
them where charged and three were released without charge).155 In other words, 
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although Britain can detain suspects up to twenty-eight days, it appears to be using its 
authority sparingly. 
During the summer of 2007, the Home Office tried to increase the twenty-eight day 
limit to fifty-six days of pre-charge detention. A government report issued by the Home 
Office in July 2007 argued that the police were investigating around 2,000 individuals 
for terrorist-related offenses and that the complexity of the investigations was escalating 
due to an increase in use of false identifies and international links which necessitated 
the cooperation of foreign governments.156  The report concluded: 
The Government is clear that it will only be necessary to go beyond twenty-eight 
days in exceptional circumstances – where there are multiple plots, or links with 
multiple countries, or exceptional levels of complexity. To ensure that any new 
limit is indeed used only in exceptional cases, we believe that any increase in the 
limit should be balanced by strengthening the accompanying judicial oversight 
and Parliamentary accountability.157 
Although the Home Office proposed four options to implement the extension to fifty-six 
days of pre-charge detention – with each option offering different varieties of judicial 
review and oversight – Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention beyond 
twenty-eight days. Alternatively, the Home Office proposed civil emergency legislation 
that would allow for an additional thirty days’ detention (for a total of fifty-eight days) if 
Parliament declared an emergency.158  This option was also defeated by Parliament.  
By comparison, in America, Congress has utterly failed to involve itself in the details 
of preventive detention of U.S. persons, although it has passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 and Military Commissions of Act of 2006 to deal with the foreign nationals 
at Guantanamo Bay. As explored earlier, while Congress did debate the DECA in 2005, 
which would have provided a statute to deal with preventive detention of U.S. persons as 
enemy combatants, it failed to pass and it does not appear that any alternatives are 
being proposed. While the Senate Judiciary Committee did hold hearings in June 2008 
concerning its terrorist detention policy at Guantanamo Bay, it has not yet enacted any 
legislation concerning the preventive detention of U.S. persons. In other words, while 
Britain’s and Israel’s respective legislatures have played an active role in their respective 
preventive detention regimes (whether called pre-charge detention or administration 
detention), Congress has been remarkably silent and deferential to the executive branch. 
Currently, the British government is trying to increase the twenty-eight day pre-
charge limit to forty-two days. In April 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith introduced 
a new anti-terrorism package that would allow for pre-charge detention of up to forty-
two days and post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects.159 According to Smith, forty-
two days would only be used in exceptional cases such as those that require the 
cooperation of a foreign government.160  In June 2008, the House of Commons passed 
the measure by an extremely narrow margin, vote was 315 to 306, but it is not likely to 
pass the House of Lords when it comes up for debate in the Fall.161 
Although forty-two days of pre-charge detention is not nearly as severe as years of 
incommunicado and indefinite detention as advocated by the Bush Administration, the 
forty-two day proposal has sparked harsh criticism from civil liberties group within 
Britain. For instance, civil rights group Liberty has called the proposal unjust, arguing 
that “[t]he UK already has the longest period of pre-charge detention in the Western 
world, and there is no evidence that a further extension will make us any safer.”162 
Human Rights Watch has argued that the government could enact “rolling periods of 
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42-day pre-charge detention” by proposing new charges against terrorist suspects.163  
According to Ben Ward, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights 
Watch, increasing the pre-charge detention period more than twenty-eight days “denies 
the basic right to liberty” and is counterproductive as it is “a recipe for alienating 
communities vital to defeating terrorism.”  He explains that the proposals to increase 
pre-charge detention evoke the experience of internment in Northern Ireland: 
“Internment was deeply counterproductive in the fight against terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, and these proposals carry similar risks.”164  Amnesty International also argues 
the extending pre-charge detention risks “alienat[ing] affected communities, leading 
people to mistrust the authorities and mak[ing] them less likely to want to cooperate 
with the police.”165 
Critics contend that other measures should be used before increasing pre-charge 
detention, such as allowing suspects to be interviewed after they have been charged (and 
allowing refusals to answer to be held against them) and using telephone intercept 
material as evidence.166 Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti maintains that she would 
support measures allowing for a suspect to be charged with a lesser offence, such as 
possessing explosive material or attending a terror camp, while investigations continued 
for more serious or related offences such as conspiracy to murder.167  
Curiously, some critics of Britain’s attempts to increase pre-charge detention beyond 
twenty-eight days argue that America compares favorably to Britain. In November 
2007, Liberty published an article entitled Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention 
Comparative Law Study, in which it compares Britain’s pre-charge detention to other 
countries, including America but not Israel. In this report, author Jago Russell argues 
that America only detains criminals for forty-eight hours under its criminal justice 
system while Britain’s twenty-eight days is excessive: 
Despite being a major terrorist target the United States, for example, allows only 
two days’ of pre-charge detention. . . . How can our Government sustain the 
argument that the UK police need over a month when so many other countries 
manage with pre-charge detention periods of less than a week?168  
In this war on terror, however, America has often bypassed its criminal justice system, 
arguing that terrorist suspects are enemy combatants who can be held incommunicado 
pursuant to the laws of war and released at the end of hostilities that may never end. 
While Russell acknowledges that America has detained individuals due to the 
executive’s “war powers” privilege, he argues such powers are not equivalent to pre-
charge detention in Britain as they are not part of the criminal justice system.169  
Nevertheless, while Britain’s twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention may be 
excessive, when it comes to preventive detention as a concept, it is hardly prudent to 
compare Britain’s twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention, which was passed by 
Parliament and has weekly judicial review incorporated within its provisions, to 
America’s enemy combatant policy where the executive branch has unilaterally decided 
to detain individuals for years of incommunicado detention. Russell notes: “If UK law is 
significantly more repressive than the law in other countries, some will use the disparity 
to question Britain’s moral authority.”170 Such a statement only applies a fortiori to the 
United States. 
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IV. Summary of Analysis: Britain versus United States 
Since 2000, Britain’s preventive detention regime has moved from seven days of pre-
charge detention to twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention with access to counsel 
after forty-eight hours and judicial review every seven days. While there has been debate 
about extending pre-charge detention to ninety, fifty-six, or currently forty-two days, 
there never has been an argument that pre-charge detention should be indefinite and 
without access to counsel. In fact, on June 2, 2008, in arguing that Britain should 
extend pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to forty-two days, Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown specifically stated in The Times that “our first principle is that there 
should always be a maximum limit on pre-charge detention. It is fundamental to our 
civil liberties that no one should be held arbitrarily for an unspecified period.”171 In 
other words, unlike President Bush who has argued for indefinite detention of enemy 
combatants with no judicial review, the executive branch in Britain has never asserted 
such authority in the war on terror. Furthermore, Parliament has not abdicated its 
responsibilities to its citizens: it has and continues to openly debate the issue. There is 
no executive usurpation of power as there was during the World Wars. 
By contrast, in the United States, Hamdi, Padilla and al-Marri – all U.S. persons – 
were locked up for years with no access to counsel. Al-Marri appears to be the only U.S. 
person currently detained as an enemy combatant, although he now has met with 
attorneys and, as of this writing, his case is pending an interlocutory appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Padilla was convicted of terrorism-related charges in August 2007 after 
serving over three years as an enemy combatant and is serving a seventeen year 
sentence, and Hamdi was released to Saudi Arabia in 2004 after the Supreme Court 
held that he must be provided a meaningful opportunity to rebut the designation as an 
enemy combatant. Yet, the precedent of unilateral executive war powers to detain 
American citizens as enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely is on the books. As 
Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman notes: “These cases [Padilla and Hamdi] present a 
unique threat to the survival of the republic. If the president can throw citizens into 
solitary confinement for years on end, our democracy is in very deep trouble.”172 While 
the Supreme Court has ruled that enemy combatants must be allowed a modicum of 
judicial review to challenge the factual assertion that they are enemy combatants, there 
is no prescribed timeframe for when it must occur and no timeframe for how long an 
enemy combatant can be denied counsel for purposes of enhancing interrogation 
potential. Even the proposed DECA did not contain such particulars. These details are 
apparently not significant enough to motivate Congress to legislate or move the 
Supreme Court to provide more than minimalist holdings in its decisions.  
While approximately 3,000 people died on September 11, Britain like Israel has faced 
decades of terrorist threats. For the worst twenty years of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, 2,750 individuals were killed, 2,000 of them civilians, and more than 31,900 
seriously injured, all in a territory of 1.5 million people.173 Furthermore, between 1976 
and November 1998, ninety-four incidents of international terrorism took place in 
Britain, including the bomb planted on Pan Am Flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie 
in 1988 killing 270 people.174 Moreover, al Qaeda killed fifty-two and injured 700 people 
in July 2005 by bombing public transportation in London, and in 2006, eight men tried 
to smuggle explosives in liquids onto airliners leaving Heathrow airport for the United 
States. Furthermore, it is well known that Britain has a substantial home-grown Islamic 
terrorist threat exacerbated by its class system and the radicalization of poor Muslims. 
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As of June 2008, according to Prime Minister Brown, there are at least 2,000 terrorist 
suspects, 200 networks or cells, and thirty active plots in Britain.175  It is simply not a 
credible argument that America’s harsher preventive detention policy is based on a 
larger threat posed by al Qaeda. As does Israel, Britain provides more due process and 
rights to its detainees than America, and the other branches of government do not 
appear to be so feeble. As Professor Schulhofer aptly notes: “In one important respect 
the British and Israeli experiences are unambiguous. They leave us with no illusion that 
the powers currently claimed by the U.S. government are in any sense normal, even for 
a situation of national crisis.”176 
Malaysia and Singapore have preventive detention regimes in which they can hold 
suspects for two-year periods without charge or meaningful court appearances based on 
mere suspicion that they might endanger national security.177 Considering the United 
States held Padilla as an enemy combatant for three and one-half years before charging 
him with a crime, and al-Marri has been held without charges since 2003, it seems as 
though the United States is more in the company of authoritarian regimes than of 
democracies such as Israel and Britain. It is questionable whether the threat posed by 
terrorism merits such a sacrifice of our democratic principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States was completely unprepared on 9/11 and the resulting enemy 
combatant policy seems to be an ad hoc response to insecurity. In comparing other 
countries’ approaches to preventive detention, the question should not be how does the 
United States create a perfect regime, because that cannot happen; the question is how 
does the United States create a regime that can at least provide some meaningful 
judicial review, some access to counsel, some congressional oversight, and some balance 
to unilateral executive discretion. While Britain’s and Israel’s approaches to preventive 
detention are not perfect – and frequently lambasted by their own human rights groups 
– they do demonstrate that democracies facing serious and long-term terrorist threats 
can provide more overall due process and substantive rights to detainees than America’s 
years of incommunicado and indefinite executive detention. Israel and Britain had the 
advantage (if it can be called that) of decades of dealing with terrorism before 9/11. It 
only makes sense that the United States should look to their experiences to see if any of 
their principles can be applied to the United States’ unique kind of government.   
Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch told Congress in June 2008 that “the U.S. 
Congress has never in its history formally established a system of preventive detention 
without trial to deal with national security threats.”178  The time is ripe for Congress to 
enact a preventive detention regime. As did the legislatures in Israel and Britain, 
Congress should address the substantive details concerning preventive detention such 
as how long an individual can be detained without access to counsel for purposes of 
interrogation and how long overall an individual can be detained before release or 
criminal changes. Israel and Britain have shown that democracies facing comparable 
terrorist threats can implement preventive detention policies that are not based on 
unilateral executive usurpation of power and that can provide more due process overall 
to detainees. Congress should take heed and legislate.  
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The Balanced Scorecard: A Strategic Tool in Implementing 




Starting in the early 1990s, Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton advocated a 
“balanced scorecard” as a top-down management system. The system would translate an 
organization’s mission and existing business strategy into a limited number of specific 
strategic objectives that could be linked and measured operationally.1 The balanced 
scorecard stressed the few critical drivers of future organizational performance – 
capabilities, resources, and business processes – and the results of those drivers – 
outcomes for customers and the growth and profitability of the organization. Specific 
objectives were linked in cause and effect relationships derived from the strategy, 
measured, and communicated to the organizational members for strategy 
implementation. Many public, private, and not-for-profit organizations have adopted 
the scorecard as part of their strategic management approach.2  
This article describes and illustrates the balanced scorecard as a tool to better 
implement homeland security strategies. In the following sections, the article (1) 
introduces the balanced scorecard approach, (2) describes an extended enterprise public 
sector balanced scorecard that can be used by individual organizations or in partnership 
with other organizations, (3) advocates and illustrates a homeland security scorecard 
and homeland security strategy mapping, and (4) concludes with a discussion of basic 
ingredients for successful scorecard implementation.  
THE BALANCED SCORECARD APPROACH 
In their many articles and books, Kaplan and Norton advocated the balanced scorecard 
as a management system designed for organizations to manage their strategy.  
Specifically, the scorecard was a way to (1) clarify and translate vision and strategy; (2) 
communicate and link strategic objectives and measures; (3) plan, set targets, and align 
strategic initiatives; and (4) enhance strategic feedback and learning. The scorecard was 
primarily intended for a “closed system” – a strategic business unit responsible for an 
entire value chain in producing and distributing products for defined customers. 
Departments and functional units within the strategic business unit would produce their 
own mission and strategy to support that of the strategic business unit. However, the 
scorecard was also useful for implementing strategy with other organizations, such as 
suppliers.3  
The heart of the balanced scorecard is a framework of four major categories or 
perspectives for strategy implementation – financial, customer, internal business, and 
innovation and learning:  
• The financial perspective asks how the organization should appear to shareholders 
so that the company can succeed financially. This perspective indicates if the 
business is improving the bottom line, measuring items such as profitability and 
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shareholder value. Financial objectives reflect economic consequences of actions 
already taken in the other perspectives.  
• The customer perspective asks how an organization should appear to customers to 
achieve the organization’s vision. Customer objectives identify customer and market 
segments where the business would compete and what performance would be 
expected for these targeted segments. The scorecard focuses on customer concerns 
primarily in four categories: time, quality, performance and service, and cost.  
• The internal business perspective asks what business processes the organization 
should excel at to satisfy shareholders and customers.  This perspective measures the 
internal business processes, core competencies, and technologies that would satisfy 
customer needs.  
• Lastly, the innovation and learning perspective asks how the organization would 
sustain its ability to change and improve to achieve the organization’s vision. The 
learning and growth perspective identifies the organization’s infrastructure needed 
to support the other perspectives’ objectives. This perspective measures a company’s 
ability to innovate, improve, and learn, such as the ability to launch new products.  
Kaplan and Norton’s books and articles through 2004 evolved the balanced scorecard 
from a set of measurement techniques, to a management system, and then to an 
organization and change framework for what they called a strategy-focused 
organization. A strategy-focused organization would follow five principles: (1) translate 
the strategy to operational terms, (2) align the organization to the strategy, (3) make 
strategy everyone’s everyday job, (4) make strategy a continual process, and (5) mobilize 
change through executive leadership. In subsequent books published in 2006 and 2008, 
they provided additional guidance on aligning all organizational units to an enterprise’s 
strategy and establishing strong linkages from strategy to operations. They posited that 
strategy should come from choosing the business’s market and customer segments, 
critical internal business processes that delivered value to the targeted customers, and 
selecting individual and organizational capabilities in support. Companies could also 
choose strategy by exploiting their unique capabilities, resources, and core 
competencies.  
According to Kaplan and Norton and others,4 scorecard success relies on crafting 
clear cause-and-effect relationships across the four perspectives, creating a balance 
among the different measures of performance drivers and results, and communicating 
strategy and the processes and systems necessary to implement that strategy. Strategy 
mapping makes explicit the cause-and-effect links by which initiatives and resources – 
tangible and intangible – create outcomes at the top of the scorecard, such as financial 
and customer expectations for private sector organizations. Kaplan and Norton point 
out that simply building scorecards and bucketing initiatives and measures into the 
discrete balanced scorecard perspectives without understanding the linkages is invalid. 
The power of strategy mapping lies in systematically and logically linking across the 
perspectives to create value. The initiatives and resources (and related measures) must 
show how outcomes will be achieved through the initiatives in the individual 
perspectives.  
Constructing strategy maps based on Kaplan and Norton’s scorecard perspectives 
started with a clear hierarchical relationship framework. The hierarchy began with 
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defining financial objectives, then determining the target customers and their 
requirements to achieve the financial outcomes. Those determinations were then 
followed by defining the activities in internal business processes that would create the 
desired customer outcomes. Then the learning and growth factors were identified to 
execute the internal business processes. Every measure in the cause-and-effect 
relationships ultimately ties to outcomes. The hierarchy and a portion of a strategy map 
derived from Kaplan and Norton’s 2001 and 2004 work is shown in Figure 1 to illustrate 





























If we succeed, how will we 
look to our shareholders?
Customer
To achieve our vision, 
how must we look to our 
customers?
Internal
To satisfy our customers, at 
what business processes must 
we excel?
Organizational Learning
To achieve our vision, how 




Derived from Kaplan and Norton (2001, 
2004)
 
Figure 1. Sample Strategy Map Portion 
 
In this simplified example, organizational learning efforts such as improving customer 
information efforts serve as inputs to internal business processes such as understanding 
customer segments, leading to customer value for financial advice and subsequent 
financial returns. In their 2004 book, Kaplan and Norton expanded on strategy 
mapping for the learning and growth perspective (also called intangible assets) and 
internal business processes. Strategy mapping, in their view, should pay particular 
attention to these two perspectives and the individual categories under each as they 
were so important to the lagging financial and customer outcome areas. Learning and 
growth described the organization’s intangible assets in terms of human capital such as 
employee skills, information capital such as information systems, and organization 
capital such as culture. Internal business processes included operations management, 
customer management, innovation, and regulatory and social constraints.  
TAILORING THE PERSPECTIVES TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Kaplan and Norton recognized that balanced scorecards for pubic sector organizations 
would not necessarily mirror those of private companies. Government and nonprofit 
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organizations would rarely place the financial perspective at the top of the hierarchy.  
For the public sector, the value creation process targeted public sector customers and 
taxpayers and fiduciary outcomes. They recommended placing financial and customer 
perspectives at the top in a co-equal status, both dependent on the mission of the 
organization.  This framework is shown in Figure 2.  
 
The Mission : “To achieve our mission, what 
critical few things will we focus on?”
Financial : “If we succeed, how 
will we look to our financial 
donors?”
Customers : “To achieve our 
vision, how must we look to 
our customers?”
Internal : “To satisfy our customers, 
financial donors and mission, what 
business processes must we excel at?”
Learning & Growth : “To achieve our 
vision, how must our people learn, 
communicate, and work together?”
 
Figure 2. Nonprofit/Public Sector Scorecard 
 
 
Kaplan and Norton defined mission as a “concise, internally-focused statement of the 
reason for the organization’s existence, the basic purpose toward which its activities are 
directed, and the values that guide employees’ activities.”5 Kaplan, in his 1999 work, 
noted that for a government agency, financial measures did not indicate if an agency 
was delivering on its mission. Placing the mission at the top of the scorecard oriented 
the objectives in the four perspectives toward achieving the mission.6 He replaced the 
customer and financial perspectives with three areas at the same level: the direct and 
indirect cost of providing service, the value and benefit of service to citizens, and the 
support of legitimizing authorities such as the legislation and ultimately taxpayers.  
Internal processes and learning and growth would support all three areas and complete 
the hierarchy.7  
Other authors have taken a similar tack with public and nonprofit sector scorecards, 
but with additional variations. For example, Niven placed mission at the top of his 
scorecard, followed by the customer perspective. Financial and internal processes 
perspectives supported the customer perspective, but at an equal, horizontal level.  
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Employee learning and growth was at the bottom of the scorecard, viewed as the central 
driver in meeting mission goals.8 Rohm’s basic design emphasized mission as the key 
driver, with a customer and stakeholder (government mandates and limitations) 
perspective directly under mission and the financial perspective and employees and 
organizational capacity (employee skills and information technology) perspective at the 
same level, underneath the customer and stakeholder perspective. Internal business 
processes were at the bottom.9  
AN EXTENDED ENTERPRISE PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCED SCORECARD 
These public sector scorecards speak to application to a single organization. Kaplan and 
Norton devoted much of their work to applications within a single company where the 
scorecard would cascade from the corporate level to strategic business units, then to 
departments and functional units, and then to employees. However, Kaplan and Norton 
saw the merits of using the balanced scorecard for joint ventures or strategic alliances.  
In their view, the scorecard could define the goals for a shared agenda and relationships, 
make explicit the strategic linkages integrating the performance of multiple 
organizations, and define how to measure the contribution and performance of each 
party.  An alliance-balanced scorecard was seen as mitigating alliance partner conflict by 
bringing the partners together to clarify the alliance goals and the strategy for achieving 
those goals. However, what might be improved perspectives for a public sector 
scorecard that could, for an individual organization or for strategic alliances or a 
network of organizations, more fully integrate roles, responsibilities, and contributions 
for strategy implementation?10 This is an important question as homeland security 
strategy implementation requires both individual independent effort as well as the 
interdependent actions of other “mission delivery” partners.  
Drawing on the described private sector and public sector scorecards, an extended 
enterprise scorecard that considers independent and/or interdependent action might 
include five perspectives, described in Table 1. These include (1) public stewardship, (2) 
clientele11 impact, (3) day-to-day processes, (4) human capital support, and (5) enabling 
support. For each scorecard perspective, several topics can be considered to determine 
objectives and then subsequent measures and initiatives for strategy mapping. For 
example, public stewardship would include understanding and balancing key 
stakeholder needs and expectations; day-to-day processes would consider the evaluation 
and enhancement of delivery partner capabilities. Such a scorecard could aid in 
designing the objectives and measures for implementing independent and shared 
strategy and clarify and communicate what activities and tasks are jointly linked or 
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Table 1. Extended Enterprise Balanced Scorecard Perspectives 
 
Perspective and Question Topics 
Public Stewardship:  
“To meet the legislative 
intent, how should we 
provide effective policy and 
resource stewardship for our 
stakeholders and society at 
large?” 
Mission in line with legislative mandates. 
Key stakeholder needs and expectations understood and balanced. 
Needs and expectations of the society at large defined and satisfied within 
funding constraints. 
Management and program policies translated to implementation goals and 
actions and results communicated. 
Financial and investment performance constraints and compliance needs 
managed. 
Investment management in line with strong financial integrity needs. 
Clientele Impact: 
“To achieve our mission, how 
should we serve and impact 
our clientele—those who 
receive our products, 
services, funding, regulatory 
intervention, or guidance?” 
Legal, regulatory, and ethical policy requirements for clientele results. 
Clientele clearly defined. 
Clientele responsibilities in achieving results. 
Clientele satisfaction with program products, services, or regulatory 
interventions. 
Clientele involved in defining goals, targets, measures, and strategies 
within legislative or policy parameters. 
Day-to-Day Processes: 
“To meet our commitments,  
how should we identify, 
secure, and sustain employee 
and delivery partner (strategic 
alliance) commitment, 
knowledge, and skills?” 
Core processes and their value chains identified, managed, and improved 
internally and externally. 
Multiple/duplicate programs integrated for best policy results. 
Emphasis on comprehensive processes and interrelationships, instead of 
stove-piped functional tasks. 
Delivery partner roles and their contributions in processes identified—
from alliances to transactional roles. 
Human Capital Support: 
“To meet our commitments, 
how should we craft the right 
organizational alignment and 
technological support?” 
Workforce skills and competencies aligned with program goals and human 
resource systems. 
Employee skills managed for retention and any necessary development. 
Delivery partners empowered in program human capital decisionmaking. 
Delivery partner capabilities evaluated and enhanced, if necessary. 
Enabling Support: 
“To meet our commitments, 
how should we craft the right 
organizational alignment and 
technological support?” 
Organizational structure and design effective, including the impact on, and 
integration with, delivery partners. 
Organizational roles adequately clear, with a strong commitment to 
carrying them out. 
Leadership to develop and sustain an organizational climate centered on 
results. 
Access to information resources within the organization and in extended 
business processes. 
Capital assets optimized for expectations. 





The hierarchy for the extended enterprise balanced scorecard, shown in Figure 3, places 
public stewardship and clientele impact at the top directly under mission, with day-to-
day processes in the middle, and the final two – human capital support and enabling 
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Internal/External Balanced Scorecard Measurement and
Measures Evaluation          
Are the outcomes 
responsive to necessary 
public stewardship and 
clientele needs?
Do processes provide the 
capability and value to utilize 
human capability, technology, 
and organizational alignment 
to meet mission objectives?
Are support capacities and 
development responsive to 




















objectives must we 
achieve?
 
Figure 3. Extended Enterprise Balanced Scorecard Perspective 
 
DEVELOPING THE HOMELAND SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND  
STRATEGY MAPPING 
However, the next question is how to use these five perspectives for homeland security. 
What might be homeland security’s scorecard objectives, and “cause and effect” 
relationships to implement the strategy across the five perspectives, whether for a single 
organization or for several delivery partners? There are several sources of information 
available to develop the extended enterprise homeland security scorecard, including 
publicly published national homeland security strategies and preparedness guidelines.  
National Strategies for Homeland Security 
The first source of information is the content of the 2002 and 2007 National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.12 At present, these two national strategies provide the common 
language and coordinating mechanisms across all parties involved in homeland security 
– federal (defense and civilian), state, local, public, private, nongovernmental, and 
international. The 2002 National Strategy included the definition of homeland security 
and its missions, what should be accomplished, and the most important goals, current 
accomplishments, and recommendations for non-federal governments, the private 
sector, and citizen action. The 2007 National Strategy’s stated purpose was to guide, 
organize, and unify the nation’s homeland security efforts, building on the earlier 
strategy.  
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Both the 2002 and 2007 national strategies defined homeland security in terms of 
preventing or mitigating terrorist attacks, minimizing attack damage, and recovering 
from attacks. The 2002 version further defined these as three overarching goals. For 
example, prevention included deterring potential terrorists, detecting terrorists, 
preventing them and their weapons from entry and eliminating the threats they pose.  
These goal areas were addressed through six mission areas, including domestic 
counterterrorism, catastrophic threat defense, and emergency preparedness and 
response. In addition, the 2002 strategy posed initiatives for four foundational areas – 
law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international 
cooperation – that covered all of the six mission areas. The 2007 National Strategy 
included the same three goals, but formally added a fourth of continuing to strengthen 
the foundation to ensure long-term success by creating and transforming homeland 
security principles, systems, structures, and institutions.  
The goal areas in both national strategies included specific initiatives and related 
activities. For example, one 2002 national strategy major initiative for border and 
transportation security is to create “smart borders.” Activities to meet this initiative 
included screening and verifying the security of goods and identities of people, 
improving the quality of travel documents and their issuance, assisting other countries 
to improve their border controls, and improving administration of immigration laws.  
The initiatives and activities in both of the national strategies can be sources of 
overarching objectives that address the five perspectives and the topics described in 
Table 1 for an extended enterprise public sector scorecard. Table 2 presents a few 
examples of possible balanced scorecard national security homeland security objectives 
and sub-objectives.  
 
Table 2. Homeland Security Scorecard Objectives and Sub-Objectives Examples 
 
Public Stewardship: Effective policy and resource stewardship. 
• Invest in resources that eliminate, control, or mitigate risks according to a risk-based approach. 
• Institutionalize a comprehensive homeland security management system. 
Clientele Impact: Serving and impacting clientele. 
• Ensure the continuity of government operations and essential functions in the event of crisis or disaster. 
• Secure borders against terrorists, means of terrorism, illegal drugs, and other illegal activity. 
Day to Day Processes: Working internally and externally. 
• Develop and disseminate accurate, timely, actionable, and valuable information to homeland security 
partners and the public and resolve information gaps. 
• Periodically assess threats and vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and key assets. 
Human Capital Support: Securing employee and delivery partner commitment, knowledge, and skills. 
• Rebuild analytical, language, surveillance, and other human resource capabilities of those organizations 
involved in homeland security. 
• Prepare health care providers and citizens for catastrophic events. 
Enabling Support: Crafting organizational alignment and technological support. 
• Harness the scientific knowledge, analytical and modeling tools, and technology to prevent and counter 
terrorism. 
• Make organizational changes to support homeland security. 
 
Expanding this table out to define a fuller set of objectives and sub-objectives for each 
perspective is useful for the scorecard design phase of strategy mapping. As discussed 
earlier, a strategy map provides clarity regarding the relationships between and among 
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the perspectives. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified, very high-level national homeland 















1. Plan and provide scalable and 
robust all -hazards readiness, 
mitigation, and recovery assistance 
and capabilities.
2. Base homeland security assistance 
strictly on an assessment of risks 
and vulnerabilities. 
1. Develop both short -term and long -term 
response and recovery actions after 
an incident.
2. Secure borders against terrorists, 
means of terrorism, illegal drugs, and 
other illegal activity. 
1. Develop and disseminate accurate, timely, actionable, and val uable 
information to homeland security partners and the public.
2. Coordinate national and international policy, law enforcement , and other 
actions to prepare for and prevent terrorism.
3. Reduce and mitigate infrastructure vulnerability from acts of terrorism or 
natural catastrophes.
4. Provide emergency response and recovery services.
1. Develop human capital 
capabilities.
2. Prepare health care providers 
for catastrophic terrorism. 
1. Strengthen doctrine and actions to guide the 
national response.
2. Improve information sharing and systems.
3. Harness the scientific knowledge, analytical and 
modeling tools, and technology to prevent and 
counter terrorism.
4. Make organizational changes to support homeland 
security. 
A nation prepared with coordinated 
capabilities to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from all hazards in a 




Figure 4. Illustrative High-Level National Homeland Security Strategy Map 
 
 
Figure 5 shows a more detailed strategy map for the intelligence and information 
sharing and dissemination component of the 2007 National Strategy information. The 
public stewardship, clientele impact, day-to-day processes, human capital support, and 
enabling support examples are specific to intelligence and warning. The strategy 
mapping in the figure draws on objectives and sub-objectives in pertaining to 
intelligence and warning. For example, day-to-day process objectives target the 
intelligence and warning process, from identifying data needs to partnerships with other 
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1. Identify appropriate personnel for 
receipt of security clearances at an 
appropriate level.
• Design and conduct exercises to 
test unit and joint intelligence and 
information sharing.
• Train appropriate personnel on 
sharing and disseminate processes 
and procedures.
1. Adhere to horizontal coordination across 
jurisdictions among law enforcement and 
other agencies at all levels through effective 
and timely information sharing.
2. Develop information sharing network 
standards: survivable, interoperable, 
compatible, secure, and accessible.
1. Identify all stakeholders, entities, and officials for inclusion in the information sharing 
framework.
2. Develop a clearly defined process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the 
inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence.
3. Develop a clearly defined mechanism/process for sharing intellig ence between federal and 
state sources and with private -sector entities consistent with their formal intelligence 
requirements.
4. Establish alternative, supplemental, and back -up mechanisms for routing information 
and/or intelligence to the necessary agencies.
A nation prepared with 
coordinated capabilities to 
prevent, protect against, respond 
to, and recover from all hazards 
in a way that balances risk with 
resources and need.
1. Develop and maintain operationally 
sound policies to comply with 
regulatory, statutory, privacy, and 
other issues that govern the 
gathering and disclosure of 
information and intelligence.
1. Share relevant intelligence and 
information systematically between 
federal, state, local, and regional 
entities in a usable format and in a 
timely manner.
Intelligence and Information 
Sharing and Dissemination
 
Figure 5. Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination High-Level Mapping 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Implementation 
However, much more strategy map granularity is required to confirm and verify 
necessary and sufficient relationships in the balanced scorecard hierarchy beyond that 
provided by the national strategies. For example, a strategy map would describe what is 
needed to develop necessary and sufficient human capital capabilities in supporting the 
effective functioning of day-to-day processes. Perhaps more importantly, such a 
mapping would expose any gaps in objectives and sub-objectives in each perspective 
that do not have a cause-and-effect relationship from the drivers of future performance 
– day-to-day processes, human capital support, and enabling support – to the results of 
past performance – public stewardship and clientele impact. These strategy maps would 
communicate specific individual or shared tasks to employees of a single organization or 
delivery partners to determine shared or individual efforts.  
Robust tools for building out a homeland security balanced scorecard are the 
various policy and operational documents developed to implement Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. Issued by the president in December 2003, HSPD-8 
called for the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination 
with other federal officials and in consultation with state and local governments, to 
develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.13 The directive’s intent was 
to establish measurable readiness priorities and balance threats and consequences with 
resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. The goal would 
include readiness measures, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and 
a system to assess the nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events, 
especially terrorist acts. Responding to the HSPD-8 mandates, DHS issued the Interim 
National Preparedness Goal in March 2005 that established the national vision for 
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homeland security and priorities. The Goal was to be used in concert with the planning 
tools of national planning scenarios and a target capabilities list. According to the Goal, 
capabilities-based planning would provide those capabilities needed to address risk-
based target levels of capabilities. 14, 15  
In September 2007, DHS replaced the interim Goal with the National Preparedness 
Guidelines. The Guidelines explain that capabilities set critical tasks and specific 
performance standards, depending on conditions, to achieve the mission areas and are 
derived from all-hazards scenarios mission areas. Mission areas include prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery, with “common” mission areas of communications, 
community preparedness and participation, planning, risk management, and 
intelligence/information sharing and dissemination.16 Further explained in an updated 
Target Capabilities List, capability definitions speak to outcomes as well as elements 
that drive of future performance.17 For example, the capability definition for on-site 
incident management is “the capability to effectively direct and control incident 
activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS).” The outcome is that an “event is managed 
safely, effectively and efficiently through the common framework of the Incident 
Command System.”18 Each capability has related tasks and measures. Capability 
elements, according to the Guidelines and List, define what resources are needed to 
perform critical tasks to the specified levels of performance.  These elements include the 
following:19  
• Personnel: Paid and volunteer staff who meet relevant qualification and 
certification standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.  
• Planning: Collection and analysis of intelligence and information, and 
development of policies, plans, procedures, mutual aid agreements, strategies, and 
other publications that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance 
necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.  
• Organization and Leadership: Individual teams, an overall organizational 
structure, and leadership at each level in the structure that comply with relevant 
laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.  
• Equipment and Systems: Major items of equipment, supplies, facilities, and 
systems that comply with relevant standards necessary to perform assigned missions 
and tasks.  
• Training: Content and methods of delivery that comply with relevant training 
standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.  
• Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions: Exercises, self-assessments, 
peer-assessments, outside review, compliance monitoring, and actual major events 
that provide opportunities to demonstrate, evaluate, and improve the combined 
capability and interoperability of the other elements to perform assigned missions 
and tasks to standards necessary to achieve successful outcomes.  
These capability elements can be seen as the drivers of future performance in the 
extended enterprise scorecard – day-to-day processes, human capital support, and 
enabling support. For example, personnel and training elements provide human capital 
support and equipment and systems provide enabling support. An organization or group 
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of delivery partners could take each mission area described in the Guidelines and build 
out a scorecard at the mission or capability level. A simplified example of such a build-
out of a scorecard from the target capabilities is shown in Figure 6 for the prevent 
















1. Develop and maintain operationally sound 
policies to comply with regulatory, statutory, 
privacy, and other issues that may govern 
the gathering of information
2. Establish short, medium, and long term 
coordinated information gathering policies, 
procedures, and systems
1. Develop and initiate terrorism 
indicator sets and relationships 
training programs
2. Provide training feedback to 
Federal trainers
1. Develop and maintain systems and/or 
technology to process the inflow of gathered 
information from all sources in a timely 
fashion
2. Catalog information provided to all sources 
and retain in a database to enable timely 
retrieval
1. Develop and provide States and tribal 
authorities with information needs clearly 
defined by the Federal community based 
on the threat environment in a timely 
manner.
2. Communicate information needs from 
Federal community and States to local law 
enforcement, Tribal, private -sector, and 
other appropriate personnel as needed 
and in a timely manner
1. Develop and maintain procedures to process the inflow of gathered information from all 
sources in a timely fashion
2. Gather homeland security information during routine day -to-day activities and pass to 
appropriate authorities
3. Utilize a predefined notification process to advise law enforcement of suspicious activity
 
 
           Figure 6. A Capability Level Scorecard Example 
 
 
Whether national strategies or the guidelines and capabilities are used separately or in 
conjunction with each other, building the scorecard can quickly highlight gaps and 
duplication.  For example, at the capability level, is the full set of tasks provided for 
human capital support and enabling support adequate to support the effective and 
efficient operation of the day-to-day processes for information gathering?  By their very 
nature, developing goals and objectives and capabilities independent of a scorecard 
framework that makes explicit relationships and linkages are highly likely to have 
implementation difficulties.  
INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
BALANCED SCORECARD 
The above sections discuss the underlying concepts, frameworks, and other mechanics 
for developing a scorecard that might be useful for homeland security. These concepts 
and frameworks are not necessary and sufficient for successful implementation of a 
scorecard. Success will be dependent on pragmatic organizational factors as well. In 
their work, Kaplan and Norton have highlighted major organizational ingredients for a 
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highly successful balanced scorecard program. In his 2000 work, Kaplan defined 
barriers in the public sector that need to be overcome if stretch performance targets are 
to be set and sustained through a balanced scorecard. Other authors such as Monahan,20 
Lundlin,21 and Mathys and Thompson22 also derived lessons learned germane to any 
homeland security balanced scorecard program. More recently, the Government 
Accountability Office described how partnerships might be enhanced in countering 
transnational terrorism.23 Drawing on these sources, the organizational ingredients for 
success include (1) consensus on strategy and key performance expectations and 
requirements, (2) top leadership direction, (3) integrating the plan and related balanced 
scorecard into investment decisions, (4) making strategy a component of every day jobs 
and operations, and (5) ensuring strategy development and implementation is a 
continuous process.  
Expectations and Requirements 
The first ingredient is organizational or partner consensus on the strategy and 
performance expectations to meet the strategy goals. Complicating the homeland 
security consensus process are delivery partners involving many levels of government, 
the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and 
multiple disciplines and functional areas. Many partners have different strategic and 
tactical agendas, resources, or perceptions of the extent of the problem that should be 
addressed and by what solutions. There are certainly differing interpretations as to what 
homeland security is.24 However, agreement would be needed on the shared value of 
working together within and across organizations and resulting strategy and 
performance expectations. Defining common ground is one of the aims of the 
implementation of the national preparedness goal.  
Top Leadership 
The second ingredient is leadership from the top, where the senior executive team 
directs the balanced scorecard effort, not a limited number of middle managers or 
inexperienced consultants. Senior executive leadership creates the climate for change 
and a common focus for the change activities. Leadership can align the changes and 
strategic initiatives with short and long-term resource allocations. For national 
homeland security, for example, senior executive leadership should come from the 
Executive Office of the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Department 
of Homeland Security, with strong partnerships with state and local government and 
private sector national associations, as well as international actors. In turn, each 
organization involved in homeland security will need top leadership support and 
direction. This is particularly important to ensure consistency in policy and operational 
objectives.  
Investment Support 
The third ingredient is integrating the plan and related balanced scorecard into 
investment decisions through the budgetary process. This is in line with the growing use 
of performance-based budgeting at federal, state, and local levels.25 In addition, federal 
homeland security grant processes and other budgeting decisions can serve to address 
building capabilities that are directly tied to the five perspectives of the public sector 
balanced scorecard. Lack of funding is a severe challenge to be overcome if strategy via 
the balanced scorecard is to be effectively implemented.  
CAUDLE, APPLYING THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG          
14 
Everyday Use 
The fourth ingredient is making strategy a component of every day jobs and operations.  
This is accomplished by making strategy the reference point for all management 
processes within and across all delivery partners. These processes would include 
communication channels and modes across and down the organization; the alignment 
of organizational goals, individual incentives, and investments; work process design; 
and linkages across program and operational units and those of delivery partners.  
Public sector organizations will require incentives to take a longer-term view of their 
role and not take the “lower hanging fruit” of an operational excellence strategy. More 
and more public sector organizations now can provide incentive pay to employees to 
provide a lever to align employees to the scorecard’s strategic objectives and measures.  
Agreements reached for strategic alliances such as for homeland security will need to 
make strategy a component of the alliances. The balanced scorecard provides an ideal 
mechanism to set high-level, interagency homeland security objectives that should allow 
multiple organizations – public and private – to work together.  
Continuous Process 
The final ingredient is to make strategy development and implementation a continuous 
process, not a one-time event. There should be a feedback loop that provides 
performance information across the perspectives for learning and adaptation. This is 
particularly important in the public sector as performance targets are a matter of public 
record. Organizations should anticipate that failing to meet the targeted performance 
will be very visible to the general public. For homeland security, a continual process of 
assessment and corrective action should be part of needs assessment, program 
objectives, and oversight.  
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This article has dealt with the basics of the balanced scorecard and presented an 
extended enterprise scorecard that can be applied to homeland security. It has also 
discussed a limited number of the organizational factors important to successful 
implementation. The article is intended to prompt ongoing dialogues regarding applying 
the scorecard as a strategy implementation tool useful for a single organization and for 
shared efforts with homeland security delivery partners. In particular, focusing on the 
five extended enterprise perspectives and using the national homeland security 
strategies and national preparedness guidelines components for scorecard build-out 
should be emphasized. They can clarify independent and interdependent initiatives, 
relationships, and linkages for homeland security mission areas and capability 
development. The cause-and-effect relationships make strategy explicit to an 
organization’s employees and to other delivery partners and provide a readily-
understood framework for resource allocation and leveraging resources and capabilities.  
Lastly, the balanced scorecard makes much more transparent the process of assessing if 
there are gaps, duplication, or overlaps in initiatives and capabilities to implement 
strategy.  
 
Future research is required to fully inform application of the balanced scorecard for 
homeland security strategy implementation. For example, are the five perspectives 
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presented in the extended enterprise scorecard sufficient or are further enhancements 
or designs needed? Should homeland security scorecards start with national homeland 
security strategies or other strategy documents?  What expertise and other resources are 
needed to develop and sustain complex homeland security strategy maps and their 
ongoing assessment? And, perhaps most importantly, what scorecard design and 
organizational factors can respond to the complexities of homeland security delivery 
partner relationships and responsibilities and resulting strategy agreement?  These 
relationships include those across federal agencies, from federal to other levels of 
government, from state to local, and from local to local. Relationships also must be 
defined from national to international delivery partners.  
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Promises Unfulfilled: The Sub-Optimization of 
Homeland Security National Preparedness 
Samuel H. Clovis, Jr. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, thousands of well-intentioned individuals 
have been working feverishly to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from 
natural and man-made incidents of national significance. Billions of dollars have been 
expended to build capacity at all levels of government to meet the mission demands of 
the new policy arena of homeland security. Homeland security, at least in definition, has 
come full circle since 9/11. Today, homeland security is narrowly defined as dealing 
predominantly with acts of terrorism.1 However, as the initial shock of the 9/11 terror 
attacks wore off, state and local governments began the process of taking on the 
expanded mission space prescribed by the new normalcy in the nation. As state and 
local governments found their footing in this new arena, they were able to absorb the 
new demands of homeland security into the existing mission space found in public 
safety and emergency management. The national government, however, has remained 
focused primarily on acts of terror. This divergence in perspective has led to ever-
increasing tensions between the national government and state and local governments 
when policies related to homeland security national preparedness are at issue. 
At the core of the set of challenges that confront national, state, and local government 
officials concerning homeland security national preparedness public policy are a set of 
assumptions, upon which current and evolving policies are based, that are suspect if not 
fatally flawed. The policy outcomes resulting from these faulty assumptions (and 
facilitated by hindering institutional pathologies, misguided policies, and bad policy 
instruments) have left the nation less prepared than is possible had forward-thinking, 
aggressively applied modern public management models been used as the foundation 
upon which national preparedness could be established. The assumptions brought into 
focus in this article are: 
1. There is an idealized level of national preparedness; achieving a prescribed level 
of preparedness to respond to events of national significance, whether man-made 
or natural in origin, is possible based on current or foreseeable resource levels. 
2. The federal government is obliged to direct the development of national 
preparedness policy to ensure that state and local governments are working 
toward policy compliance and are providing full accountability for grant funds.  
3. Current homeland security public policy is coherent, embraces an all-hazards 
approach to national preparedness and reflects the comprehensive involvement 
of state and local governments in its development, deployment, and 
implementation. 
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After a brief discussion of research methodology, this article traces the evolution of 
national preparedness policies and describes the institutional pathologies and policy 
instruments that have inhibited national preparedness. The next section provides 
analysis related to the research and an explanation of why the assumptions identified 
above are flawed. Finally, recommendations are offered that might allow the next 
administration and those with public safety, emergency management, and homeland 
security responsibilities at the state and local level insights into building community 
resilience and governance capacity that raises preparedness to as high a level as 
possible.   
Methodology 
This research project is part of an ongoing research agenda focused on homeland 
security national preparedness public policy. The approach taken is qualitative in nature 
and is characterized by the examination of behaviors of individuals and institutions 
found in this policy arena, comprehensive literature reviews, and hundreds of informal 
interviews with officials at the local, state and national level who are directly involved in 
the development, deployment, and implementation of homeland security national 
preparedness public policy. Additional data were gathered from field research 
associated with national preparedness assessment activities. 
The focus of the research has been on Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 
National Preparedness (HSPD-8)2 and its complement, HSPD-5, Management of 
Domestic Incidents.3 These directives lay the foundation of all subsequent policy 
development related to homeland security national preparedness. By parsing the policy 
guidance and goals found in these documents, it is possible to establish points of 
comparison when the current policy environment is fully developed. Judgments 
concerning the efficacy of policies, instrumentalities, and behaviors are based on 
observation and substantiated by research found in refereed journals and books related 
to the field of interest. 
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES 
A series of “foundational” documents began to populate the homeland security policy 
arena after 9/11.  Along with the seminal legislation found in the Homeland Security Act 
of 20024 came a series of documents such as the National Homeland Security Strategy5 
and Homeland Security Presidential Directives providing policy guidance to federal, 
state, and local governments. The directive most associated with national preparedness 
is HSPD-8. The purpose of the directive was to guide the development of policy for “all 
hazards preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies.”6 The document described preparedness as the existence of plans, 
procedures, policies, training, and equipment for governments to maximize their 
respective abilities to deal with major events.  The directive dealing with management 
of domestic incidents (HSPD-5) is an integral companion document to the national 
preparedness directive, because HSPD-5 directs the development of a national Incident 
Command System (ICS) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS), both of 
which are key elements of national preparedness policy implementation. 
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There are several significant policy guidelines to be found in HSPD-8 that have direct 
bearing on current policies related to national preparedness. Though the directives are 
rich in content, the focus should be on those clauses that have spawned the most 
contentious and pernicious policy instruments. Those guidelines direct the secretary of 
DHS to: 
1. Build support for and assessment of state and local first responders. 
2. Develop methods for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of federal assistance 
to state and local governments. 
3. Focus on terrorist events (emphasis added). 
4. Establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance 
the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from them (emphasis added). 
5. Develop standards for preparedness assessments and strategies and a system of 
assessing national preparedness. 
6. Base a grant award system on risk calculations related to population 
concentrations and critical infrastructure. 
7. Develop quantifiable performance measures for federal, state, and local 
governments. 
The primary mechanisms for influencing behaviors at the state and local level have been 
the awarding of grant funds to “encourage” desired behaviors, primarily from the states.  
“The awards will be delivered in a form that will allow the recipients to apply the 
assistance to the highest priority preparedness requirements at the appropriate level of 
government.”7 
The complementary guidelines found in HSPD-5 are that the secretary of DHS will: 
1. Develop a single approach for domestic incident management. 
2. Develop and administer a National Incident Management System that will meet 
mission requirements “regardless of cause, size or complexity.”  The system will 
also allow jurisdictions to track resources. 
3. Establish national standards for qualification and certification in this area of 
interest. 
4. Develop a National Response Plan based on an all-discipline, all-hazards 
approach to incident management.8 
From these artifacts came a series of support documents further outlining the policy 
intentions of DHS.  Those documents include the National Preparedness Goal, National 
Preparedness Guidance, the Target Capabilities List (TCL), a revised National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, and the National Preparedness Framework.  
 The significant contributions of these documents were the introduction of national 
planning scenarios, the concept of capabilities-based planning and direction to state and 
local governments to “enhance regional collaboration.”9  The approach to expanding and 
developing implementing directives for HSPD-8 were perhaps well intentioned but 
displayed a lack of knowledge of and an insensitivity to the policy environment of state 
and local governments.10 With each subsequent document and volume of guidelines 
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related to homeland security grants, the tone and directness moved from partnering and 
facilitation to dictating more and more requirements for compliance with non-legislated 
regulatory regimes based on limited theoretical development and no appreciation for 
the impact in dollars and labor on state and local officials charged with public safety, 
emergency management, and homeland security responsibilities. In essence, HSPD-8 
and its spawn could be characterized as a direct assault on the stability of American 
federalism and intergovernmental relations, particularly in this policy arena.11 
HONORING THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM 
In a broader context, there has long been discussion of the ebb and flow of American 
federalism and whether or not the continual march toward centralization of power in 
the national government will ever abate. Throughout history, power has shifted toward 
the central government whenever the country faced a crisis (Civil War, World Wars, 
Great Depression, 9/11, etc.), faced an increase in the complexity of government (Great 
Depression, Post-war recoveries, self-sustaining tax authority, etc.) or faced times of 
incredible creation of wealth (post-World-War II, post-Korean War, Reagan to Bush 
administration years). Efforts on the part of presidential administrations and the courts 
to shift power back toward the states have been haphazard at best. Devolution, where 
authority and program controls are shifted to state governments is not the same as 
decentralization. Within this dynamic cauldron of churning intergovernmental 
relations, where does one find the discussion of federalism as it relates to homeland 
security? The discussion is necessary to provide context for the evolution of policy. 
There is growing literature addressing the difficulties imposed on American 
federalism and intergovernmental relations by the current policy regime related to 
homeland security national preparedness.12  Though there are innumerable versions of 
governance schemes identified as meeting the criteria of “federalism,” there are but 
three dominant federalism theories – Cooperative, Coercive, and Competitive – that 
manifest in various institutional pathologies and behaviors in contemporary America. 
These theories and their application to homeland security national preparedness have 
been fully developed.13 To further develop the connection between theories and 
behaviors, however, one could easily apply the templates found in the 
intergovernmental management (IGM) models developed by Agranoff and McGuire.  
The table below illustrates the features of each of the IGM models, how these models 
align with contemporary theories of federalism, and how these models might overlay the 
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Table 1.  Contemporary Intergovernmental Management Models.14 
MODELS 
Top-Down Donor-Recipient Jurisdiction Network 
Policy development 
concentrated at the 
national level. 
State and local 
governments coerced 
into implementing 
policies with high 
compliance 
requirements and little 
flexibility. 
Funding found in 
categorical grants with 
stringent 
accountability. 
Policies developed at 
the national level to 
treat “national” issues. 
State and local 
governments 
implement policies for 
national government 
but have some 
flexibility in 
implementation to suit 
constituent needs. 
Funding categorical 
but less stringent in 
compliance. 
Center of policy and 
planning focused on 
the local jurisdiction. 
Planning is strategic in 
nature, placing the 
jurisdiction at the 
center of the planning 
process and the 
recipient of all 
potential support 
coming from other 
jurisdictions or levels 
of government. 
Funding, if available, 
focused on meeting 
constituent 
preferences. 





collaboration to meet 
common needs, 
particularly in times of 
crisis. 
Support based on 
temporary excess 
capacities. 
Network expanded to 
include other 
jurisdictions and 
levels of government. 








Reflective of a more 
collaborative form of 
Federalism 
Enforced Behaviors Mutual Dependencies Centralized Planning Capacity 
Augmentation  
Current homeland 








state, and local 
interactions related to 





plans that allow for 
deliberate, effective 
resource planning and 
management. 
Would allow 
jurisdictions to build 
an expectation of 
augmentation to own-
source capacities 




The Agranoff and McGuire Donor-Recipient model represents the notion that 
government actors have mutual dependence. Jurisdictions at different levels of 
government cooperate even though there might be tensions or conflicts related to 
program activities. This arrangement aligns conveniently with Cooperative Federalism 
characteristics. Policy implementation takes place at the intersection of goal setting and 
carrying out actions. The donor does not have the time or inclination to interfere and 
the recipient must balance conformity and compliance with seeking jurisdictional goals.  
This model seems to fit most longstanding interactions related to well-established grant 
programs and organizations like those found with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and state emergency management officials. Unfortunately, another one of their 
models characterizes nearly all other aspects of homeland security national 
preparedness intergovernmental relations.   
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The Top-Down model matches the developed characteristics of Coercive 
Federalism.15 In the Top-Down model, direction comes from the national government 
with state and local governments executing policy. The pernicious nature of this model 
is found in the behavior of the national government, forcing cooperation among actors 
with little or no discretion available at the state and local level.16 
Even though the federal homeland security policy apparatus has been reminded time 
and again of the need to embrace alternative public management models, particularly in 
this arena, the administration and its operatives have become less collegial and more 
directive in their approach to policy development and implementation.17 As Conlan and 
Dinan describe, the Bush administration has been generally dismissive of federalism 
concerns across a wide front of policy areas and homeland security policy is no 
exception.18 The foundational documents related to homeland security, authored in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, gave strong acknowledgment to federalism as a controlling 
and guiding principle in policy development.  The most recent documents, however, give 
no mention of federalism and have changed the rhetoric from seeking coordination and 
collaboration with state and local partners to merely seeking consultation with other 
levels of government. These changes in tone and continued centralization of policy 
power have not gone unnoticed by state and local governments across the country.19 
State and local governments seek guidance from the national government that, when 
implemented, is revenue neutral and actually facilitates mutual aid arrangements that 
minimize rent seeking, free riding, and policy entrepreneurship. Documents like the 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) have not been subjected to comprehensive cost-impact 
analysis until recently, yet the preparedness and performance measures outlined in the 
TCL (and being pushed on jurisdictions by DHS) are taking on the status of “standards” 
which, if pursued, will distort state and local government budget and policy priorities.20 
If one accepts the notion that this administration and the supporting bureaucracy 
have demonstrated behaviors dismissive and disdainful of federalism, one should not be 
surprised by the increased resistance to centralized policy developments related to 
public safety, emergency management, and homeland security as perceived at the state 
and local levels.21 As if the situation were not tenuous enough as it relates to federalism, 
one should be particularly mindful of the inhibiting effects institutional pathologies 
have had on developing sound, workable national preparedness policies. 
INSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES 
Eugene Bardach cautions those with interests in public policy to be on guard when 
analyzing policy options.22 If changing a single pathology or overcoming one barrier 
would eliminate a properly identified policy problem, why has that pathology or barrier 
not already been eliminated? The reason may be that there are some things that cannot 
be changed in the policy arena. There are institutional pathologies that might inhibit 
good policy development, but many of these behaviors are such that the marginal return 
in trying to change them may not be worth the cost of so doing. Similar caution would 
be prudent in examining the other institutions that comprise the homeland security 
national preparedness policy arena. This section examines the institutional pathologies 
of Congress, DHS, the Executive Branch and state and local governments and how those 
behaviors influence homeland security national preparedness public policy.  
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The Congress of the United States 
There are several behaviors of Congress that have direct influence on the public policy 
arena. Many of the behaviors of Congress conspire to make the development of optimal 
policy outcomes difficult at best. However, a prudent policy analyst should be aware of 
those behaviors that are not likely to change.   
The first of those pathologies that are not likely to change is the notion that elected 
representatives behave in such a manner as to first assure re-election, then begin the 
work of those to whom they are accountable.23 Another set of behaviors not likely to 
change are those associated with preemptions of state and local government 
prerogatives and the propensity to advance policy regimes for which there is little or no 
financial support at the state and local level. These unfunded mandates have an 
extremely deleterious impact on state and local government revenues and expenditures 
but are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.24  There are some outcomes of this 
behavior, however, that do have an impact, directly and indirectly, on national 
preparedness.   
One of the most interesting aspects of the combinations of preemptions and 
mandates found in legislative and regulatory regimes is the impact of indirect taxation 
associated with passing program costs on to the constituents of the state and local 
governments. These state and local representatives of constituents who have not asked 
for these programs are left to use jurisdictional own-source revenues to support the 
implementation of nationalized programs. This indirect taxation is imposed on 
taxpayers and consumers without the benefit of shared information between the 
government and its constituents. The impact of the indirect taxation is not 
insignificant.25 Analysis of data gathered by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures indicates that the average state must use an additional 5.1% of its operating 
budget to meet the unfunded requirements associated with implementation and 
administration of national grants-in-aid programs.26  This percentage translates to a $71 
billion tax levy across the nation, or over $236 for each man, woman, and child in the 
country. The $71 billion is revenue that must be taken from supporting programs 
preferred by the state and local constituents to be applied to programs that may or may 
not benefit those same constituents and for which no preference may have been 
expressed.   
This imposition of mandate is indicative of a central government tendency to overtax 
constituents as a manifestation of revenue maximization.27 Likewise, rather than 
decentralization of programs – something needed in complex systems – devolution of 
programs has meant increased tax and revenue requirements for state and local 
governments.28 Based on interviews and informal surveys, few taxpayers are aware of 
the impact of unfunded or under-funded mandates on their individual situations. 
Interviews of state and local bureaucrats, however, elicit quite a different response.  
Nearly to a person, these individuals are not only aware of the impact of unfunded or 
under-funded mandates, but they must work to find the offsets in state and local 
operating budgets so that national funds continue to flow into their respective 
jurisdictions. Even if the behaviors of Congress in the above areas are unlikely to 
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change, there is one area in which such change might be effected: oversight of the 
Department of Homeland Security.   
Congress, as part of the checks and balances of this nation’s federal form of 
government, provides oversight and funding for executive branch agencies that develop, 
deploy, and execute policies based on congressional input. Congressional oversight is 
manifested in its committee structures in both houses and in the rules of conduct for 
both the House and Senate. Using the Department of Defense as a model of a complex 
organization for which Congress must provide considerable oversight, there are some 
thirty-six committees in both the House and Senate that have responsibilities for 
oversight of the department. However, only six of these committees (House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees, House and Senate Defense and Military Construction 
Committees, and House and Senate Appropriations Sub-Committees) have any 
substantive authority over or impact on the Department of Defense. The oversight of 
DHS is somewhat more complex, with no less than seventy-nine committees and 
subcommittees claiming some form of oversight. Congressional leaders have chosen to 
protect prerogatives associated with oversight of the legacy agencies that comprise the 
current DHS rather than streamlining oversight for more effective department 
management and operation.29 This means that all 100 senators and 412 of the 435 
members of the House have input to the oversight of the department.  One cannot help 
but be struck by the fact that the Department of Defense, given its $400+ billion budget, 
is more than ten times the size of DHS yet has far less oversight.30   
On average, at least one senior DHS representative provides testimony to one of these 
committees every day Congress is in session. As one who has had to prepare for 
congressional testimony in the past, the author can state that preparation for such 
appearances can take days or weeks of full-time concentration of a department’s staff.31  
If the staff is preparing for congressional testimony, it is not likely to be able to deal 
(with any level of credible effort) with day-to-day operations or developing long term 
objectives. The complexity and pervasiveness of demands on senior department staff 
from Congress lead to inefficient and sub-optimized functionality. Likewise, if senior 
staff are focused on congressional oversight, then midlevel bureaucrats are, by default, 
more likely to end-run senior leaders in the department given the extraordinary access 
to Congress these individuals are given. Even with all the attention paid to homeland 
security in the wake of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, analysis of funding levels for the 
department indicate that those levels have not increased outside the average increase for 
any other department, while federal grants-in-aid funds for homeland security have 
actually declined.32 
The Department of Homeland Security 
In March of 2003, DHS became a fully operating department of the executive branch, 
with its secretary given full cabinet rank. Since DHS began operations, the department 
has undergone no less than five major reorganizations, including three since the 
celebrated Second Stage Review (2SR) in 2005. This lack of continuity in organization 
has led to several other problems that have impeded the department in fully meeting 
expectations and in fulfilling its assigned missions. These management challenges are 
well documented, most notably by the Government Accountability Office (USGAO).33 
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Although staffing of the department seems to be one of the critical shortfalls, many 
capable officials are working diligently, doing the best they can. Unfortunately that 
effort, complicated by congressional oversight issues, has led the department to craft ill-
defined and ambiguous national preparedness policy that in turn has led to ill-defined 
and ambiguous implementation standards and objectives. Subsequently, much of the 
public policy related to program administration has been slow in development and 
implementation due mostly to the lack of qualified people to orchestrate the complex 
networks of stakeholders to reach consensus on policy decisions. Likewise, much of the 
policy has been sub-optimized and has had to be retooled at the behest of those asked to 
implement the policies, because the policies did not adequately address such 
fundamental issues as the constitutionality of policies or the feasibility of policies based 
on existing or potential resource limitations. 
There are foundational documents that should guide the development of public policy 
related to homeland security national preparedness. Subsequently, the policy coming 
from the National Preparedness Directorate of FEMA (the latest variant) dictates the 
distribution of federal grant funds supporting homeland security initiatives. What has 
been difficult to ascertain is exactly how policy parameters are being formed in the 
department and who is actually guiding the effort to develop national preparedness 
policy. Many offices have operational “taskings” associated with policy development, but 
none claim to be the guiding force behind the efforts. Given this ambiguity, many offices 
in FEMA are either attempting to capture turf or are working to avoid taking 
responsibility for policy development or implementation. Currently, there are two 
processes being developed to assess national preparedness and no less than four other 
“assessment” processes being evaluated for integration into a single process intended to 
apply to all 39,000 general purpose jurisdictions in the country. None of these programs 
have been evaluated for imposed cost or labor implications. 
In a recent analysis conducted by the author of the potential for integrating the two 
prominent national assessment programs, simply answering the survey required by just 
one of the programs could potentially cost state and local governments $660 million in 
own-source resources. Add to that cost the expense of satisfying initial National Incident 
Management System compliance and state and local governments must find a total of 
$1.2 billion in own-source funding. As was stated earlier, the TCL has not been 
subjected to a realistic cost analysis until recently, but not much imagination is needed 
to grasp the potential cost of 39,000 jurisdictions complying with more than 2,500 
preparedness and performance measures. Recent cost-impact analysis of only a few 
“common” capabilities outlined in the TCL indicate the imposition of initial costs of $4.7 
billion for acquisition and annual costs of $3.4 billion for sustainment.34  All but a few 
jurisdictions will have no ability, or incentive, to strive for compliance with NIMS or the 
TCL. Given the lack of appreciation for the realities of scarce resources at the state and 
local level, there are few reasons for governments below the national level to take the 
TCL seriously. 
State and Local Governments 
State and local government are entities that provide goods and services based on some 
form of revenue and expenditure scheme that reflects the preferences of the constituents 
of those governmental entities. Using this definition, there are approximately 39,000 
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jurisdictions (counties, cities, towns, villages, etc.) providing an array of public goods 
and services to constituents.35 These jurisdictional entities are significant when 
discussing homeland security, because these jurisdictions have the task of fulfilling 
homeland security responsibilities by attempting to ensure that all measures have been 
taken to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. 
After all, all disasters are local. 
All but one state and nearly all the sub-state jurisdictions are constitutionally bound 
to balance their respective annual budgets. State and local governments are also 
typically bound to higher levels of scrutiny and accountability, because these 
governments are closer to their constituents. The accountability of state and local 
government manifests itself through public meetings for all government activities, 
public budgets, outside auditing, competitive bidding practices for procuring services, 
and many other activities in which transparency is demanded by the citizens.   
Most state (and local) governments operate on budget cycles that generally are 
annual or biennial in nature.36 All but nine states have some form of state income tax 
system tied to the federal income tax system. When the economy is doing well, state 
revenues are generally very strong. However, when the nation is in a recession, the 
impact on state income tax revenues is often extremely stressful for state governments.  
Most states also use a sales tax to support further revenue generation. Corporate taxes 
and user fees tend to round out state tax revenue schemes. 
Local governments often are faced with tough budget situations and are normally 
funded through property taxes and fee systems for services. Many large metropolitan 
areas also use local sales and income taxes to support government operations. The 
variety of taxes available to most sub-state jurisdictions is limited, which leads to other 
difficulties when resources are stressed. 
Given that competitive forces are strong at the state and local level, finding a balance 
between providing preferred public goods and services and funding those goods and 
services with an appropriate and acceptable tax and fee structure is perhaps the most 
difficult challenge for state and local legislators and administrators. There is significant 
resistance on the part of both administrators and constituents to raising taxes, so 
revenue streams are restricted at best.37 
As was mentioned previously, the perspectives of those at the state and local level are 
different from those at the federal level. When focused on governance and homeland 
security, state and local officials worked diligently to achieve a new equilibrium in 
spending and expansion of existing public safety and emergency management mission 
space to include “homeland security.” As the executive director of a prominent 
emergency management organization expressed, “Terror is another hazard to be 
included in our all-hazard approach to accomplishing our mission.”38 Survey data 
confirm that state and local governments, when considering the hazards that most 
influence planning and resource allocation, consider acts of terror ranking alongside 
drug trafficking and school shootings. These events are considered the least likely high 
consequence events to occur in most jurisdictions. The only jurisdictions that consider 
terrorism a realistic priority are those with large, dense populations with significant 
infrastructure that might attract terrorist interests.  
There are a couple of points that should be made so as to provide a broader context 
for the discussion of reallocation of resources and funding the expanded homeland 
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security mission space at the state and local level. Over time, however, funding at the 
state and local level has stabilized to the point that there is a new equilibrium for 
revenues and expenditures at the state and local level. This behavior is consistent with 
competitive federalism tenets and belies the argument that competition leads to a “race 
to the bottom.” 
The second point to make is that in the aftermath of 9/11, constituents made their 
preferences known to their agents (elected or appointed representatives) but have 
subsequently decided that if more revenue is to be spent on homeland security 
initiatives that money will have to come from other programs (for which preferences 
have changed) or from revenue-neutral intergovernmental transfers. After having 
reached a new equilibrium, they will not entertain discussion of increases in taxes to 
further expand public safety, emergency management, or homeland security 
capabilities.39 Most jurisdictions in the United States are spending exactly as much as 
they need to spend on homeland security. Unless the federal government provides state 
and local jurisdictions revenue-neutral or revenue-positive funding, it is unlikely state 
and local governments will expend greater resources than are already being spent. 
In recent years, the general behavior of state governments, when enjoying budget 
surpluses, has been to provide tax cuts to the citizens, increase allocations to “rainy day” 
funds, broaden the client base for social programs, provide incentives to particular 
industries to attract them to the states, or a combination of these techniques.40 The 
sensitivity of constituents to marginal tax rates sometimes forces states to focus on 
short-term solutions rather than look to the future to secure stability in the fiscal regime 
of the state. Likewise, constituents have become sensitive to broadening client bases 
when surpluses are small but seem more generous when surpluses are unexpectedly 
large. No matter the situation with budget surpluses, state and local governments act to 
increase their competitive positions relative to other peer jurisdictions.41 
One of the most important revenue streams for state and local governments is the 
federal tax revenue repatriated through grants-in-aid. In fiscal year 2004, the last year 
for which complete data are available, state and local governments received 31.9 percent 
of their operational revenue from the federal government. Although state and local 
governments may appear to be addicted to the repatriated revenue, they are not in favor 
of categorical grants and the persistence of unfunded or under-funded aspects of the 
programs supported through these grants. The weakening of the relative position of the 
state and local governments in the current intergovernmental relations scheme has been 
affected by the loss of some fiscal autonomy.42 Further, state and local governments 
want most of the grants moved from categorical grants to block grants. Block grants 
provide state and local governments the flexibility needed to apply the funds where they 
best serve constituent needs and eliminate the requirement to use own-source funds to 
ensure full implementation and administration of the programs supported by the 
funds.43 
There are some difficulties in getting Congress or executive department agencies to 
move to block grants as neither can claim credit for the distribution of funds to pet 
projects or districts. In countless conversations with federal level bureaucrats 
concerning homeland security grants, the common theme is that the state and local 
governments need to be accountable for the funds they are receiving. In truth, 
homeland security grant funds comprise less than one half of one percent of the overall 
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operating budgets of state and local jurisdictions, and homeland security is a distant, 
minor priority in the general budgeting scheme of all but a few jurisdictions.44 What 
federal officials fail to grasp is that state and local officials are not accountable to the 
federal government but to their constituents. 
Given the current administration’s movement from program analysis to performance 
management, most grant programs fair poorly. The use of the Performance Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) process has caused considerable friction and tension between the 
federal government and state and local governments attempting to administer grant 
programs. Not surprisingly, block grant programs perform the worst with this system.45 
Ironically, the most effective public program operating today is the Temporary Aid to 
Needy Family program where the funds are given to the states with wide discretion in 
how to implement and management program activities.46   
To date, all DHS administered grant programs have focused on building capacity 
without attention to funding to support required human capital and sustainment. This 
factor can be mapped back to Congressional pathologies. The instructions found in 
grant application materials are explicit about what can and cannot be purchased. Many 
jurisdictions now have new fire trucks, ambulances, and police vehicles, but few have 
been able to add staff to operate the new equipment. Subsequently, jurisdictions have 
been able to replace aging equipment with new equipment, but have added no capability 
and little capacity to their operations. Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of grant 
distributions has been the phenomenon of fewer and fewer jurisdictions applying for 
grant funding, because those jurisdiction cannot, or will not, overcome the opportunity 
or transaction costs associated with pursuing homeland security grant dollars.47 This 
single phenomenon has had dramatic impact on federal level policy developers who are 
having difficulty explaining the reluctance of some state and most local governments to 
feed at the homeland security public trough. 
The distribution of funds under the current grant programs is uneven at best. States 
with high populations and population densities receive relatively little funding per 
capita compared to states with low populations and population densities. The 
distribution of funds related to other homeland security programs outside those 
administered by FEMA may dilute the overall effectiveness of the internal grant 
programs, because the funds are distributed to highly concentrated areas (although the 
funds to fulfill these grant requirements are taken from the national tax revenue base). 
State and local administrative agents for homeland security grant funding do not see 
most of these funds as they are passed directly to agencies at the local level. At present, 
there is no mechanism available to examine the balance of all grant programs, nor are 
there any mechanisms to level grants to ensure more equitable distribution of funds. 
Even with recent changes to the state homeland security grant program distribution 
formula, the baseline distribution of funds is still unbalanced in favor of small 
population states. 
THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THE CURRENT POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
There are a number of assumptions, or elements of conventional wisdom, related to 
homeland security national preparedness public policy that must be addressed. Based 
on the discussion above, the following paragraphs examine the assumptions upon which 
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current policies are being developed and why the assumptions are flawed. If the 
assumptions are flawed, then any subsequent policies forthcoming will be flawed as 
well.  As Ingraham advises, if the policy problem has been properly identified, it is not 
likely that policy errors will have to be corrected after implementation.48 Further, bad 
assumptions lead to a distorted view of the current policy environment. In order to find 
reasonable solutions to reestablish national preparedness policy efficacy, we must 
appreciate the realities that compel behaviors at the state and local level to be contrary 
to those desired by an insensitive national government. 
  This assumption is indicated by examining the HSPDs and subsequent policy 
documents associated with homeland security national preparedness. The Department 
of Homeland Security has based most of its preparedness planning on the fifteen 
national scenarios that address natural and man-made disasters, which range from 
response to a conventional improvised explosive device to the detonation of a nuclear 
weapon inside the United States. The Target Capabilities List (TCL),49 a document 
outlining some 2,500+ preparedness and performance measures in thirty-seven target 
capabilities for national, state, and local governments, is predicated on matching 
capabilities at each level of government with the “requirements” to meet a particular 
scenario. Though supposedly not prescriptive, the TCL is gaining the status of being a 
“standards” document for all general purpose jurisdictions in the country.50 Similarly, 
the document has only recently been subjected to any level of cost analysis. That 
analysis indicates that the costs of meeting the requirements found in a handful of 
common capabilities far exceed the level of grant funding available to general purpose 
jurisdictions through all of the grant programs associated with homeland security and 
managed by DHS. 
The major problem with the assumption above is that the level of preparedness 
outlined in the TCL is unattainable. There are simply not enough resources available for 
the 39,000 general purpose jurisdictions to build the capacities suggested in the TCL. 
The expectation implied in the assumption is that state and local general purpose 
jurisdictions will spend own-source revenues to build the capacities outlined in the TCL. 
State and local governments, however, are already spending all they are going to spend 
on public safety, emergency management, and homeland security. The budget priorities 
of state and local governments reflect the preferences of constituents. Typically, the 
priorities of state and local governments concentrate the majority of spending on 
education, transportation, job training, development, income security, and health care. 
There is very little left in public coffers to expand public safety and emergency 
management funding beyond the level preferred by citizens within the respective 
jurisdictions.51 For the national government to think otherwise is indicative of  
insensitivity to, or ignorance of, the dynamics of budget priorities of governments below 
the national level. 
In the days immediately following the attacks of 9/11, policy documents placed 
emphasis on including state and local governments in the policy process and, in 
particular, addressed the need to honor the principles of federalism. However, as time 
passed and policy development evolved, state and local governments became less 
partners and more instruments of policy implementation. One of the most vocal 
complaints heard from state and local officials is that federal officials, particularly in 
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DHS, have not provided officials below the national level a strong enough voice in policy 
development and implementation. 
One of the common complaints voiced by those in DHS and Congress is that state and 
local jurisdictions must be accountable for the funding received through grant 
programs. To that end, DHS officials have increased grant reporting requirements with 
each version of the grant guidance since 2004. Subsequently, state and local officials 
have stopped applying for grant funding because the transaction and opportunities costs 
associated with gaining grant funding cannot be overcome. Therefore, most of the 
jurisdictions that applied for funding early on have stopped applying. The federal 
government demand for accountability and the directive nature of policy documents 
provide few incentives for state and local governments to participate in policy 
development and give the impression that homeland security is no longer a national 
problem requiring collaboration but a federal problem requiring compliance. State and 
local government authorities would be much more likely to collaborate with federal 
officials if the national government appeared to be interested in collaboration, 
facilitation, and optimization of preparedness based on the resources available, rather 
than continuing to coerce jurisdictions into spending funds that are currently applied to 
the preferences of citizens. 
One other point pertaining to this assumption needs to be highlighted. The amount of 
homeland security grant funding coming to state and local governments is less than 0.3 
percent of the operational budgets of state and local governments. The coercive 
approach employed by DHS to gain compliance with the National Incident Management 
System or with the TCL loses its impact when the funding levels are so low to begin with 
and have been declining every year since 2002.52 
Homeland security national preparedness public policy, as documented in the latest 
version of the National Strategy for Homeland Security,53 is focused on applying the 
efforts of the nation to preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from 
acts of terrorism. At the state and local level however, “terror” is considered as yet 
another hazard that must be addressed in the expanded public safety and emergency 
management mission space. One of the major complaints from state and local officials is 
that the federal government is “all terror-all the time,” leaving preparedness for the 
more frequent occurrences of fires, floods, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes as an 
afterthought for which little is being done at the national level. 
Perhaps one of the key challenges undermining the above assumption is that all-
hazard national preparedness is a top-down requirement that must have federal 
government stewardship. In fact, preparedness in communities around the country is a 
bottom-up proposition that requires application of contemporary public management 
models to build capacities for community resilience and to ensure that help is available 
in times of crisis. One must remember that all disasters are local and few events ever 
rise to the level of national significance. Similarly, when communities respond to 
requests for help, they provide temporary excess capacity – that amount of help 
available at the time of the event for a specific time. Perhaps most significant is the fact 
that capacities in communities ebb and flow based on funding, conditions, preferences, 
and demographic changes. These capacities are not finite and fixed. Federal government 
officials would be well served to remember that most events are local, focused, and 
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discrete, and any response builds from the bottom up to include support from other 
jurisdictions horizontally and from different levels of government vertically. 
If the one can accept that the assumptions listed above might be suspect, then one 
should be interested in whether there might be institutional pathologies, misguided 
policies, and bad policy instruments that further exacerbate the sub-optimization of 
national preparedness. The next section, however, discusses of the key foundational 
documents that have guided the evolution of national preparedness public policy. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Does the description of the current policy environment provided above support the 
assumptions currently guiding national preparedness policy development? The answer 
is a resounding “No.” 
The first assumption asserts that the nation can achieve an idealized level of 
preparedness based on current or foreseeable resources. Certainly, the national policy 
documents seem to indicate that there is some idealized level of preparedness to which 
each jurisdiction must contribute. However, this is simply not possible. No amount of 
coercion on the part of the national government will compel state and local governments 
to spend money they do not – or will ever – have. State and local governments are 
accountable to their citizens and cannot alter budgetary priorities focused on the 
compelling needs of education, job training, transportation, development, income 
security, and health care. Further, state and local governments absorbed homeland 
security mission requirements into the existing mission space found in public safety and 
emergency management. Without an increase in homeland security grant funding, state 
and local governments will be left to augment preparedness and increase community 
resilience based on public management models other than the ones in place at this time. 
The second assumption states that the national government should direct the 
development of national preparedness policy and ensure that state and local 
governments comply with the guidance and account for all homeland security grant 
funds. In the study of economics, good information is required to make sound economic 
decisions. It is preposterous for the national government to assume that officials in DHS 
have enough information to make decisions about what is best for the citizens of 
Florida, Kansas, or Arizona. The one-size-fits-all approach to policy development belies 
any sensitivity to the fact that perhaps conditions might be different in each state, 
county, city, and village.   
The second element of this assumption presumes that the grant program is effective 
in altering the preparedness landscape of state and local governments. Given that many 
jurisdictions have decided they cannot overcome the transaction or opportunity costs 
associated with applying for grants, the need for accountability may be lessening. 
Similarly, the amount of money being distributed to state and local governments is of 
little consequence in the typical budget scheme found below the national level of 
government. 
The third assumption concerns the efforts of the national government to build 
national preparedness policy based on the full involvement of state and local 
governments that includes a full appreciation of an all-hazards approach to emergency 
management and public safety. As can be seen in the evolution of the most recent policy 
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documents, state and local governments have been consulted about but not included in 
the policy development process. If state and local governments are to augment 
preparedness levels, they must do so based on a strong reliance on a bottom-up 
approach as opposed to accepting a top-down approach that most likely does not fit the 
needs of constituents. 
If the key assumptions upon which national preparedness policies are based are 
flawed, there are changes that can occur that will allow the nation to achieve a level of 
preparedness above current levels – if new assumptions are advanced. What might 
those new assumptions be that would allow a different frame of reference for those 
charged with preparedness responsibilities, regardless of level of government? 
The first assumption should be reshaped to acknowledge that the level of 
preparedness possible in the country is bounded by the resources available to federal, 
state, and local governments. The greatest constraints are found below the national 
level. The second assumption needs to be modified to allow for state and local 
governments to meet the needs of constituents by working toward guidelines, not 
mandates, for national preparedness. Further, grant funding should be given in the form 
of block grants with maximum flexibility available to recipients. If the national 
government cannot live with this level of latitude, then perhaps no money should be 
given at all, given that the current amount is so small compared to other revenue 
streams. Finally, the national government should perhaps take on the role of facilitator 
rather than dictator and cede policy sovereignty to a shared form of policy development 
focused on the needs of sub-national governments. If the underlying assumptions upon 
which policies are based are changed, then perhaps recommendations can be fashioned 
that will allow the nation to achieve the level of preparedness possible within the 
immutable constraints that are not likely to change. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rather than rehashing the material entered above, perhaps the focus should be on 
addressing the Agranoff and McGuire jurisdiction and network models and examining 
whether or not these models might allow state and local jurisdictions to increase 
community resilience and preparedness. The models must be examined together, 
though, as doing one without the other does not seem to optimize their collective value. 
The jurisdiction model asks the government entity to place itself in the center of a 
policy arena and focus on planning that will allow the jurisdiction to achieve its strategic 
objectives. As the jurisdiction develops its strategic objectives, the planning process 
should develop outcomes that include all own-source assets and should identify those 
assets that need to be acquired. Perhaps the jurisdiction can apply for grant funding.  
Perhaps the jurisdictions can enter a cooperative agreement with the state. The idea is to 
harness, in the planning process, all the resources the jurisdiction might need to meet its 
long-term objectives. 
If the focus of the planning process conducted by the jurisdiction is to enhance 
community resilience and augment preparedness, then the government entity should be 
the capacity center, meeting preparedness needs horizontally from other similar 
governments and vertically from different levels of government. With a comprehensive 
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planning effort in support of the jurisdiction model, the government entity will have 
identified the resources needed to meet requirements. 
The next step is to apply the network model to the preparedness strategy developed 
using the jurisdiction model. The basis of building a viable, scalable, and effective 
network is to understand that the preparedness and response capacities of a jurisdiction 
are fluid and not fixed. In order to provide assistance to a neighboring jurisdiction, 
temporary excess capacities can be provided for a limited amount of time. At some point 
the capacity loaned to the neighboring jurisdiction must be returned to fulfill the needs 
of the lending jurisdiction. This advancement of temporary excess capacity is a key to 
augmenting capacities without incurring additional costs. 
An anecdote supports the use of these models to augment capacities from the bottom 
up. Recently, in a small town in the author’s home state, a grain elevator exploded due 
to the accumulation of grain dust ignited by an errant spark. There were several injuries 
and the elevator was rendered unsafe. In the ensuing response, jurisdictions throughout 
the region sent first responders to augment the local government’s efforts to treat the 
injured and secure the scene. The response, so typical of this part of the country, was 
based on the temporary excess capacities of those neighboring jurisdictions. The help 
was sent willingly without concerns for free riding and the response was mounted in an 
ad hoc manner without formal agreements. However, based on the nature of the 
preparedness environment and the political culture of this region, one can be assured 
that an informal network had been established that provided some assurance that help 
would be coming if needed. 
The incentives for local jurisdictions to follow these models are numerous. First, 
preparedness professionals can gain some certainty that needs are identified and 
resources are located that will allow the jurisdiction to meet its preparedness needs. 
Second, elected officials in the jurisdiction can be assured that preparedness 
augmentation can occur without incurring additional costs. These same individuals, the 
faces of most emergencies, will have a greater stake in ensuring that the network 
developed is extensive, comprehensive, and includes horizontal and vertical elements. 
Finally, the citizens of the communities involved can be assured that their government 
will be resilient in times of crisis and that their preparedness is as great as is possible 
given the resources and circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
There is always hope for things to change, but the definition of insanity is doing the 
same things over and over again and expecting different results. It is time to end the 
insanity in homeland security national preparedness public policy. If officials at all 
levels of government do not change what is being done, national preparedness will 
continue to be at levels below what is possible.   
The first step to changing the direction of national preparedness policy is to revise the 
operating assumptions upon which these policies are based. The current assumptions 
are flawed and must be changed. 
The second step is to encourage state and local governments to adopt contemporary 
public management models for planning and augmenting preparedness from the 
bottom up. Local jurisdictions must embrace the notion that the safety and security of 
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their citizens lies in their hands and not wholly in the hands of the national government. 
By focusing on achieving strategic preparedness goals through networking, 
preparedness levels will increase without further distortions of budgets and without 
coercion from the national government to achieve levels of preparedness that are 
unattainable given the level of resources available. 
Finally, state and local governments must help the national government gain an 
appreciation of what all-hazards emergency management really means. Terrorism, 
perhaps the most compelling threat to national security, is not the only hazard for which 
government should prepare. The responsibilities at all levels of government are 
profound, so getting it right is essential – a national requirement.  
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New Requirements for a New Challenge: 





Threats along America’s borders have taken on a new and ominous character. In the 
past, United States customs and border officials were focused on relatively benign 
matters of enforcing laws surrounding trade and immigration, protecting agriculture 
and economic interests from pest and disease, and processing people, vehicles and 
cargo.1 In the last three decades, however, these issues have been joined, and eclipsed, 
by growing apprehension surrounding matters of far greater concern than illegal 
immigrants in search of economic opportunities. The migration of gangs across the 
nation’s borders and into our cities, organized criminal elements trafficking drugs and 
human beings into the United States, and the specter of terrorists and terrorist devices 
seeping through our borders to the north and south, all combine to contribute to a 
growing set of dangers to our people. Moreover, a compounded threat is emerging at the 
intersection of these concerns, wherein criminal and terrorist elements may unite 
toward the attainment of shared and separate goals. The combination of these elements 
elevates the potential disruption to our society beyond the responsibilities of law 
enforcement to matters of defense. 
As the nature and severity of the threat increases, the character of our response to it 
must change. This country has a cherished tradition of separation between its police and 
its military. That tradition has generally delegated responsibility for keeping the 
citizenry safe from internal, domestic dangers to federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. Likewise, safeguarding that citizenry from external aggression 
has, for the most part, been the obligation of the United States armed forces. But in a 
time where criminal and terrorist activities may merge at our borders, this distinction 
may not be maintainable. New cooperation is mandated between the military and the 
border patrol. In terms of that cooperation, the military must be prepared to assume a 
greater role. 
AN OVER-TAXED BORDER 
No one seems to underestimate the urgency of the requirement. Nor have they since 
before 9/11. 
The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly known 
as the Hart-Rudman Commission, recommended that the executive branch establish a 
“National Homeland Security Agency.” Among other things, this agency would 
encompass the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the United States Coast Guard 
in a synergistic environment to patrol U.S. borders and police the flow of peoples and 
goods through hundreds of ports of entry.2 Legislation creating the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) included border and transportation security as one of the 
original five under-secretariats.  When Secretary Michael Chertoff came to Washington 
in February 2005, he entered the department with “six priorities;” the third of those was 
TUSSING, MILITARY’S ROLE IN BORDER SECURITY 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
2 
to “strengthen border security and interior enforcement…3” The new secretary would 
make his concerns clear as he unveiled a new organizational structure that would 
remove bureaucratic layers between his office and customs and border protection as 
part of an effort to 
…gain full control of our borders to prevent illegal immigration and security 
breaches. Flagrant violation of our borders undercuts respect for the rule of law 
and undermines our security. It also poses a particular burden to those in our 
border communities. We are developing a new approach to controlling the 
border, one that includes an integrated mix of additional staff, new technology 
and enhanced infrastructure investment.4   
Institutionally, the requirement for a robust border security mechanism seemed clear. 
 Functionally, the requirement was even clearer. In the best of times, under the best 
of circumstances, the need for diligence at the border is compelling.   
On a typical day, more than 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians, including 
635,000 aliens, over 235,000 air passengers, over 333,000 privately owned 
vehicles, and over 79,000 shipments of goods are processed at the nation’s 
borders.5 
Every year U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes nearly half a billion 
people, 130 million trucks and cars, and 20 million cargo containers through 325 ports 
of entry.6   
Curiously enough, however, the immensity of the daily requirement is not the most 
compelling factor among concerns over the security of the border. What is described 
above is the routine, legitimate traffic that allows for the free flow of visitors and 
commerce, keeping open the doors of the “land of opportunity” and, coincidentally, 
sustaining much of the economy. The greater concern for security lies beyond these 
factors in an accompanying flow that does not seek legitimate opportunity, but criminal 
gain; that is not interested in sharing the American way of life, but in undermining it 
and the institutions and values which sustain it. A report developed in the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security offers an interesting and potentially 
ominous contrast: 
During 2005, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 1.2 million illegal aliens 
[along the Southwest border between the United States and Mexico]; of those, 
165,000 were from countries other than Mexico. Of the non-Mexican aliens, 
approximately 650 were from special interest countries. 7, 8 
The threat along the northern border, while far less publicized, is nevertheless cause for 
concern; perhaps equal concern, perhaps greater. In 1988, U.S. Customs officials 
arrested three members of a Syrian terrorist group, linked to al Qaeda in the process of 
entering the U.S. with explosives.9 Members of the terrorist cell that executed the 1993 
attack on the World Trade Center entered the U.S. from Canada, and were planning to 
use Canada as a possible escape route. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested 
crossing into the United States in possession of bomb making materials and plans for 
what became known as the Millennium bomb plot against Los Angeles International 
Airport.10 Ressam would be characterized by the State Department as a textbook 
example of someone who “capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration and asylum 
policies to enjoy safe haven, raise funds, arrange logistical support, and plan terrorist 
attacks.”11   
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And the past, we have every reason to fear, may well be prelude, as pointed out by Dr. 
Todd Hataley of the Royal Military College of Canada: 
In the post 9/11 period Canada has continued to raise security concerns in the 
United States. U.S. security officials believe that Canada is not only home to 
“sleeper cells” waiting for a chance to cross the border and attack the United 
States, but also that crossing from Canada has become a favorite route for illegal 
immigrants, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists.12 
THE MILITARY IN (LIMITED) SUPPORT 
Juxtapose this history against a northern border that stretches nearly 5,000 miles and a 
southwestern counterpart that runs another 2,000, and the challenge weighing against 
CBP is irksome, to say the least. In October 2006 there were 11,000 agents assigned to 
watch and protect both sets of borders.13 In May 2006, the Administration embarked 
upon a plan to raise those numbers to over 18,000 by the end of 2008,14 increasing the 
total number to over 101% of the number that stood when the president took office in 
2001.15  
Whether or not that number will be sufficient is debatable. Whatever the case, plans 
for the future do not meet a requirement facing us today. The challenges that have 
inspired these increases will not be suspended until the increases can be brought about.  
As though acknowledging the same, the Administration launched Operation Jump Start 
in May 2006. The operation was officially terminated on July 15, 2008,16 but at its 
height included over 6,000 National Guard from forty-eight states, brought to 
“strengthen border security and encourage deterrence.”17 David V. Aguilar, chief of the 
Office of Border Patrol for CBP, testified as to the nature of the Guard’s mission before 
members of the House Homeland Security Committee:  
National Guard units will assist DHS by executing missions such as logistical and 
administrative support, operating detection systems, providing mobile 
communications, augmenting DHS’s border-related intelligence analysis efforts, 
building and installing border security infrastructure, providing transportation 
and training.18 
It is important to note, however, that while the presence of the Guard allowed CBP 
agents to return focus to law enforcement activities along the border, the troops did not 
join the agents in those activities, nor were they ever intended to do so. At the same 
hearing, Chief Aguilar was quick to remind the Congress of one clear distinction 
between the National Guard and the CBP mission. 
However, law enforcement along the border between the ports of entry will 
remain the responsibility of Border Patrol agents. The National Guard will play 
no direct law enforcement role in the apprehension, custodial care or security of 
those who are detained.19 
This pronounced distinction in the roles that the National Guard may assume in border 
operations may seem confusing. After all, the immediate requirement that saw the 
deployment of Guard seems to invite additional manpower on the border to assist in 
surveillance, intervention, apprehension, and arrest. In the face of the immensity of 
their task, CBP lauding the fact that 6,000 National Guard allowed the Border Patrol to 
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return 350 agents to “traditional frontline duties”20 could easily lead to questions as to 
why more Guard could not be positioned on those “frontlines.” 
Those slightly schooled in laws and regulations surrounding the issue of military 
support to law enforcement agencies may still be confused. The hub of much of the 
discussion surrounding these issues is the Posse Comitatus Act, legislation enacted in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, which largely prohibits the use of the active 
duty armed forces in executing the domestic laws of the United States.21  Note, however, 
that the act only applies to federal forces. It does not apply to the National Guard, 
unless the Guard forces in question have been “federalized,” or mobilized under Title 10 
of the United States Code to perform a federal mission. Title 10, for instance, is the 
authority under which National Guard units are serving overseas in support of the 
United States’ mission in Iraq. If the Guard forces are either in a “state active duty” 
status, or serving under the authority of Title 32 of the United States Code (a status that 
has the forces sustained by funds from the Department of Defense but retained under 
the command and control of the state governors and their adjutant generals), National 
Guard forces may serve in a direct law enforcement function.22 Why, then, the 
distinction, and restriction, in border operations in the Southwest or any other 
operations of this sort? Perhaps even more to the point: Why restrict the military – 
active or reserve – from directly supporting the law enforcement function of the border 
security mission? 
Soldiers – Not Policemen 
The motivation behind the restriction is, perhaps, uniquely American and embedded in 
our national mindset. Simply stated, the people of the United States do not want our 
soldiers to be policemen, or our policemen to be soldiers. The philosophical 
underpinnings of this aversion can be traced to the colonies of the pre-Revolutionary 
War, when the heretofore loyal subjects of Great Britain were repulsed by oppressive 
measures like the Quartering Acts that cast the British forces in the role of overseers 
and, even, oppressors.23 These same attitudes emerged at the end of the Reconstruction 
following the Civil War, when the federal military stood as an occupying force over the 
former Confederate states. These historic examples – combined, perhaps, with 
persistent images of military oppression that accompanied much of our immigrant 
ancestry from overseas – may help us to understand our citizenry’s aversion to too much 
of a military presence for too long in our streets. Consider, for instance, what may be 
thought of as the subliminal response to the presence of the military in our nation’s 
airports following 9/11.  Initially the sight of soldiers along the concourses of O’Hare and 
Kennedy International kindled an air of assurance and accompanying goodwill. But how 
long was it before some of us were asking “Why are these military people here, with 
those rifles and that equipment?” The truth is Americans live in a state of dichotomy 
regarding attitudes about the military. We appreciate their sacrifice. We acknowledge 
their dedication. We take pride in their prowess and the virtue of their leadership. But 
we are dedicated to the proposition that these soldiers will ever remain the servants of 
the people, and not our overseers. 
Fortunately, few are more sensitive to the military’s role than the military’s 
leadership. The clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of law 
enforcement and the military is ingrained in the mindset of its generals. Any number of 
reasons could be cited for this sensitivity, beginning with the fact that the country’s all-
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volunteer force is very much a military “of the people” and therefore very much “for the 
people.” Moreover, the senior leadership currently directing our armed forces evolved 
from a generation of young officers born in the shadow of the Vietnam era.24 The 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of that era undeservedly bore the derisive brunt of 
a society turned sour on the war. In the same time period, reports of the Pentagon 
gathering intelligence against anti-war groups further broadened the divide between 
much of America and her military. Institutional assurances were put in place in the 
1980s to prevent this type of surveillance from ever occurring again;25 but having 
survived that era of distrust between the nation’s people and the nation’s military, the 
current uniformed leadership is keenly aware of how important the support of the 
citizenry is to its soldiers – and how fragile. 
Nothing New in the Requirement? 
Even so, Chief Aguilar reminds us that border security operations involving the National 
Guard are not a requirement unique to the new century: 
Let me first state that National Guard support and coordination with DHS and 
the Border Patrol is nothing new. While this new infusion will be on a larger 
scale, the Border patrol has a history of nearly two decades working with National 
Guard units to utilize their unique expertise, manpower, technology and assets in 
support of our mission and as a force multiplier.26 
In fact, recent history witnessed the United States military’s involvement in border 
security operations not only by the National Guard, but by the active duty component as 
well. In response to a growing connection between border security and counter-
narcotics programs in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan signed a National Security 
Decision Directive that simultaneously described drug trafficking as a threat to national 
security and authorized military involvement in combating it.27 In 1989, the military’s 
Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was created to coordinate its expanding support for “the 
anti-drug efforts of border region police agencies, including the Border Patrol.”28 Like 
the Guard, this task force would eventually play an important role in constructing 
physical barriers designed to slow or channel the flow of illegal immigrants. Unlike the 
Guard, JTF-6 also deployed aviation assets and ground troops along the border.29 
Support for the military’s role along the border continued through the 1990s. In 1991, 
key legislation was passed that codified a consensus to allow the Department of Defense 
to support any agency of the federal government with counterdrug responsibilities. 
More noteworthy yet, the legislation opened the way for DoD support to state and local 
government law enforcement agencies in achieving the same ends.30 In 1997, the United 
States House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the deployment of 
10,000 additional troops in support of counterdrug operations along the southwest 
border.31 
Tragedy was to interrupt the final passage of that resolution. On the evening of May 
20, 1997, eighteen-year-old Ezequiel Hernandez was herding goats when he was 
mistakenly shot by the leader of a Marine rifle team that was observing an area of the 
Rio Grande known for its illegal drug trafficking. The Marines were members of JTF-6 
and had been acting in support of the Border Patrol, but had received no civilian law 
enforcement training or briefings on local conditions.32 
The outcry against the tragic occurrence would eventually subside across most of the 
social landscape, but not from the perspective of the military. Returning to its 
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traditional degree of reticence, the Pentagon’s leadership withdrew its armed forces 
from the border and levied new restrictions that would cast the military in a 
predominantly technical-support capacity. In the future, JTF-6 would be re-designated 
Joint Task Force-North and the personnel-intensive, boots-on-the-ground support 
provided by the unit in the 1990s would be replaced along the border with ground 
sensors, radar, airborne platforms, and thermal imagery. Deliberately postured in 
support of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities, the command’s website 
notes that its technological focus has allowed for a reduction in manpower 
requirements.33 But the first, and perhaps most significant, reduction came in terms of 
troops on the ground. 
This would largely characterize the military’s consistent role, for both the active and 
reserve components (including the National Guard) from the time of the tragedy in 
Texas until the calamity of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediate steps were taken to reinforce the 
security of the nation’s borders. Along entries from both north and south, the president 
commanded the deployment of roughly 1,600 National Guard troops for six months to 
support federal border officials.34 New emphasis in maritime and aviation security 
along, within, and through the approaches to our borders became accompanying 
measures to land border security, and were formalized in interagency strategies.35  
In the midst of these events, the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
was established on October 1, 2002 “to provide command and control of Department of 
Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil 
authorities.”36 The new combatant command, primarily responsible for active service 
components’ activities within the domestic confines of the United States, was charged in 
their mission statement to:  
Deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its 
territories and interests within its assigned area of responsibility; and as directed 
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil 
authorities, including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence 
management operations.37 
This mission statement instantly distinguished the new command from its counterparts 
overseas. The first part of the mission was reasonably clear, if ominous. “Deter, prevent 
and defeat” could be realistically expected as part and parcel of a military mission 
anywhere around the globe. The armed forces of the United States identify with this 
language and are fully prepared to do whatever is required to fulfill this mission. But the 
second half of the command’s mission statement (euphemistically referred to across the 
military as the “right of the semicolon” requirement) was less intuitive, and arguably 
more complex than the first. The powerful segue – “as directed by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense” – is indicative of a very measured approach to this part of the 
mission.  Placing the military in support of civil authorities will concurrently place them 
in activities normally conducted and controlled by those authorities. And the closer the 
military comes to controlling civil activities, the less comfortable it finds the mission.   
A SHIFT IN FOCUS: COUNTERDRUG TO COUNTERTERROR 
The military’s directives support its reticence. Civil support is characterized by the 
Department of Defense as granted in response to domestic emergencies and “for 
designated law enforcement and other activities.”38 However, the DoD directive 
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regulating military support to civilian law enforcement agencies specifically prohibits 
the use of the military for interdiction; search and seizure; arrest, apprehension, stop 
and frisk or similar activity; and the use of military personnel in the pursuit of 
individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.39   
As the new structure of NORTHCOM was designed to meet the threat, along with a 
new office in the Department of Defense to oversee it,40 the support mission for the 
military along the border was also changing. JTF-6, as previously noted, was re-
designated JTF-North. This change in designation would mirror a change in focus, away 
from counterdrug operations to counterterror operations. Persistent, legitimate 
concerns over drug trafficking were being overshadowed by revelations of looming 
threats to our north and south. In Canada, as early as 1998, the Special Senate 
Committee on Security and Intelligence labeled the country as  
…a ‘venue of opportunity’ for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise 
funds, purchase arms, and conduct other activities to support their organizations 
and their terrorist activities elsewhere. Most of the international terrorist 
organizations have a presence in Canada. Our geographic location also makes 
Canada a favorite conduit for terrorists wishing to enter the United States, which 
remains the principal target for terrorist attacks worldwide.41 
More recently, the same committee reported that “[a] relatively large number of 
terrorist groups [is] known to be operating in Canada, engaged in fundraising, procuring 
materials, spreading propaganda, recruiting followers and conducting other activities.”42 
To the south, there is growing concern over the opportunities being taken to 
transplant elements of international terrorist organizations among our closest 
neighbors. As early as May 2001, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, former Mexican national 
security adviser and ambassador to the United Nations warned that “Spanish and 
Islamic terrorist groups are using Mexico as a refuge.”43 General James T. Hill, former 
commander of U.S. Southern Command, warned that the U.S. faces a growing risk, both 
from terrorist groups relocating to Latin America and “homegrown” groups originating 
therein. He warned specifically that Hezbollah and groups like it had established bases 
in Latin America, taking advantage of nearly ungovernable areas like the tri-border 
region between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.44 Add to these viable concerns over 
Venezuela’s support to radical Islamic groups,45 and the security concerns surrounding 
the well-being of our people at home continue to grow. 
Unfortunately, as the military and the law enforcement agencies it supports along the 
border have moved on to this new concern, they can ill-afford to leave the old concerns 
behind. As though adding to the population of a snake pit, the arrival of terrorist 
concerns has done nothing to thin out the presence of drug traffickers among the 
cartels. Neither has it had an effect in reducing other organized-crime activities, like 
human trafficking, or diminishing a rise in criminal gang activity immigrating through 
Mexico into the United States. A majority report from the House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security gave voice to these concerns, warning against “the 
triple threat of drug smuggling, illegal and unknown crossers, and rising violence” facing 
communities in the southwest.46 
Criminals involved in this activity have taken on an air of arrogance that should 
further spur the nation’s concerns. The aforementioned House study validates frequent 
reports that the cartels may be literally “outgunning” local law enforcement agencies on 
both sides of the border, possessing military-grade weapons, technologies and 
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intelligence, and their own “paramilitary enforcers.47” The enforcers usually restrict 
their activities to actions against rival factions, but not always. In 2005, just hours after 
being sworn in as Nuevo Laredo’s police chief, Alejandro Dominguez was killed.  
Dominguez came to office on the promise of cracking down on the cartels.48   
This threat across the border should be enough to warrant alarm, but there are 
growing concerns that it cannot be contained there. Violence against U.S. law 
enforcement officials, from the Border Patrol to local law enforcement agencies, is rising 
at an alarming rate. From 2004 to 2005, attacks against Border Patrol agents on the 
Southwest border increased 108 percent. During fiscal year 2006 there were 746 violent 
incidents launched against these agents, including rock assaults, physical assaults, 
vehicle assaults, and firearm assaults. In March 2006, the House Judicial Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims conducted a hearing 
addressing these issues, noting a growing concern over law enforcement agents literally 
being “outmanned and outgunned” by criminal elements.49 In January 2008, a U.S. 
Border Patrol agent was run down and killed near the Imperial Sand Dunes in Southern 
California, by men suspected of drug and alien smuggling.50 And in what is perhaps the 
most blatant disregard for our territorial integrity so far, various cartel elements have 
recently initiated open attacks across our borders – against rival cartel members, 
against former Mexican law enforcement officials who have fled to the United States, 
and even against state and federal law enforcement officials.51 
General Barry R. McCaffrey, former director of the White House Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, commented on the disturbing partnership growing between crime 
and terrorism at the nation’s door. 
These groups are drawn together because of their complementary capabilities.  
Terrorists can create chaotic circumstances that allow for illicit activities.  
Criminal organizations have pre-established networks to move and sell narcotics 
and launder money.52 
To date, the manifestations of this partnership have not taken on a character that would 
call for a military response. However, a recent report from Arizona indicates that a 
future requirement for the same is not beyond reason. Officials at Fort Huachuca, the 
nation’s largest intelligence training center, changed security measures in May of last 
year after being warned that Islamist terrorists, with the paid assistance of Mexican 
drug cartels arranging their entry, were planning an attack against the post.53 The 
plotters, up to sixty in number, were reported to be Afghan and Iraqi terrorists with 
high-powered weapons (including anti-tank missiles, Soviet-era surface-to-air missiles, 
and grenade launchers) smuggled into the United States through tunnels. The FBI 
would not elaborate on investigations surrounding the threat; neither would they 
comment on other reports suggesting the “plot” was a Gulf cartel “plant” to bring in the 
U.S. military against a rival cartel. But an FBI representative did acknowledge that the 
report “demonstrates the cross-pollination that frequently exists between criminal and 
terrorist groups.”54 
The immediacy of genuine defense concerns, as opposed to law enforcement concerns 
along the border, is certainly open to question. Nevertheless, the evolving, intersecting 
threats of organized crime and terrorism, masked by the relentless challenge of illegal 
immigration across our borders, clearly present a dangerous and perplexing set of 
difficulties for federal, state, and local government officials. Law enforcement agencies 
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across all three levels of government have the lead in addressing the difficulties. The 
military has been, and continues to be, in support. But is the current role being played 
by the military – under the current circumstances, against the current threat – 
appropriate?   
Temporary, but Recurring? 
As though hedging bets, all discussion of placing the military in support of border 
security operations in the United States is consistently couched in terms of temporary 
requirements. Such was the case in 2002; such was the case again in 2006. It is clear 
that the current Administration is making an honest effort in re-tooling Customs and 
Border Protection, in terms of both technology and “boots-on-the-ground” to meet the 
broader threat that has emerged since 9/11. The functions that have characterized DoD 
support along the border – communications and logistical support, lending and 
operating detection and sensor systems, augmenting border-related intelligence analysis 
efforts, training, and so forth – are being reflected in the strategic plans of the 
Department of Homeland Security in general and its Customs and Border Protection 
agency in particular. CBP’s strategic plan specifically lays out a strategic objective to 
“maximize border security…through an appropriate balance of personnel, equipment, 
technology, communications capability and tactical infrastructure.”55 Moreover, the 
DHS is clearly intent on putting resources behind their rhetoric, as demonstrated by the 
fact that approximately half of its $5.4 billion information technology budget for 2008 
will go towards developing and modernizing these capabilities.56 Ostensibly, the intent 
is to enable CBP to completely take control of that part of the mission the military has 
served to supplement to date. 
The question is, can we reasonably expect them to do that? 
Is it reasonable, for instance, to expect the Department of Homeland Security to 
duplicate the sensor capabilities that have been introduced in their support during this 
“period of transition?” Is it feasible and/or advisable for them to reproduce the 
communication suites that have supported their operations along the southwest border 
since 2006? Is it fiscally responsible to match the engineer assets that the military has 
introduced in support of the mission over the last few decades…and the maintenance 
capability…and the training capacity? To be sure, DHS has the means and the aptitude 
to address all of these functions to a degree; but does it have enough to meet the 
requirement posed by the threat according to our current assessment? And if it does, or 
shall soon, is it fair to assume that DHS will be able to meet the full evolving 
requirement to meet an evolving threat? 
Is it safe to make that assumption?  
PLANNING FOR THE LONGER TERM AGAINST A VARIABLE THREAT 
I would contend that it is not. The Department of Homeland Security’s current direction 
towards strengthening border security will not, and can never, be the final solution. 
Trying to empower a single federal agency with the ability to solve foreseeable 
challenges in this area is neither feasible, nor advisable. Expecting our military forces to 
continue to “stand in the gap” in their present capacity is also ill-advised, whether 
referring to the federal component – our active duty forces – or the “states militia” 
whose strength resides principally in the National Guard. A closer approximation of a 
solution to the evolving dilemma will begin with the realization that the border 
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challenge must be addressed as a problem that varies with the introduction of a variable 












Figure 1. Variable Scale of Border Protection  
 
 
Experience has taught us that the lower end of that threat is embodied in massive 
numbers of illegal aliens, albeit ones without malicious intent (indeed, a significant 
amount of the nation’s concern in this regard is for the well-being of the aliens 
themselves).57 It is reasonable to assign day-to-day cognizance over that end of the 
threat to Customs and Border Protection, as the clear “lead federal agency”.   
As the threat moves further up the scale, however, we are introduced to an organized 
criminal element which has been seen trafficking both drugs and human beings. At this 
point, one might envision a requirement quite literally calling for greater force. That 
force could begin with a concentration and coordination of other law enforcement 
agencies (federal, state, and local). These would be keyed to their requirement by 
integrated information and intelligence from across the federal interagency. But they 
should also be served by mechanisms designed for intergovernmental intelligence and 
information exchange – up and down the chain between federal, state, and local 
authorities.   
That exchange could also provide warnings and signals at the upper end of our threat 
spectrum, manifested in the aforementioned confluence of organized crime and 
international terrorism. In her study “U.S. Border Enforcement: From Horseback to 
High-Tech,” Deborah Waller Meyers suggests that the difference in responding to the 
variations of the threat at our borders may parallel the difference between border 
control (protection against the illegal entry of people and goods), border safety 
(protection against criminals, violence, smuggling, etc.), and border security (protection 
against terrorists).58 
Responsibility for security at the border, therefore, becomes a shared concern.  
Federal, state, and local government must arrive at a common understanding of what is 
needed to provide an acceptable level of security at the borders, and then determine a 
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package to provide that security that is feasible, affordable, and acceptable to the 
American people. Addressing our variable scale, therefore, begins in the federal 
government with an interagency plan, led by the Department of Homeland Security.  
The impetus for border protection that began with consolidating the nation’s frontline 
border enforcement agencies under Customs and Border Protection must be continued 
to harness the support of other agencies (including but not limited to DoD) that have 
vital roles in meeting the complexities of the task. This will certainly include agencies 
like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
whose traditional roles along both borders provide a background in both information 
and intelligence exchange and law enforcement. Multiple sectors of the intelligence 
community, led by DHS’ own under secretariat for intelligence and analysis, can provide 
for the underpinnings of what the Department of Defense calls an “active, layered 
defense.”59  In turn, they will provide for the security of our borders, ideally well before 
the threat reaches it.  
A stand-alone federal solution, however, will be one doomed to failure. Governor 
Janet Napolitano of Arizona begrudgingly acknowledged as much when she declared: 
States are not responsible for operational control of international borders; 
however, due to the dire situation that exists along the United States-Mexico 
border in Arizona, the state has had to act to preserve the rights and bests 
interests of its citizens.60 
Concerns mirroring those of Governor Napolitano, in Texas, New Mexico, and 
California, led to the memorandum of understanding signed between those states and 
the Department of Defense that served as the foundation for Operation Jump Start.  
Comparable shared concerns between the states of New York, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and the federal government led to similar agreements in the initiation and 
execution of Operation Winter Freeze in 2004.61 
Beyond these operations, a host of evolving mechanisms are being built to strengthen 
cooperative efforts between the three levels of government that could be trained to 
address concerns for border security. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force offices 
located across the country (notably including cells in Phoenix, San Diego, and El Paso) 
could certainly be utilized towards these ends, bringing together representatives not 
only from state and local law enforcement, but agencies like the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and DoD.  Likewise, 
state fusion centers, financially sponsored in their development through grants from the 
Department of Homeland Security, are already serving as principal conduits for 
information exchange.  
The military’s role in the solution set that will be required in this combined 
interagency and intergovernmental solution, while occasionally cumbersome for the 
services, is inescapable.  The expected transition described by the Bush Administration 
as the impetus behind Operation Jump Start may begin to solve the immediate problem 
at the lower end of the variable scale, but it should not be relied upon to address the 
middle and upper dimensions of its concerns. Even assuming CBP receives a significant 
infusion of resources to provide for technological solutions, that infusion will not take 
place overnight. While Operation Jump Start was officially terminated, counterdrug 
operation support is still being provided by our armed forces, Innovative Readiness 
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Training (IRT) from the National Guard remains on the borders,62 and sensor support 
operations from elements of both the active and reserve component remain underway.63  
The equipment and expertise currently being provided by the military will, for at least 
the time being, remain a requirement.   
Moreover, technology can only serve to complement boots-on-the-border; it cannot 
replace them.  Whether focused on interdicting the threat or – more ideally – deterring 
or preventing illegal transit, it is the physical presence of people that will actually 
accomplish the desired function. Again, DHS recognizes this reality and, along with the 
infusion of funds provided for technology along the border, is asking for an increase of 
$442.4 million to hire, train, and equip 2,200 new Border Patrol agents.64 But these 
planned increases will not translate into immediate reinforcement along the borders.  
And, when spread across more than 7,000 miles of border to our north and south, 2,200 
new agents may still project a degree of protection that is exceedingly thin. Therefore – 
even if only addressing the steady-state, lower-end requirement suggested by our 
variable scale – sufficient numbers for accomplishing this mission may only be available 
if the military remains actively engaged.    
Keeping the military engaged and, as necessary, bolstering that engagement, will 
present a series of questions. First, the nation’s leadership must decide which 
component of the military is best suited to address the issue along our variable scale: the 
active duty forces, or the National Guard, or both? Next, it will have to address the 
relative capacity of those forces to take on these responsibilities. Finally, having 
addressed the feasibility of the requirement, the leadership will have to return to the 
question of whether such engagement is advisable and, most importantly, acceptable in 
the eyes of the American people. 
Active Duty Forces  
Recent tradition shows that if an active component organization is involved in domestic 
civil support operations, its role is specialized and its numbers are small. A good 
example is the United States Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response 
Force (CBIRF). The CBIRF’s mission requires it to respond to credible threats of a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive yield incident in order to 
assist local, state, or federal agencies.65 The unit lists an impressive array of capabilities 
to include agent detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel 
decontamination, medical care, and stabilization of contaminated personnel.66  
However, the unit is composed of only 350 personnel and its mission is focused, and 
contained, around CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High 
Explosive Yield) incident response. The United States Northern Command’s Joint Task 
Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) was also designed as a very specialized force, dedicated 
to planning and integrating consequence management support from the Department of 
Defense to civil authorities following a CBRNE incident. However, the task force is 
essentially a command and control entity, without assigned forces or dedicated 
transportation. In the event of a CBRNE crisis, several thousand personnel could be 
attached to JTF-CS by order of the secretary of defense to handle manpower intensive 
requirements alongside the specialized requirements the unit is uniquely qualified to 
fulfill.67 
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 Joint Task Force North, as already noted, is much more directed to matters 
associated with the concerns of this article. The mission statement of the organization 
reiterates its relevance here. 
As directed, Joint Task Force North employs military capabilities to support law 
enforcement agencies and supports interagency synchronization within the 
United States Northern Command area of responsibility in order to deter and 
prevent transnational threats to the homeland.68 
As is the case with much of the current National Guard mission along the southwest 
border, JTF-N has frequently assisted law enforcement efforts by means of detection 
and monitoring missions and by facilitating engineer support. This facilitation is 
brought about by the unit processing and prioritizing requests, and then sourcing those 
requests through appropriate active duty units.69 In addition to these roles, however, the 
task force has played an important part in providing intelligence analysis and 
information sharing with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; other 
federal interagency partners; military units in support (from the active component, the 
service’s reserves, and the National Guard); and (when authorized and appropriate) 
Canadian, Mexican, and other international partners by way of bi-national 
agreements.70 Beyond this support, the task force has a history of conducting 
collaborative planning with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. This 
ability to plan for complex operations, incorporating bi-national, federal, state, and local 
stakeholders, highlights a core competency of the military and continues to prove more 
than beneficial in civil support missions inside and out of the United States. 
Placed reasonably along the variable scale, the role of JTF-N could be seen in support 
of the Border Patrol in interdicting and arresting criminal elements, and intercepting 
and/or deterring the flow of terrorists over the nation’s borders. While very deliberately 
not involved in arrest and apprehension themselves, the task force can support CBP as 
the primary law enforcement agency charged with that responsibility. Truthfully, if 
statutes and regulations were amended to allow JTF-N to join in those more direct 
functions, they are hardly configured to do so. Possessing approximately 150 soldiers, 
the unit’s main contribution is in intelligence and information sharing, and in 
facilitating the introduction of other military forces to accomplish specified ends. 
Perhaps curiously, JTF-N may be the only standing force from the military’s active 
component dedicated to an aspect of land border security. Its ties to the mission are 
indirect, born out of a concern over the illicit flow of drugs across our borders; but the 
evolution of those counterdrug concerns to the newer concerns over counterterrorism 
will no doubt assure the task force’s continued association with the CBP and its partner 
agencies.   
In the meantime, there are other units whose missions could be applied to these 
endeavors, especially as concerns progress from border control, to border safety, to 
border security. The United States Northern Command itself may serve a vital liaison 
function between the militaries of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, ensuring 
transparency and encouraging cooperation through bilateral and multilateral Theater 
Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs). NORTHCOM’s Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) is poised as a deployable command and control 
element about which a Joint Task Force could be quickly configured in response to any 
number of homeland defense scenarios71 – to include scenarios along our borders. Pre-
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designated Quick Response Forces in both the United States Army and the United States 
Marine Corps could rapidly fall in as the key components of those JTFs, if deployed. But 
they are not, nor are they envisioned to be, dedicated forces for those missions. 
The National Guard 
Then again, neither is the National Guard. Operation Jump Start, like the 2002 mission 
conducted in the wake of 9/11, was framed by the Administration as being an anomaly.  
Unless an unexpected turn of events lifts the threat from our borders, however, or a 
remarkable (some would suggest inadvisable) infusion of manpower takes place in the 
Border Patrol, it is likely to be a recurring anomaly. In spite of understandable reticence 
surrounding their use, no force recommends itself better to the mission than the Guard. 
The thing that recommends the Guard most as the military resource of choice in 
support to civil authorities is its traditional relationship with those authorities. 
Recruiting offices across the country remind us of this relationship, an affinity born of 
both empathy and the proximity of the Guard to the people they serve. No one in the 
military is more attuned to the border enforcement, safety, and security challenges 
facing Yuma County, Arizona than the Arizona National Guard; no one in the armed 
forces is more aware of persistent concerns surrounding aliens of interest passing 
through the Swanton sector of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York than their 
Guard. Likewise, no element of the United States military enjoys a closer working 
relationship with state and local government than those who dwell among them, 
exercise with them, and plan to respond to emergencies alongside them – in the 
National Guard.   
Accordingly, logic continues to dictate that if greater forces are needed along the 
border, the Guard is the “go to” solution. The same thought process that calls for closer 
integration between federal, state, and local law enforcement extends easily to 
incorporating the local “state militia” in support of those integrated efforts. By further 
extension, as regional state cooperative efforts like the ones discussed here continue, 
cooperative, collaborative planning between the adjoining states’ National Guard will 
provide a synergy that could “close the seams” between states’ borders while 
simultaneously addressing the larger national border issue.   
While the greatest urgency surrounding border security may exist in the states that 
constitute those borders, the cost for providing that security should not be theirs to bear 
alone. In fact, there are a number of precedents that have been set since 9/11 which 
allow for greater federal support to the states’ immediate concerns. Notable among 
these are measures designed to fund deployment and employment of the National 
Guard in missions which remain under state control. For instance, Title 32 of the United 
States Code has been invoked by the secretary of defense in providing funds for state 
missions that remain under the authority of that state’s governor as “necessary and 
appropriate” in supporting “homeland defense” activities.72 Similarly, the potential 
exists for states’ governors to fund National Guard activities undertaken in state active 
duty status through Department of Homeland Security grant monies.73 Additionally, 
federal funding available to the states via 32 U.S.C. §112 for “drug interdiction and 
counterdrug activities” could logically be extended to a state force whose mission is tied 
to the federal effort to interdict these illicit activities coincident with the general policing 
of the nation’s borders.74  
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Funding issues, however, become secondary when viewed against the greater concern 
of how the National Guard could afford the additional manpower demands implied in a 
recurring border security mission. A partial solution to this more immediate challenge 
to border states is to continue to augment their efforts with National Guard units from 
other states. Doing so would continue the pattern begun in 2002, revisited in Operation 
Winter Freeze, and most recently exhibited in Operation Jump Start.  Officials are quick 
to point out that military readiness was not degraded by the Guard’s participation in 
these endeavors.75 Rather, the Guard’s support has been portrayed as enhancing the 
engaged units’ readiness in engineering, logistics, transportation, aviation, medical, and 
maintenance. Given continued federal funding, and accompanying cooperation among 
the states through the EMAC, this is a mechanism that could be applied to the problem 
for some time.  
One should understand, however, that this is only a partial solution, and one that 
may not be sustainable. Indeed, rising demands, set against existing numbers in the 
Guard, may make sustainability the ultimate “deal breaker” in these discussions. The 
current strain being felt by the National Guard due to its employment at home and 
abroad is well documented. Expecting the Guard to accept an increased burden by way 
of operations along the border amounts to what has been called “a further strain on 
already overextended military resources.”76 What most people fail to realize is that the 
National Guard has taken on these unprecedented demands, escalating from 
deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the late 1990s and on through 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, with historically weakened 
manpower rolls. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Guard was charged with 
making force reductions that have never been recovered. In 1989, the end strength of 
the National Guard stood at 570,000 personnel. Buoyed by the confidence of a “peace 
dividend” yet to be realized, that force has now been reduced by 20 percent to numbers 
that today stand at approximately 456,000, of which 350,000 are Army Guard.77 
Balance this depletion against the comparative operational tempo of the National Guard 
in the last three decades, and the picture becomes bleaker still. In the 1980s, serving 
Guard accounted for approximately 1 million man-days of duty per year. In the 1990s, 
(with a shrinking force), that figure had grown to 12.5 million man-days. In 2003, 
statistics showed that these figures had ballooned to 63 million man-days per year.78 
It is beyond the intent of this article to suggest how many personnel are required to 
effectively secure the borders of the United States. In 2005, the late Representative 
Charlie Norwood (R-GA) sponsored a study that suggested 36,000 National Guard 
and/or authorized “State Defense Forces” would be required to assist the Border Patrol 
in securing the southwest border of the United States.79 At one point before the 
activation of Operation Jump Start, the Administration had planned to deploy 10-
12,000 troops in support of the border patrol, as opposed to the 6,000 that were 
eventually sent.80 Whatever the case, the numbers and the need that inspire them are 
more than appreciable. Combine concerns for the southwest border with the realization 
that our border with Canada is twice its size – and that there are only one-tenth the 
number of border patrol agents there as exist in the southwest to “protect” it – and the 
immensity of the requirement at hand becomes more appreciable still.   
But up until this point we have only examined numbers, without coming to grips with 
how those numbers should be applied. It should be obvious that the 36,000-man 
augmentation envisioned in Congressman Norwood’s study were not intended merely 
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for surveillance, intelligence analysis, or engineering functions. They were intended to 
be postured as the deterrent effect that can only be supplied by boots-on-the-ground, 
standing in the gap, able to interdict and, as necessary, arrest and apprehend the threat 
to our people. They were intended to augment law enforcement agents alongside of 
those agents, occasionally providing peripheral support to their mission, but equally 
prepared to provide direct support to policing requirements. Were the threats we are 
facing still limited to those unintentionally accompanying the “huddled masses yearning 
to breath free,” the necessity for this augmentation would be significantly different.  But 
that is not the case and the nation is obliged to prepare for a greater menace. 
We are faced in the center and upper levels of our variable scale with a requirement 
that fails to fit comfortably in the realm of either law enforcement or national defense.  
Given the adversaries encountered in what has been called the “seam of ambiguity” 
between the two, the best path is to prepare to meet the trials of both environments.  
With all deference to the Department of Homeland Security and especially to their 
Border Patrol agents, it is illogical to expect them to be prepared for an upper-end threat 
that may see them outgunned. Neither is it logical to expect the American public to 
duplicate the assets and capabilities contained in the military to perform a function it 
should be capable of fulfilling. The reticence the armed forces have demonstrated in 
taking on the more direct involvement envisioned here is understandable – but perhaps 
misguided. Beyond the question of technology and manpower, of capabilities and 
numbers, the military requires a new mindset in addressing the border security issue. 
The spirit embedded in the Posse Comitatus Act, and the laws and regulations which 
reflect it, is focused on reiterating and retaining the role of the military of the United 
States as the servant of its people. But the preponderance of the concern along our 
borders does not have to do with the comings and goings of the American people. Our 
concern is over the illegal entry into our country of those who wish to do us harm. The 
nation’s primary defensive focus, as always, remains outward against an external threat 
– but that focus must now begin on the nation’s shorelines and along its territorial 
boundaries. The studied hesitancy of leadership in the Department of Defense should be 
viewed against how quickly border enforcement issues could become border safety 
issues and, finally, reactive issues of national defense. An organization that justifiably 
prides itself on a preemptive mentality should bear no umbrage against employing itself 
as an obstacle to the threats envisioned here. 
There is no doubt that these measures will require a reexamination of statutes, 
policies, and directives. But 9/11 has forced many such reexaminations. Moreover, the 
redirection envisioned here need not automatically alter the traditional relationship 
between America and its military concerning matters of domestic law enforcement. It 
will, however, automatically and exponentially emphasize a message of deterrence along 
our borders and bolster the means of defending those borders should deterrence fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Border security isn’t what it used to be. Over the last three decades our concerns have 
steadily escalated from what was once as much a humanitarian issue as a security issue, 
to concerns over paramilitary violence, organized crime, and international terrorism. 
The requirements to meet these concerns have likewise increased, to the point that 
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anything less than an interagency and intergovernmental response will inevitably leave 
the nation’s citizenry vulnerable to a new and expanding series of threats.   
One would like to think that the new era of threats to the country’s borders and its 
people is a temporary condition and that the nation could soon settle back to a less 
demanding posture of readiness. Unfortunately, reality does not accommodate those 
wishes. The “long war” our leadership forecasts for the nation and our allies cannot be 
expected to remain “over there.” Mr. Craig Duehring, principal deputy assistant 
secretary of defense for reserve affairs, framed the current state of affairs succinctly and 
with candor: 
The nature of the mission has changed because of the Global War on Terrorism.  
The potential danger to our country has increased dramatically. It’s not just a 
story of people looking for a better way of life. It is, in fact, a great potential for 
increased damage to our country, threats to our citizens, to our way of life. That’s 
something that needs to be addressed. We took the border mission for granted 
for too many years, and that’s no longer going to be the case.81 
The new threat portends a new challenge for the military, both active and reserve 
components, from the United States Northern Command through to the individual 
states’ National Guard. It will compel the military to revisit its thinking, motivation, and 
ethos in addressing this particular “law enforcement” requirement. The National Guard 
is by far the best tool to apply to the problem, but to do so must itself be re-tooled – 
principally in terms of numbers, but likewise in its predilection to take on a mission that 
normally resides outside of its traditional “lane.” This should not imply, however, that 
the Guard should be the only military component focused on the problem. As the issue 
of security along the nation’s borders climbs to concerns over protection against 
terrorism, assets and components of the active duty force, under the direction of the 
NORTHCOM, must be folded into the process – first in terms of planning, and then, as 
necessary, in execution of those plans alongside their counterparts in the Guard. This 
coordination in planning and execution will be essential, as the National Guard will 
provide the foundation from which to launch a graduated response, if and when 
required.  
Inevitably, a national strategy, emanating from the same impetus that launched 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives on maritime and aviation security82 will be 
required for the land component of the nation’s border protection. Reason and tradition 
dictate that the Department of Homeland Security take the lead on the development of 
this strategy, with the Department of Defense heavily in support. When DoD’s 
supporting role is portrayed, it should be as a reflection of an operational concept drawn 
up in cooperation and coordination between NORTHCOM and the National Guard 
Bureau. This strategy will require our government to decide from the depth and breadth 
of its capabilities which entities are best postured, best equipped, and best trained to 
meet the trials that lay ahead. Once those means are selected, however, they must come 
with an accompanying commitment from our government to ensure that they are 
sustainable. That sustainability must be measured in terms of equipment, in terms of 
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The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, 




Reviewed by Randy Beardsworth and Theophilos Gemelas 
 
No one should be surprised with the current state of the U.S. border security system. 
After all, it reflects a neglected effort on behalf of the U.S. government to manage its 
border prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and scrambled efforts to patch 
programs and implement new ones shortly after 9/11. It shows what can happen if a 
government does not have a vision for the future. It shows how the government may 
make it harder for terrorists to enter the country but makes it harder for everyone else 
as well. It reflects a government that desperately needs to come to some decision about 
the kind of border security system that is necessary to help it manage the overall 
harmful risks to the nation’s security. And it reflects the tensions between government 
efforts to enforce immigration laws and implement counterterrorism policies, two very 
distinct efforts that need to be separated. 
These conclusions are fairly evident in The Closing of the American Border: 
Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11, by Edward Alden, Bernard L. 
Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A journalist by profession 
(Alden has held several positions at the Financial Times), Alden has captured all of the 
issues pertaining to border security through interviews with senior government officials 
and immigrants that have fallen victim to an imperfect and at times dysfunctional 
system. Alden nicely weaves together debates among the departments of State, Justice, 
and Homeland Security on how to secure borders, effect visa policy, and use 
immigration law to counter terrorists. The book goes on to expose shortcomings in the 
enforcement efforts of the old Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and 
highlights the relationship between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico on 
border control and trade. Amazingly, it is the first book, since that of the 9/11 
Commission, to attempt to examine comprehensively the set of issues and problems 
confronting border security. 
Alden brilliantly frames for the reader the struggles between what he calls the 
“Technocrats” (Chapter 3) and the “Cops” (Chapter 4). The technocrats are those who 
champion the position of taking a risk management approach to border security, 
adhering to constitutional principles and the rule of law, and the appropriate use of 
technology, information, and intelligence for security purposes so that restrictions or 
controls do not impede the free flow of people and commerce. These advocates included 
Tom Ridge, the first assistant to the president for homeland security and the first 
secretary of homeland security. They also included Admiral James Loy, former deputy 
secretary of homeland security, and to some extent former Customs and Border 
Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner. 
On the other side of the debate are the “Cops.” The cops are those who champion the 
use of laws and regulations to potentially head off any terrorist attacks. They include 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft, who advocated for aggressive use of 
immigration laws. For Ashcroft, “If a terrorism suspect committed any legal infraction 
at all, regardless how minor, we would apprehend and charge him” (p. 81). Ashcroft and 
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others interpreted immigration law not as a constitutional protection but as a regulation 
that allowed the government to charge someone suspected of an immigration violation 
and detain him or her without charge almost indefinitely without bond. They believed 
detentions would “help to prevent another attack,” help to intimidate a detainee into 
“cooperating with the government,” or cause a disruption in terrorist plans (p. 84). 
But other cops, most notably Jim Ziglar, former commissioner of the INS, pushed 
back against Ashcroft. They believed that “the aggressive and often indiscriminate use of 
immigration laws and visa rules to keep out foreigners or to punish others on technical 
violations was self-defeating” because it would alienate those groups willing to 
cooperate, anger foreign governments, and waste government resources by trying to 
find the “needle in a haystack” (p. 88). In the end, as Alden notes, the cops’ approach 
blurs the distinction between anti-terrorism enforcement and immigration enforcement. 
For those readers who follow bureaucratic politics, dynamics in organizational 
change, the recent history of immigration and visa policy, or the experiences of 
immigrants and ordinary people traveling to or hoping to work in the United States, 
Alden’s book will not disappoint. Alden gets the insider debates just about right. His 
painstaking interviews and ability to create a broad mosaic from those interviews is 
uncanny. The Closing of the American Border is a superb text for policy makers who 
must wrestle with the challenges of border security and immigration policy.  
If there are shortcomings in the book, they might be with the limited conclusions 
offered by the author. After reading this book, one properly cries out for policy 
prescriptions that start with the need to create a vision for border security. The author 
shares with us the attempt by Tom Ridge and Richard Falkenrath, former deputy 
homeland security advisor to the president, to craft a vision for the future, called “The 
Border of the Future” (p. 137). It was a vision that embraced a “risk-based decision 
making” (pp. 138-139) approach, distinguished between “high-risk and low-risk traffic” 
(p. 139) based on intelligence, cooperation with other governments in developing 
standards and procedures, intelligence information organized and managed to get to 
front-line inspectors in a timely manner, and constant threat assessments.  
As discussed in Alden’s book, we know that vision was criticized and rejected by the 
Cabinet. But this is where the president should have taken a leadership role to push his 
administration to think through a border security strategy rather than just haphazardly 
realigning all of the border security and relevant law enforcement agencies into the 
Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for disaster planning and 
response, protecting the president through the Secret Service and other missions. 
Alden’s book should be required reading for U.S. presidential candidates and those 
eventually charged with executing the border security enterprise. Alden shows what 
happened without a common vision. Alden’s book can show the next president and his 
team that they have an opportunity to learn from history and craft a common vision. 
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Consent, Consumers, and the Constitution 
Philip J. Palin reviews Terror and Consent: The Wars for the 21st Century 
by Philip Bobbitt (Knopf, 2008)  
 
Philip Bobbitt has written another big book full of big ideas. He examines “change in the 
constitutional order – from nation state to market state – and whether that change will 
result in the triumph of states of consent or states of terror” (p. 4). 
      According to Bobbitt there is a troublesome tendency by those in power to patronize 
those they seek to protect. Rather than citizens to be engaged, the American people have 
been treated as consumers to be assuaged. This approach, he argues, only increases our 
vulnerability to terrorism. 
     Bobbitt, professor of jurisprudence at Columbia University, perceives we are in the 
latter days of the constitutional order formed from the Thirty Years War and the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648). Our modern notion of the state emerged from this struggle. “Give 
us power, the (princely) State said, and we will better protect the person…” (p. 86). The 
American and French revolutions accelerated the succession of the princely state to the 
nation state. 
The nation state bases its legitimacy on having undertaken the task of 
maintaining, nurturing, and improving the material conditions of it citizens 
whose equal rights to well-being derive solely from their membership in the 
nation itself. The nation state set itself against the unfettered market.  Nation 
states asserted their legitimacy on the basis of a characteristic claim: give us 
power, they said, and we will improve the material well being of the national 
people (p. 86). 
Twentieth-century nation states battled over different approaches to improving material 
well being. Among the contenders were capitalism, communism, fascism, and socialism. 
But consumerism won.  
We have learned – paradoxically for some – that consumption creates wealth.  
Consumers crave choice. Producing more choices spurs economic creativity. Economic 
creativity delivers more choices and a virtuous (or vicious?) cycle takes hold. This is a 
thesis Bobbitt set out in his previous book, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the 
Course of History (2002, Knopf). 
The insatiable nature of the consumer economy, however, threatens the very 
foundation of states of consent. Consumers are different than citizens. Citizens rally 
together for protection. Consumers compete for differentiation. Consumers want to be 
informed enough to protect themselves, but tend to be annoyed when the “nanny state” 
interferes with their choosing. “Market states say: Give us power and we will give you 
new opportunities” (p. 88). 
We are, according to Bobbitt, in the throes of a profound transition from nation state 
to market state. The turmoil caused by this transition spawns contemporary terrorism. 
Terrorists might be seen as radical citizens who are alarmed by the withering of the 
nation state and the protections it promised.  
These citizens observe the growing influence of consumerism and are repulsed by its 
promises and claims. Where consumers proudly point to expanded opportunities, 
citizens perceive unnecessary – potentially perverse – temptation. While consumers 
pursue material wealth, citizens complain of aesthetic, spiritual, or intellectual poverty. 
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Consumers celebrate their individuality, even as citizens mourn the triumph of 
selfishness and the diminishment of shared community.   
Many of us recognize these contending perceptions in ourselves. There is a lack of 
resolution that causes concern, and Bobbitt argues this concern can be addressed 
through explicit adjustments in the strategy and law of nation states. The antithesis of 
the nation state can be accommodated in a meaningful synthesis of nation state and 
market state. We can be consumers and citizens. But for some citizens such an 
accommodation is seen as an existential threat. They will fight ferociously to combat 
corrupt consumerism, even using the expanded opportunities of the market state to 
craft their own image of the perfect nation state. Bobbitt explains, 
This transition from one constitutional order to another will occur over many 
decades, and there are many forms the market state might take.  If the past is any 
guide, the transition will not be completed without violent conflict.  In the past, 
decades-long epochal wars brought about these transitions. It may be that the 
wars against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein’s regime were the first 
engagements of this new conflict, the epochal war of the market states, the Wars 
against Terror (page 124). 
Bobbitt is confident of the potential benefits to be derived from the market state. But 
that potential could be lost in how we manage the transition and, especially, in how we 
shape our strategy and laws in response to the terrorist threat. These transitional 
periods have always been treacherous. But never before have the tools of reaction and 
resistance been so powerful. 
In earlier centuries, liberationist, secessionist, and other political groups have 
used terror to gain or keep state power… In the twenty-first century terrorism 
presents a different face… The greatest difference, however, will lie in the 
potential combination of a global terror network and access to weapons of mass 
destruction… This looming intersection of an innovative organization and a novel 
means of terror will require a fundamental rethinking of conventional doctrines 
in international security and foreign policy, that is, in strategy and in law (p. 84). 
Bobbitt expects the worst. He expects terrorists to succeed in horrible attacks killing 
thousands and even tens of thousands. He works to persuade us that our only 
meaningful defense is the realism of preparing now for this awful success. Only by 
recognizing our vulnerable reality can we mitigate the impact of the attacks that are 
certain to come. 
     Bobbitt’s mitigation goes far beyond resilient design of critical infrastructure; it is 
focused on resilient design of our constitutional order. He argues for vigorous – some 
will say Draconian – measures of prevention, preparedness, and mitigation. But unlike 
so many making similar arguments he insists these measures must emerge from 
thoughtful, transparent, and principled legislation, executive enforcement, and judicial 
review. We must behave wisely and consistently as a state of consent or – without ever 
intending so – we are likely to end up living in a state of terror. 
The states of consent must develop rules that define what terrorism is, who is a 
terrorist, and what states can lawfully do to fight terrorists and terrorism. Unless 
we do this, we will bring our alliances to ruin as we appear to rampage around the 
world, declaring our enemies to be terrorists and ourselves to be above the law in 
retaliating against them. We will become, in the eyes of others, the supreme 
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rogue states and will have no basis on which to justify our actions other than the 
simple assertion of our power. At the same time, we must preserve our open 
society by careful appreciation of the threat that terror poses to it and not by 
trying to minimize that reality or to appease the sensibilities of people who would 
wish it away… We must do this because an open society depends upon a 
government strong enough and foresighted enough to protect individual rights.  
If we fail to develop these legal standards, we will find we are progressively 
militarizing the domestic environment without having quite realized that we are 
at war. And, when a savage mass strike against us does come, we will react in a 
fury that ultimately does damage to our self-respect, our ideals, and our 
institutions (p. 394). 
Bobbitt’s writing is Talmudic. Depending on the reader’s purpose or taste this might be 
a compliment or a critique. The ellipsis in the quotation above encompasses several legal 
and operational steps that Bobbitt advocates. He builds a case for these specific steps 
with detail that resists easy summary. In this detail Bobbitt invites the reader to join 
him in thinking through the goals, principles, and practicalities of confronting a 
profound threat while preserving our core values. This process of principled dialogue 
leading to shared decisions is a modeling of what he argues must characterize a state of 
consent. 
      Bobbitt’s argument breaks out of the conventional security vs. liberty dilemma. He 
insists we must be prepared for the worst and be tough with a dangerous adversary. But 
we must also hang tough with the Constitution. In particular, we must be transparent in 
our toughness. Consent is meaningful only when it is informed. 
     If Bobbitt was a scriptwriter instead of a lawyer and scholar, his concept pitch would 
have us imagine the love child of Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) on 24 (the Fox 
counterterrorism series) and MacKenzie Allen (Geena Davis) on Commander-in-Chief 
(the ABC series about the first female President). Fight the bastards, but keep the moral 
high ground. James Bond as lead counsel for the ACLU. Rambo as a senior partner in 
the best Fourth Amendment law firm in the nation. 
     Despite the terrorist successes that Bobbitt predicts are ahead, he is equally confident 
that we can – as a society, culture, and constitutional order – survive and thrive. He 
waxes poetic on the potential benefits of the market state if – big if – we prepare 
ourselves for the dark days that will come and remain full-fledged states of consent.   
If they do not lose – if the U.S. and the E.U. endure without compromising the 
basic ethos and practices of consent – they will steadily and surely prevail over 
states of terror that depend upon a climate of fear not only to intimidate other 
states, but to establish their own authority with respect to the persons they seek 
to govern. The states of consent will prevail if they endure because their enemy 
must win. States of terror can maintain themselves in power only by fresh threats 
that, if successfully resisted, steadily erode their legitimacy. States of consent 
don’t need to win; they simply need not to lose.  Indeed for such states, not losing 
amounts to winning.(pp. 182-183). 
Terror and Consent was published in spring 2008. I do not perceive it has yet had the 
impact for which Bobbitt may have hoped. It is easy to blame the 688-page length. But 
that did not discourage readers of the 784-page Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows.  
I wonder if the problem may be Bobbitt’s brave embrace of the tragic.  
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     If the reader is absolutely sure that terrorists will fail in their stated intentions, 
Bobbitt’s thesis unravels. Few of us are so certain. But we are – at least most of us – 
unwilling to accept the full implications of our uncertainty, much less accept Bobbitt’s 
inevitable tragedy. He is sensitive to our state of suspended judgment. Bobbitt appends 
a brief and curious Coda to his main text. His purpose, perhaps, is precisely to address 
our own prayer that this cup might pass from us. 
The deaths and destruction caused by twenty-first century terrorism have thus 
far been negligible compared to those of twentieth century conventional wars.  
We must, however, prepare our defenses, chief of which is our ingenuity and 
adaptability. When we finally determine to take up the Wars against Terror in 
earnest, we will face a threat to mankind that is unprecedented and is potentially 
measureless in its tragedy. Having prepared, however, we will act to preclude 
such tragedies; having acted in time, we will have preserved our liberties despite 
the historic suffering we could not in the end prevent; having protected our 
liberties while enduring such awful pain, we will have prevailed. We must each 





Philip J. Palin is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Strategic Preparedness and co-
author of Catastrophe Preparation and Prevention (McGraw-Hill, 2008). He can be contacted 
at ppalin@nisp.us.  
 
No Longer Trapped in the War on Terror: Harold & Kumar 
Escape From Guantanamo Bay 
 
Directed by Jon Hurwitz and Hayden Schlossberg  
(New Line Cinema, 2008) 
 





Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay, Theatrical Poster 
   
 
Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay, the recent film from directors Jon 
Hurwitz and Hayden Schlossberg, is an unlikely candidate to be considered a prophetic 
commentary on American culture. It is, simply put, a terrible movie. With a ridiculous 
storyline, poor editing, extremely crude humor, weak dialogue, and the world’s worst 
President George W. Bush impersonation, it would be easy to dismiss this film as just 
another stoner movie that glorifies sex and drugs (preferably experienced at the same 
time). Despite these flaws, it is worth taking a moment to consider what this film means 
in the broader historical narrative of cultural change following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and how it may reflect public perception of homeland security.  This 
movie represents a significant step forward in our attempt to escape from the “war on 
terror” that has overshadowed American culture for the past seven years. Building upon 
the classic theme of buddies on a road trip, Hurwitz and Schlossberg have written and 
directed a movie that could only be created several years after September 11, 2001. 
Although the movie repeatedly departs from reality for the sake of a laugh, it is critical 
that viewers recognize this absurdity for what it ultimately represents: a cathartic 
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release from what Ian Lustick has characterized in his book Trapped in the War on 
Terror as “a specter that haunts America – the specter of terrorism.”1    
Escape from Guantanamo Bay is a sequel to Hurwitz and Schlossberg’s previous film 
Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle, in which viewers were introduced to Harold Lee 
(John Cho) and Kumar Patel (Kal Penn), two best friends who get the munchies after 
smoking marijuana and decide nothing but White Castle hamburgers will satisfy their 
cravings. A madcap adventure ensues and, through occasionally brilliant and often 
raunchy humor, the viewer is challenged to reconsider racial and social stereotypes 
while the pair goes on their quest.    
Now back from White Castle, the buddies decide to go to Amsterdam to track down 
the love of Harold’s life, Maria (Paula Garcés), and to take advantage of that city’s 
tolerant drug culture. At the airport, Kumar discovers that his ex-girlfriend Vanessa 
(Daneel Harris) is about to marry Colton Graham (Eric Winter) – the son of Texas 
aristocracy with connections to the Bush family.    
From this point on, Hurwitz and Schlossberg invite us to join them in a complete 
departure from reality. To fully appreciate this flight of fancy, it is useful for the reader 
to pause for a moment and recall American culture following September 11, 2001.  
Immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush gave notice to the 
American public that they were no longer safe:  
The American people need to know that we're facing a different enemy 
than we have ever faced.  This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard 
for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, 
runs for cover.2   
American society experienced a disturbing new feeling of vulnerability that led to a 
public expectation the federal government would respond to this susceptibility as a 
national security matter. The government’s solution was to declare “a war against 
terror,” both domestically and internationally. Military action abroad was accompanied 
by increased security measures domestically.  
This sense of an enemy lurking in the shadows or living amongst American 
neighborhoods as part of a sleeper cell waiting to be activated resonates throughout 
popular culture. In best-selling novels and prime-time television shows, terrorists 
(almost always of Middle Eastern descent) plot and carry out dastardly deeds to strike a 
blow against America. But there is also a sense of fear regarding our own government – 
what is it doing in secret places with secret things? When the government is not 
forthcoming about its methodology – perhaps out of a legitimate need to maintain 
secrecy – people go to the darkest places of their minds and imagine what could be 
going on. The result is an image of the Department of Homeland Security as an 
Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ government agency.  
Hurwitz and Schlossberg builds upon post-9/11 “war on terror” stereotypes to create 
the basic narrative for a film that is completely detached from the real governmental 
efforts to fight terrorism. Due to their non-Caucasian appearance (Harold is of South 
Korean descent and Kumar of Indian descent) and a mistaken belief that Kumar’s 
marijuana bong is a bomb set to explode mid-flight, Harold and Kumar are suspected of 
being Middle-Eastern terrorists trying to blow up their plane on its way to Amsterdam. 
The plane immediately returns to the United States where Harold and Kumar are met by 
a maniac deputy secretary of Homeland Security (Rob Corddry) who gives them a 
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graphic demonstration of what he thinks of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights and then 





Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Ron Fox (Rob Corddry) interviewing Harold 
(John Cho, left) and  Kumar (Kal Penn, right)3 
 
 
After narrowly escaping from a “meat sandwich” delivered by prison guards who appear 
to have trained in the backwoods where Deliverance was filmed, the pair hitches a ride 
back to the United States with a group of illegal migrant Cuban boat-people. Harold and 
Kumar spend the rest of the movie trying to outrun Homeland Security, evade white 
supremacists, and survive the mushroom-induced delusions of Neil Patrick Harris 
(playing a spoof of himself), in a cross-country trip from Miami to Texas. In Texas, 
Harold and Kumar hope their well-connected friend Colton, about to marry Kumar’s ex-
girlfriend, can use his political connections to convince the government they are not 
terrorists.  
Harold and Kumar ultimately find themselves – literally – falling into the Texas 
ranch of President George W. Bush. Much to their astonishment, President Bush offers 
them some of his “stash” of marijuana and confirms what some might have always 
suspected: while you cannot trust the government, it helps to have friends in high places 
within the government. After a presidential pardon, Harold and Kumar are free to 
rescue Vanessa from the back-stabbing Colton, find Maria, and gallivant through 
Amsterdam, high on both love and drugs.  
Following 9/11, American citizens had a decision to make. Despite the threat 
advisories and increased security measures, President Bush called upon the public to 
not give in to an atmosphere of fear. By going forward with routine activities such as 
“playing, worshipping at churches and synagogues, and mosques, going to movies and 
to baseball games,” Americans will be doing their part to “not give the power of fear to 
the terrorists.”4 And yet, according to Randall Larson in his book Our Own Worst 
Enemy, during the six years following 9/11 Americans have failed to change the way we 
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think about security.5 We have worried too much and about the wrong things, leading to 
a culture of fear that has us imagining threats more destructive than the damage 
terrorists are likely to inflict on us and our society.6 This has created a homeland 
security paradox: while Americans are not expected to ignore the threat, we are 
encouraged to go about our daily lives despite the threat. 
If popular culture serves as a reflection of public concerns on a continuing basis, then 
this film demonstrates that terrorism may no longer hold the tight grip it once did on 
American society. There appears to be a growing gap, as Jack Goldsmith describes, 
between “the government’s view of the terror threat and what it thinks must be done to 
stop it, and the public’s view of the matter.”7 Immediately following 9/11, Hollywood 
adjusted storylines and delayed movie releases in an abundance of caution so as not to 
offend public sensibilities.8 In recent years, lampooning the actions of the government 
to “increase” our security or questioning the wisdom of curtailing civil liberties in 
furtherance of the “greater good,” has become tolerable and profitable. With this film, 
Hurwitz and Schlossberg have combined homeland security and terrorism themes with 
slapstick and jokes about bodily functions to create a film that appeals to the lowest 
common denominator of American culture. While we may not remember much about 
this film, we should mark its release as a clear indication that the trap has been sprung 








MPAA rating: Rated R (for strong crude and sexual content, graphic nudity, pervasive 
language and drug use). 
Running time: 1:42. 
Opening: April 25, 2008. 
Starring: John Cho (Harold), Kal Penn (Kumar), Rob Corddry (Ron Fox), Roger Bart (Dr. 
Beecher) and Neil Patrick Harris (as himself). 
Written and directed by: Jon Hurwitz and Hayden Schlossberg; photographed by Daryn 
Okada; edited by Jeff Freeman; music by George S. Clinton; production design by Tony 
Fanning; produced by Greg Shapiro and Nathan Kahane. A New Line Cinema release. 
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Letter to the Editor 
Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security? 
 
Dear Dr. Bellavita: 
 
Thank you for your intriguing article “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland 
Security?” in the June edition of Homeland Security Affairs. Your use of an “ecosystem” 
to capture the plethora of homeland security definitions was innovative and helpful.  
I served in the Department of Homeland Security from 2005 until recently as the 
chief of staff to the director of Office of Operations Coordination (Ops). The primary role 
of the Office is to coordinate interagency operations and planning in support of the 
Secretary. From my view the challenges and confusion over the definitions and 
interpretations of homeland security that you described are accurate. Your observation 
that “semantic entities struggle for resources to sustain themselves” is great inside-the-
beltway insight! 
While working for DHS I often found myself in the position of describing the purpose 
and the role of the department to audiences of other federal, state, private, and public 
sector audiences. My pitch went something like this: 
Defining the Role of Secretary:  The secretary of the department has four primary roles: 
•  Carry out the president’s policies. 
•  Execute the laws passed by Congress. 
•  Manage the agencies within his/her department. 
•  Coordinate federal operations to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks and other man-made/natural disasters.   
The first three roles could apply to any cabinet-level secretary; it is the last bullet that 
differentiates the role of the DHS Secretary and, I would argue, was the primary reason 
why the department was created.   
Defining Homeland Security: How you define homeland security may be a case of where 
you stand is what you see (or what you believe). To a fire chief and other first 
responders, homeland security may mean federal grant money to purchase new radios 
or emergency response equipment; to a CEO of a major corporation it may mean 
implementing increased security regulations (perhaps with an adverse impact on the 
bottom line); to a governor or mayor it may mean access to classified threat information 
from the intelligence community. How DHS and the federal government meet the needs 
and interests of homeland security partners defines their level of satisfaction with the 
department and commitment toward “homeland security” (which is often viewed as a 
“federal” program). Curiously, I found that among “homeland security partners” there is 
little discussion or appreciation of the “C” word: Coordination.  
Coordination, Prevention, Protection, Response, and Recovery: The DHS coordination 
role is a common thread that runs through the 2002 Homeland Security Act, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) and the Homeland Security National 
Strategy. Each document, either implicitly or explicitly, emphasizes the coordination 
role of the secretary as the principle federal official for domestic incident management.   
Prevent What? Prevent terrorist attacks. This is primarily an intelligence and law 
enforcement function. The National Counter-Terrorism Center coordinates intelligence 
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from the FBI, CIA, and other members of the national intelligence and law enforcement 
community. The role of DHS is to disseminate threat information and to coordinate 
operational responses to mitigate the threat. The threat to the British airlines in 2006 is 
a good example of how intelligence information was disseminated to the public and 
private sectors and how TSA worked with airlines to put in place operational responses 
to counter the threat (in this case liquid explosives that could be concealed as legitimate 
personal products).  
Protect What? Protect critical infrastructure and people from terrorist attacks and 
man-made/natural disasters through a coordinated planning and exercise effort. Given 
that 85+ percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, 
and that the protection and safety of most citizens is a local law enforcement and 
emergency response/management function, the federal government’s role, as outlined 
in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), “National Preparedness,” 
describes how the “federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, 
including prevention.” Recent changes to HSPD-8 include a planning framework that 
will be the first step in coordinating and synchronizing strategic, operational, and 
tactical level plans across all levels of government. Protection and prevention are also 
enhanced through grant programs and active participation of homeland security 
partners in national and local exercise and training programs.   
Respond to What? Respond to natural and man-made disasters (including terrorist 
attacks). We are all very familiar with FEMA’s vital role in emergency management in 
response to hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and other natural disasters. However the 
secretary’s HSPD-5 role as the domestic incident manager is more inclusive. A year ago, 
in response to a report of a possible outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease among 
livestock imported into the U.S., DHS – operating under its HSPD-5 authority – 
coordinated the interagency planning and operational response among the Departments 
of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, the White House and other federal 
agencies. The livestock turned out to be ill with another less-serious disease; 
nonetheless this and other recent cases have demonstrated that while all forms of 
emergency management are part of incident management, not all incident management 
responses involve participation from the emergency response and management 
community.  
Recover from What? Recover from short- and long-term consequences. Experience 
has shown that recovery from another Katrina-size event will take years. The creation of 
the Gulf Coast Recovery Office suggests that permanent or semi-permanent institutions 
to manage long-term issues related to housing, benefits, and mitigation might become 
the norm. In the latest Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercise, participants dealt with the 
long-term radiation effects from “dirty bombs” detonated in urban areas. Participants 
found that long-term recovery will involve significant coordination, not only within DHS 
but also among Department of Energy, Housing and Urban Development, state, local 
(perhaps international partners), and the scientific community 
 
It is true that “Homeland Security is not the same thing as the Department of 
Homeland Security.” But it is also true that that DHS, other federal, state, local, and 
tribal governments, and the private sector, in exercising their authorities and interests, 
conduct homeland security functions As we continue to better understand the 
authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the “homeland security community,” one day 
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the meaning of “homeland security” may become intuitively obvious to all. Until then I 
applaud you for making the discussion more than just a war of words. 




Vero Beach, FL 
 
June 26, 2008 
 
 
Letter to the Editor 
National Intelligence Strike Teams 
 
Dear Editor,  
 
I am in full agreement with Adam Crowe’s article “National Strike Teams: An 
Alternative to Low Probability, High Consequence Events.” In fact I believe that the 
organization of strike teams should be extended to intelligence collection teams 
originating at the local level. 
Homeland security since 9/11 has evolved around first responders and their reaction 
to hazards, catastrophes, and terrorist threats. The effort has lacked support for law 
enforcement training in terrorism counteraction. A terrorist attack when it comes will 
affect the local level first, followed by the state and national level organizations. The gap 
remains where it is needed most: at the local law enforcement level.  
The RAND Corporation recently published a paper authored by Seth G. Jones and 
Martin C. Libicki on “How Terrorist Organizations Come to an End.” The evidence in 
the Rand study shows that active terrorist groups since 1968 through 2006 have come to 
an end by different means: (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and 
intelligence arrested or killed key members. Military forces have rarely been the primary 
reason for the end of terrorist groups and few groups within this time frame achieved 
victory. 
Terrorist groups, be they foreign or domestic, have been defeated by diligent and 
dedicated police work. In all cases it has required a well-trained police force and 
intelligence-gathering organizations which eventually led to the arrest or deaths of those 
involved in acts of terrorism. At present the local police departments have not been 
trained in the gathering of intelligence through a network of agents specifically designed 
to counter the terrorist threat. In order to fill this need it is important and necessary to 
develop a well-trained group of law enforcement officers at the local level to establish 
police departments’ Intelligence Strike Teams (IST) to identify terrorist activity and 
those involved in such efforts. Since all the ports of entry are now protected from illegal 
entry it is safe to assume that terrorists will attempt to enter the country surreptitiously 
by other means, i.e. crossing the border illegally, entering the country with third country 
passports, and/or gaining legal entry under false pretenses, perhaps as students or as 
business associates of third country business groups. This will limit the number of 
foreign agents entering the country and will give rise to the “home grown” terrorist 
group(s).   
 Countering this threat will require a group of law enforcement officers designated as 
Intelligence Strike Teams (IST), selected from each major center of the target 
population area. For example let’s assume that on the west coast the largest target 
population is in Los Angeles and the surrounding area. Officers from each of the 
departments in the Los Angeles area would work with the Los Angeles Police 
Department Intelligence Strike Team.  All information/intelligence would be processed 
and coordinated from the offices of the LAPD and disseminated within the police 
departments in that area as required. The LAPD operating team would process the 
information and send the information to a coordinating center like Denver where a 
National Intelligence Strike Team would process the information/intelligence and 
disseminate it nationally. Each team would work independently but coordinate 
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information through the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) processing 
center in its area. This allows each department to work autonomously within its area 
and as a part of a larger effort.  
The most important part of this system will be the training and implementation of the 
police departments’ Intelligence Strike Teams. The team will engage in developing 
sources; coordinating with target population leaders and establishing community ties; 
proselytizing business owners who sell whatever dangerous materials a terrorist group 
would look to buy.  The training will consist of human intelligence collection, to include 
source operations; training and evaluating Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources and 
documents for exploitation; interrogations, debriefings, and elicitations for positive 
intelligence and information; counterintelligence; and force protection operations, 
including liaisons with counterintelligence sources.  Also, they must train to prepare and 
edit intelligence and administrative reports, analyze intelligence using HUMINT 
communications and reporting equipment, and perform briefings as necessary. The 
objective is to identify agents operating in the target population community and any 
enemy combatants operating within the community. 
The IST will be assigned to specific areas, i.e. West Coast, East Coast, South Atlantic 
States, Southern States, Midwest, and Western States area to coordinate within their 
area the efforts of the IST and DHS and its national agencies. The funding for the police 
departments’ Intelligence Strike Teams should come from the DHS budget and the 
training made available through each National Intelligence Strike Team.  The IST will 
also utilize the support of their department’s armed teams, i.e. SWAT and supported by 
whatever other national armed strike resources are needed. The key to the program is 
the individual autonomy of each team and the training which will prepare the individual 
officer of each team in HUMINT collection.  The IST will be the first to come into any 
kind of contact with the threat. Through its net of established agents it will know if there 
are any strangers in the community; become aware of any new vehicles and tenants; and 
any new activity in the neighborhood. The agents will also report strangers in areas of 
the neighborhood. 
The establishment of the NIST will provide the fastest alarm, and also build goodwill 
in the target population by enlisting their help in a war against terrorism. The defeat of 
terrorism consists of efficient policing of America’s borders; the preparation for the 
aftermath of a terrorist act and the implementation of Local Intelligence Strike Teams to 
counter terrorism at its operational level within the boundaries of the continental 
United States.  The IST and NIST will be America’s first line of defense against the home 
grown terrorist groups which will emerge given the success of our international counter-
terrorism efforts. 
 
CWO Zacharias Fuentes 
U.S. Army Retired 
August 28, 2008 
